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This thesis examines the proposition that terrorism is a form of war. To do this,
this paper first analyzes warfare in terms of what it is and how it functions. This is
done by surveying classical military thinkers such as Thucydides, Sun Tzu, Machiavelli,
von Clausewitz, and Liddell Hart, to name just a few. This provides an understanding
not only of the nature and purpose of war, but of the basic immutable principles under
which it operates. These offer a means to construct a paradigm with which terrorism
can be tested to determine whether or not it is a form of war. Once the constant
elements of war are analyzed and understood, the variable factors are then examined.
Here, the study focuses upon the evolution of war. highlighting what changes and why.
From this, it is possible to understand not only why terrorism came into being but the
environment in which it operates as well.
The second part of this study begins with an analysis of the terroristic method of
force employment, followed by an examination of seven major types of terrorism to
determine which, if any, qualify as a form of war. These include: psychotic, criminal,
mystical, revolutionary, repression, militaiy and state sponsored terrorism. Of these,
three are found to qualify as a form of war — miUtar\', revolutionary', and state
sponsored.
These three types of terrorism are then analyzed as forms of warfare in terms of
how they employ force, as well as to what end that force is used. What becomes
apparent is that not only does this terroristic force operate in the same basic manner as
that employed in traditional warfare, it has the same basic capabilities and weaknesses
of classical military force. This is significant because it suggests that countervailing
strategies must be based upon classical principles of war and combat. These general
countervailing strategic guidelines are presented in the final part of this work.
The significance of this study, then, is that it determines that terrorism, or certain
types of terrorism, are indeed a form of war. Moreover, these not only have the same
end but operate m essentially the same manner as the more classical or traditional
forms of warfare. Consequently, the only proper means to neutralize these forms of
terrorism is to treat them as a form of war and apply mihtar}' force against them in





I. GENERAL INTRODUCTION 9
A. OVERVIEW 9
B. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 12
n. WAR: FORCE, POWER, AND POLITICS 13
A. INTRODUCTION 13
B. THE APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF WAR 14
C. THE TECHNOLOGICAL APPROACH 18
D. VON CLAUSEWITZ ON THE PURPOSE OF WAR 22
E. SUMMATION 24
III. FORCE: THE PRIMARY ELEMENT OF WAR 25
A. INTRODUCTION 25
B. FORCE AND POWER 25
C. PHYSICAL FORCE, MORAL FORCE AND COMBAT
POWER 28
D. MILITARY ORGANIZATION AND MORAL FORCE 32
E. WEAPON SYSTEMS: THE INSTRUMENTS OF FORCE 38
F. SUMMATION 42
IV. THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR: FACTORS GOVERNING THE
USE OF FORCE IN WAR 44
A. INTRODUCTION 44
B. FIVE MAJOR PRINCIPLES OF WAR 44
C. THE SEVEN PRINCIPLES OF COMBAT 56
D. SUMMATION: THE THREE TEST CRITERION OF
WARFARE 62
V. VARIABLE ELEMENTS AND FACTORS IN WAR 64
A. INTRODUCTION 64
B. TYPES OF WAR 64
C. THE EVOLUTION OF MODERN WARFARE 70
1. The Dialectical Process in the Evolution of War 71
2. The Five Warskills of Modern Warfare 73
3. The Evolutionary Phases of Modern Warfare 76
D. SOCIAL WARFARE 97
L Social Warfare Before the Nuclear Era 97




B. DEFINING TERRORISM 108
C. HOW TERRORISM FUNCTIONS 113
D. SUMMATION 123
VII. APOLITICAL TERRORISM 125
A. INTRODUCTION 125
B. PSYCHOTIC TERRORISM 125
C CRIMINAL TERRORISM 129
D. MYSTICAL TERRORISM 131
E. SUMMATION 134
VIII. REVOLUTIONARY TERRORISM 135
A. INTRODUCTION 135
B. THE ROLE OF TERRORISM IN THE
REVOLUTIONARY PROCESS 135
C. REVOLUTIONARY TERRORISM -- A FORM OF WAR? 156
D. SUMMATION 162
IX. STATE TERRORISM 164
A. INTRODUCTION 164
B. REPRESSION TERRORISM 165
C. MILITARY TERRORISM 172
D. STATE SPONSORED TERRORISM 182
1. Types of State Sponsored Terrorism 183
2. International Terrorism 186
3. Analyzing State Sponsored Terrorism as a Form of War 189
E. SUMMATION 193
X. COUNTERTERRORISM: CONCLUSIONS AND
COUNTERMEASURES 195
A. INTRODUCTION 195
B. WHAT IS TO BE DONE? 197
1. Countering Revolutionary Terrorism 199
2. Countering State Sponsored Terrorism 210
C. SUMMATION 219
XI. CONCLUSION . 221
BIBLIOGRAPHY .230
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 245
LIST OF TABLES
1. VOX DER GOLTZ MATRIX 56
2. PRINCIPLES OF COMBAT 58
3. CATEGORIES OF WARFARE 69
4. THE EVOLUTION OF MODERN WARFARE 75
5. THE COMPONENT PARTS OF THE STATE . 98
6. THORNTON'S FOUR LEVELS OF RESPONSE TO TERROR 117
7. HOW TERRORISM FUNCTIONS 118
S. INDIRECT TERRORISM 119
9. THORNTON'S FIVE STAGES OF REVOLUTION 137
10. STAGES OF REVOLUTIONARY MOBILIZATION 13S
I. GENERAL INTRODUCTIOiN
A. OVERVIEW
Tliis study seeks to answer the question, is terrorism a form of war?
Unfortunately, there is no simple answer to this simple question. First, we must come
to terms with the two phenomena that are being compared. That is, we must
determine what is "war" and what is "terrorism". Moreover, great care must be taken
in order not to create a simple tautology; i.e., definition 'W equals defmition T' and
therefore the two are equivalent. In order to avoid tliis pitfall, the present study has
approached both phenomena from two basic perspectives: 1) how they employ force
and 2) to what end they employ force. Thus, if it can be shown that terrorism and
warfare function in the same manner, and seek the same basic ends, it is safe to
conclude they are equivalent.
War, however, is a highly complex phenomenon. Although everyone believes
they know it when they see it, coming up with a workable academic definition of what
v/ar is and how it functions is no simple task. Indeed, simple definitions are fraught
with arbitrary limitations which have no bearing in the real world o[ human endeavor.
For instance, were we to say that war is simply the employment of one state's miihtary
instrument against another state, where does that leave revolutionary or civil wars?
Equally important, what, then, were the conilicts between peoples -- such as primitive
hunter-gathering or nomadic societies -- whose political structures had not yet
developed to a le\el in which an entity defined as the state existed? Clearly, then.
simple definitions must be carefully analyzed and validated before being accepted as an
academically sound means to test whether war and terrorism are equivalent concepts.
As a consequence, the first three chapters following this introduction have been
employed in coming to terms with v/hat war truly is. These chapters seek to uncover
certain basic and immutable factors which govern not only the purpose of war but how
it functions as well. Moreover, these factors are gleaned by analyzing the opinions and
writings of classical irdlitary thinkers to establish common ground on the nature and
function of war. This, in turn, is combined with modern academic and military
concepts of war and what emerges is a very sound, relatively smiple common
denominator with which to test terrorism.
Chapter Two is dedicated to isolating the purpose of war. It entails a brief
examination of the four major schools of thought on warfare and then a more in-depth
analysis of the tecknological approach which will serve as the main -- although not the
only — method this study will use to examine warfare. Following this is an
examination of the opinions of the great classical militar}' tiiinkers on war. These
include: Sun Tzu, Thucydides, MachiaveUi, and von Clausewitz to name just a few.
This will provide the reader with a basic foundation and understanding of what the
present study considers to be warfare. Finally, Chapter Two will conclude by
summarizing the common end to which all wars are aimed, providing the first major
criteria by which to test terrorism.
The third and fourth chapters examine how warfare functions; or, to be more
precise how force functions in war. Chapter Three will introduce and analyze the
psychological and moral factors governing the use offeree in war while Chapter F^ai
will examine force from a physical perspective; identifying the basic principles which
govern how force functions against force on the physical plane. Naturally, each of
these chapters vml afford an additional means by which to test terrorismi.
The second major problem in determining whether war and terrorism are
equivalent is that both phenomena, although based upon immutable principles and
laws, are highly variable entities subject both to the exigencies of the environment in
which they operate as well as by the incredible variety of ends men seek to achieve
through their use. Chapter Five introduces the variable factors in war by a somewhat
lengthy but necessary expedient of discussing the types of war as well as those elem.ents
and processes which have governed the evolution of war m the modern epoch. This
will entail a brief examination of each evolutionan.' phase of modern warfare
highlighting those elements and factors unique to it as well as identifying the
characteristics each phase in the evolution has given to its successor(s). Finally, this
chapter will analyse a specific type of war -- social warfare -- in which terrorism plays a
major role. The importance of this chapter also devolves from the fact that it provides
an understanding not only of the conditions permitting the use of terroristic methods,
but also provides insight into possible means for combating terrorism. This latter
factor will become particularly useful in the final chapter of this study which discusses
counterterrorism and prescriptive methods.
After having read through Chapter Five the reader will have a thorough
understanding of the present study's position on the function and nature o\^ war, as
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well as the basic means by which terrorism is to be tested. In the sixth chapter, the
phenomenon of terrorism per se is introduced. Here again the term must be defined,
but not in a way which is too siniplestic or valid only for one of the many
manifestations of this phenomenon. Consequently, the definition proferred is one
com.bining the opinions and positions of many of the most notable experts on the
subject, including: J. Bow}'er Bell, Martha Crenshaw, Walter Laquer, Brian Jenkins,
among many others. Again, a simple definition is not relied upon to isolate so
complex a concept as terrorism, but an analysis of how it employs force is also made.
In this way, a common position on what terrorism is and how it functions is presented,
providing a basic means for identifying this activity as it appears in its numerous and
variable forms.
These variable forms are presented in Chapters Seven, Eight and Nine. In each
chapter a basic type of terrorism is introduced and each subtype, if any, is presented,
analyzed and tested against the parameters for war introduced in the first section of
this study. Chapter Seven deals exclusively with the so-called apolitical forms of
terrorism, including: psychotic, criminal, and mystical. Chapter Eight examines
revolutionan.' terrorism and includes an analysis of the role this form of terrorism plays
in the revolutionary mobilization process as well as determines if it qualifies as a form
of war. In chapter Nine, tiiree forms of state terrorism are introduced. These include
repression terrorism, military terrorism and state sponsored terrorism. Following an
analysis of how each of these types of state terrorism employ terroristic force, a
determination as to whether they represent a form of war will also be made.
Chapter Ten is an analysis of the prescriptive miCthods and countermeasures
necessary to neutralize the terrorist threat. As will be seen, only by treating those
forms of terrorism that qualify as a form of war as warfare, subject to all of the
principles of war and combat, can efiective terrorist countermeasures be identified and
implemented.
The importance of this study is based on several factors. First, it provides
substantive evidence to confirm the widely held behef that terrorism - or at least some
types of it -- are indeed a form of war. Secondly, armed with this understanding,
appropriate responses to the types of terrorism that are warfare become not only more
apparent but. once clearly identified, can be carried out more elTectivcly. Finally, at
present tliere exists very little exhaustive research into terrorism as a military- as
opposed to a general political phenomenon. While it would be wrong to suggest that
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the current study is an exhaustive study of the militan.' aspects of terrorism, it is the
sincere hope by the author that this study represent at least a step toward closing this
academic gap. This author freely acknowledges that he undertook a great deal in too
short a time to do any true justice to the subject at hand. Consequently he asks the
academic community to accept the present work as a less than totally polished product
that he and others may build upon. Indeed, if this study serves to stim.ulate any
further research or discussion of terrorism as a form of war. its purpose will have been
fulfilled.
3. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
As the computer program with which I am^ currently writing this study has no
ability to create a section entitled Preface without adding an entirely new chapter to
this already long work. I would like to take a few moments here to acknowledge those
without whom this study would not be possible. First. I owe a great debt to my
graduate professors at the University of South Carolina, but especially to Professor
Peter Sederberg who initially encouraged me to pursue this subject. Secondly I am
greatly indebted to two authors whose works provide both insight and inspiration.
First is Theda Skocpol whose book, States and Social Revolutions gave me an
understanding of the structural approach to political science providhig me with an
entirely new way in which to perceive the world and man's actions in it. Equally
important is Colonel Harry Summers whose book. On Strategy taught me that it is not
enough for a soldier to be professionally competent in term.s of technical expertise,
management and leadership, but that he; she also has a scholastic duty as well.
Thirdly, this study would never have been completed without the patient, learned
feedback and guidance from my fellow students and professors at Naval Postgraduate
School. Finally, of course, I acknowledge the support, advise, and encouragement
provided by my wife, Donna Dare to whom this paper is dedicated.
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II. WAR: FORCE, POWER, AND POLITICS
A. INTRODUCTION
War is a highly specialized activity having characteristics common with other
forms of human intercourse, but combined in a unique manner. The first characteristic
is, of course, its reliance upon lethal force as its primary means. This, in itself, is
certainly not unique. Many other form.s of human activity also deal with lethal force
such as: criminal activity, capital punishment, suicide, abortion and euthanasia.
Clearly, these lie outside the pale of war. What makes war war, then, is not its reliance
upon lethal force, but how it uses this force and to what end. This study seeks to
identify the unique manner in which warfare combines these factors and thereby
provide a m.eans by which to measure whether certain types of terrorism are a form of
war. That is to say, if it can be established that war represents a unique combination
of factors or characteristics regarding how and why lethal force is employed, and if it
can be established that these same factors or characteristics are present in a certain
type of terrorism, then it is safe to assume the tv^'o -- war and terrorism -- are
equivalent.
This chapter seeks to identify the first of these characteristics germane to all
forms of war, namely: to identify to what end lethal force is employed in war. This will
provide the first element of the paradigm by which this study will measure war. To do
this it is first necessary to have a basic understanding of the four basic approaches to
the study of war in order to be aware of the different theories on the courses and
purpose of warfare. Particularly important to the first section is determining the
similarities between the four approaches, especially regarding the utility of force in the
struggle for power. The second section will then focus upon the approach which, for
the most part will govern this study's analysis of war. This is the technological
approach which is based primarily upon the works of classical mihtary thinkers whose
expertise includes not only the function of war per se, but how force functions in war
in particular. The third section will then isolate the purpose of force in war --
providing the first means by which to test whether certain types of terrorism are also a
form of war.
B. THE APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF WAR
According to Quincy Wright in his work, A Study of War, there are four basic
approaches to the study of this phenomenon: ideological, psychological, sociological
and technological.^ Each approach suggest that war is caused by a different motive.
What this section will show is that these motives are not mutually exclusive and, more
importantly, at the highest level of abstraction; all perceive war to be caused by the
same motive — the quest for power. This is clearly recognized by the technological
approach which essentially accepts the other three approaches as being valid but
unable to stand alone. For this, and reasons that will be discussed later, the
technological approach will provide the primarv' perspective of war throughout this
paper.
The ideological approach is the oldest approach to the study of war and is
normative in its conception of warfare. Early writers of this school believed wars were
caused by injustices^ or they believed war to simply be a facet of the human condition,
hke language or sex, and not the creation of man.' Later writers and thinkers of this
approach emphasize the role of war as an instrument of justice or authority and are
primarily concerned with whether it is waged with, by, and for legitimate means and
ends.^ In the Calvinist ethic for example, "The state was ordained by God [to use war]
not only to protect the good and punish the bad, but also support the true religion."^
This essentially was a spin off of the Catholic tradition initiated by St. Augustine in the
fourth century which asserted that "...war was permissible to promote peace, that is
order and justice, provided the war v/as initiated by a proper authority and ...that
authority had found peaceful procedures inadequate.'
^Qumcy Wright, A Study of War. 2 vols. (Chicago: The University of Chicago
Press, 1941) p. 423?
-The City of God, Book XXII (Post-Xicene Latin Father. Early Christian Primers,
ed., G.P. Fischer, p. 130) As quoted in Wright, p. 431.
"Barrie Paskins and Michael Dockrill, The Ethics of War (Minneapolis: The
University of Minnesota Press, 1979) p. 109.
'^Wright, op. cit., Table 63, p. 678.
'^Ibid., p. 49.
^'Roland H, Bainton, Christian Attitudes Toward War and Peace: A Historical
Survey and Critical P.e-evaluation (New York: Abingdon Press, 1960) p. 145.
"^Wright, op. cit., p. 886.
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Although man now recognizes he has "more rational" reasons for going to war,
the ideological approach still plays a ver\' major role in miobilizing a populace for war.
Virtually every nation goes to war convinced that they are right, that the war is just
and God is on their side. During World War II America went to war to "make the
world safe for democracy." Even today, the Soviet Union has gone to great lengths in
its political and military doctrine to differentiate between just and unjust wars. To the
USSR, just wars are limited to those that aid the forces of socialism or are waged in
defense of the Soviet Union. ^ All other wars are, by their definition unjust.
The basic weakness in this approach derives from the fact that being normative,
it generally ends up describing what "should be," rather than "what is." Secondly, all
normative approaches suffer form being subject to interpretation. Hence, one man's
holy war is another's war of repression and aggression.
The psychological approach essentially perceives war from a behavioral
perspective in which experts "...take as their point of departure the behavior of
individuals, and from this they draw inferences [to] the behavior of the species."^ In
other words, it sees cultures as being simply "...abstractions of psychological elements
in aggregates of human beings. "-^"^ Consequently, this approach perceives war to be
caused by the personal motives of individuals who band together to satiate specific
personal desires by the use of force against an "out group." War begins in the minds
of men for the purpose of serving the goals of individual actors which are then
translated to a broader scale.
The basic weakness of this approach is that war is an organized, group activity
that includes organizations having dynamics of their own which do not lend themselves
to explanations based upon individual human behavior patterns. While it provides
useful insights regarding the human element as a catalyst for war, it cannot, for
instance, explain why, as happened during World War I, Britain v/ent to war with
Germany because Austria invaded Serbia. ' '
^Pvichard F. Staar, USSR Foreign Policies After Detente (Stanford, California:
Hoover Institution Press, 1985) p. 112.
Robert L. Pfaltzgraff and James Doherty, Contending Theories of International
Relations: A Comprehensive Survey (New York: Harper & Row, 1981) p. 140.
^^Wright, op. cit., p. 1233.
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This question is easily answered by the Sociological approach, which is basically
a systems-theor\' approach to the study of war. This approach perceives war to be but
one of many interactions between and within political systems. War, like any
interaction, may be usefiil in maintaining or regulating a political system, such as that
manifested in the "balance of power" which governed the 19th century European state
system. It can also be useful in transforming a political system, which is the purpose
of those who foment a revolutionarv' or civil war. Using this system-theory approach it
is easy to understand how Britain became engaged in a war with Germany because of
Austrian aggression. Britain wanted to maintain status quo in the interstate system
while Gennany and Austria wanted to modify it. The ultimate result was the First
World War.
This is not to denigrate -- much less totally eliminate — the role of human I .ings
in causing and fighting wars. The Sociological approach emphasizes, however, that
"Any valid explanation of revolution [or war] depends upon the analyst's rising above
the viewpoints of the participants to find important regularities across given historical
instances...". According to Gordon Wood, "...it is not that men's motives are
unimportant; they indeed make events ...but the purpose of men ...are so numerous, so
varied, and so contradictory that their complex interaction produces results no one
intended or could even foresee." ^^
Despite the fact this approach provides a ver\' good understanding of how war
can maintain, regulate or change social and political systems it, like the ideological and
psychological approaches, has great difficulty in explaining how wars are fought. That
is, they cannot explain why one side chooses a certain tactic or why the armed forces
are employed in a certain way. For answers to questions such as these, it is necessary'
to use the technological approach.
As Quincy Wright notes, "The technological approach is usually exemplified by
the attitude of professional mihtary men and diplomats, in writing on strategy and
diplomacy ...[and] conceives [of] war as the use of regulated violence for political
ends." ' It is an approach comfortably shared by such "realist" thinkers as Thomas
Theda Skocpol, States ami Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of
Finance, Russia and China (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983) p. 18.
'"Gordon Wood, "The American Revolution," Revolutions: A Comparative Study,
edited by Lawrence Kaplan, (Nev/ York: Vintage Books, 1973) p. 129. As quoted in
Skocpol, Ibid., p. 18.
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Hobbes, Francis Bacon, Niccolo Machiavelli. Carl von Clausewitz and Kans
Morgenthau.^"*" It is also the priman/ -- although not the only -- approach this study
will use to investigate war and terrorism.
There are three basic reasons why the technological approach will predominate
throughout this study. First, the study proposes to establish that terrorism is a form of
war based upon its manipulation offeree to meet political objectives, which is the basis
of the technological approach. Second, the technological approach incorporates
elements from each of the other three approaches, which can be applied when
necessary and appropriate. Finally, the technological approach is the only one that
adequately describes how and why wars are fought the way they are. All of these
factors make the technological approach more versatile and accurate in its depiction of
warfare.
Although the three previously-mentioned approaches appear to focus on a
different cause of war, at the most abstract level, they are actually identifying the same
basic cause as the technological approach — the struggle for power. Whether one
wishes to correct an injustice, satiate the goals of individual actors, or change the
status quo within a given political or social system, power is an essential element when
opposition is met. Furthermore, the side enjoying the greater power will determine the
outcome. As will be shown later, having greater power does not necessarily mean
having the most physical force -- otherwise it would be impossible for terrorism to exist
- but force is the dynamic element of power, and it is by properly applying force that
determines which side has the greater power. The key point here is that whether the
objectives have ideological, psychological, or sociological roots, force has utility in
securing and/ or defending them.
The utility of force is readily seen in both the writings of Machiavelli and von
Clausewitz. In The Prince, Machiavelli admonishes "... the ruler to keep in mind the
preservation of his power depend[s] upon military strength."^^ Von Clausewitz is even
^^Wright, op. cit., p. 423.
For more on the realist perspective see Machiavelli, The Prince or Discourses
Also see Thomas Hobbes, Elements of Law, Natural and Political and Leviathan. To
gain an understanding on the realist perspective on warfare, see von Clausewitz. On
War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton: Princeton
University Press. 1976).
^Feiix Gilbert, "Machiavelli: The Renaissance of the Art of War," Makers of
Modern Strategy: Military Thought From Machiavelli to Hitler, edited by Edward M,
Earle (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1943; Princeton Paperback Printing,
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more specific. He states, "The decision by [force] is ...in war what cash payment is in
comm.erce."^^ Force, then, is the ultimate arbiter in the struggle for power; and this
struggle is the prhnar/ cause of war. The adherents to the technological approach
perceive a Hobbesian international system which is "...characterized by an absence of
elTective institutionalized constraints on the use of force by its members...".^' As
Thomas Hobbes put it in his work. Leviaihan:
In all times kings and persons of sovereign authority, because of their
independency, are in continual jealousies, and in the state and posture of
gladiators: having their weapons pointed, and their eyes fixed on one another --
that is, their forts, garrisons, and guns on the frontiers of their kingdoms -- and
continual spies upon their neighbors; which is a posture of war ... {\V)here there
is no common power, there is no law. no injustice. Force and fraud are in war
cardinal virtues. ^^
International relations are consequently punctuated by wars resulting from the
continuous struggle between the constituent parts. It is a social system wherein force
and power are useful both in achieving political goals and defending against the
demands and incursions of others. But while this clearly identifies the cause of war. it
does not adequately identify what makes war a phenomenon unique form all other
forms q'l human endeavor. For this, the specific characteristics of warfare must be
identified and war must be precisely defined.
C. THE TECHNOLOGICAL APPROACH
The technological approach rests upon scientific methodology. That is, it begins
"...with the concrete and objective evidence of the senses and attempts to create from
[this], logical structures capable of predicting events in the future and practical
techniques [or fundamentals] capable of controlling them."^^ This scientific realism
permits war to be logically analyzed to discern not only what causes war but how it
functions. Furthermore, it makes possible the ability to identify the special
1973) p. 3.
^^Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and
Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976) p. 97.
K.J. Holsti, International Politics: A Framework for Analysis (Englewood Cliffs,
New Jersey: Prentice-Mall. Inc.. 1983) p. 270.
'^Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan. XXII, p. 65. As quoted in Will and Ariel Durant.
The Story of Civilization, vol. 8. The Age of Louis XIV (New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1963) p. 555.
^^Wright, op. cit., p. 426.
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characierisiics germane to all types of warfare. These characteristics will be described
in this section.
The scientific methodology o[ the technological approach fmds early roots in the
classic Greek and Roman histories of Thucydides, Polybius, and Livw. Thucydides
began writing his histories on the Peloponnesian Wars in the 5th centurv- B.C. It is in
these essays that he proposes "... that in the order of human nature, future events
would resemble those which had occurred."-^^ In other words, there is a pattern to
histOH/'. Furthermore, Thucydides also believed that human nature is constant and
that the pattern of "...history will reveal the springs of human behavior.""^ Finally.
Thucydides believed that human conflict was due to the motives of fear, greed and
ambition. '^^
What Thucydides is suggesting, is that since there is a pattern to historv', it is
possible to analyze its course by careful observation and reasoning. Upon close
examination he found that wars were essentiallv caused bv human motives, which
further suggests that war must serve some useful purpose in satisfying hum.an desires,
including those to be free from fear, and to satiate greed and ambition. Although his
ideas were lost during the Dark Ages, his careful recording of historical events enabled
thinkers and writers of the Renaissance to once again ponder and "discover" basic
factors of histon.' and human nature.
While Thucydides was writing his histories, a Chinese philosopher named Sun
Tzu began writing his treatise The An of War. In it, he revealed "...an understanding
of the political and philosophical fundamentals so sound and enlighting as to warrant
serious study by scholars and soldiers today."^-^ Sun Tzu's basic premise can be found
in the opening verse of his work: "The art of war is of vital importance to the state. "'"^
As Samuel 3. Griffith points out in his excellent translation of Sun Tzu, "Here is
recognition -- and for the first time -- that armed strife is not a transitory aberration,
but a recurrent, conscious act and therefore susceptible to rational analysis."-^ Griffith
* Thucydides, The Peloponnesian Wars, translated by Benjamin Jowett, revised
and abridged by P.A. Brunt (New York: Washington Square Press, 1963) p. XXIX.
^^Ibid.
^^Ibid., p. XXX.
"•R. Ernest Dupuy and Trevor N. Dupuy, The Encyclopedia of Military History:
From 3500 to the Present (New York: Marper & Row Publishers. 1970) p. 19.
" Sun Tzu, The Art of War, edited and translated by Samuel B. Griffith (London:
Oxford University Press, 1963; Oxford University Press Paperback, 1971) p. 63.
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continues,
By relating war to the immediate political context, that is to alliances or lack of
them, and to unity and stability on the home front and high morale in the army
contrasted with disunity in the enemy country and low morale in his army, Sun
Tzu attempted to estabUsh a realistic basis for relative power."'^
This was Renaissance-thinking five centuries before Christ. Furthermore, Sun
Tzu understood war to be an intrinsic element of politics. First, he deemed national
unity to be essential to military' victory.^' Second, he proposed that war was not an
end in itself, but rather a means to an end. When discussing how a war should be
waged. Sun Tzu stated that a wise general "...creates conditions certain to produce a
quick decision; for him victory is the object of war, not lengthy operations however
brilliantly conducted."^^ This is essentially an appeal to the militar\' commander to
subordinate his military objectives and operations to the political objective for which
the war is being waged.
Despite having been published in the West as early as 1772,^^ the works of Sun
Tzu were to remain relatively obscure until the early 20th century. It was not until Sir
Basil Liddell Hart was introduced to Sun Tzu in 1927 that the Chinese philosopher was
incorporated into any major Western military writings. Liddell Hart was extremely
impressed with Sun Tzu, crediting him with having "...in ...one short book... embodied
almost as much about the fundamentals of strategy and tactics as [Hart] had covered in
more than twenty books. "^^
Niccolo Machiavelli is generally considered the first modem military' thinker to
see war in a way similar to Sun Tzu. Like Sun Tzu, Machiavelli saw war as an
organized, recurring, premeditated act that could be subjected to rational analysis. ^^ As
a Renaissance thinker, Machiavelli based his views on war upon the belief that behind







^HVright, op. cit., p. 426.
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logical deduction, could be discovered and applied to daily life.^^ Machiavelli sought to
support his theories by carefully studying the events of the past. He was particularly
inspired by the classical histories of Thucydides, Livy and Polybius and the military'
handbooks of Caesar, Frontinus and Vegetiusr^
Although the principles of war will be discussed in detail later in this paper, it is
important to note some of the more salient observations made by Machiavelli. First,
he noted the importance of morale and cohesion in achieving victory.^'* Additionally,
he emphasized the central importance of the battle to warfare, and contended that in
war a state should apply all possible force available to it. Perhaps MachiaveUi's most
profound observation derived from the classical histories was that political power is
based upon mihtary power rather than the size of its treasury, pointing out that gold
only became political power if it could be transformed into military strength."'"
Machiavelli was to have a major impact upon the 19th and 20th centur}' military
thinkers. Quincy Wright goes so far as to credit Machiavelli with influencing "...a huge
literature ...of books on strategy and power politics such as those by von Clausewitz,
Jomini, Mahan and von Der Goltz."^^ Each of these writers have in turn affected
others, such as Liddell Hart, J.F.C. Fuller, John Keegan and Generals Patton, von
Moltke, Guderian, Rommel and von Schlieffen, to name a few.
As a member of the technological school, it should come as no surprise that von
Clausewitz perceived war from a Machiavellian perspective. Like Machiavelli, von
Clausewitz sought to ascertain and precisely defme the recurring, immutable laws
governing warfare.
^^Gilbert, op. cit., p. 23.
^^Wright, op. cit., p. 427.
^^Gilbert, op. cit.. p. 18.
Ibid., p. 14. This idea was quite revolutionary at the time when Italian wars
were fought with Condottieri (mercenaries) who often engaged in day-long battles in
which only one or two men were killed. Because waging war was a service each
Captain of a Condottieri company provided, and because the individual soldier was the
"working capital" of said companies, losses were kept to an absolute minimum with
battlefield maneuvers often deciding the victor.
^^Ibid., p. 15.
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D. VON CLAUSEWITZ ON THE i^'URPOSE OF WAR
For von Clausewitz. the purpose of war is isolated in the phrase, "War is an act
of force to compel our enemy to do our will."-^' This defmition, standing alone, could
apply to the full spectrum of violent human interaction, from individual persons -- say
in a barroom brawl -- to alliances of nations. Von Clausewitz quickly narrows this
defmition with his famous maxim, "War is the continuation of policy by other
means. "'^ Here we see he is referring to political entities, not merely individuals.
Hence, war is the employment of force by a political entity sufficient to compel another
political entity to m.eet a political goal or objective.
The beauty of this definition stems form the fact it is free of any normative
concepts. War exists when a political entity attempts to compel an enemy by force -
irrespective of whether this force complies with regulatory laws created by man or
meets a specific juridical uermition. Man's law is an artificial construct. It is not an
immutable law, such as the law of physics, and hence man's law may be (and often is)
ignored or broken. The principles of war, on the other hand, apply whether man
recognizes them, or not. They apply whenever war exists and, therefore, are not
considered normative.
This is not to infer that man's law has no impact on war from a policy, strategic,
or tactical perspective. Wars are often limited by the normative values of man, but
these values are effective only if all the belligerents adhere to them and. most
especially, if they do not confront the principles and laws governing the use of violent
force in war. As von Clausewitz noted.
Kind-hearted people might of course think there was some ingenious way to
disarm or defeat an enemy without so much bloodshed ...pleasant as this sounds,
it is a fallacy ...war is such a dangerous business that the mistakes [coming] from
kindness are the very worst. The maximum use of force is in no way
incompatible with the simultaneous use of the intellect. If one side uses force
without compunction, undeterred by bloodshed ...while the other side refrains,
the first will gain the upper hand. That side will force the other to follow suit;
each will drive its opponent toward extremes, and the only limiting factor are the
counterpoises inherent in [the laws and principles of] war.




' ^ We might conclude from von Clausewitz's line of logic that the limitations on
force imposed by the normative laws of man will give way if the situation is desperate
for the political entities engaged and neither side is quickly victorious. Put in less
tautological form: war becomes less subject to nonnative restrictions as desperation
grows for one or all the political entities involved, and if the war is not ended quickly.
Another very important factor in understanding the purpose of war from the
Clausewitzian perspective is his definition of force. Using only von Clausewitz's
definition of war as stated above, it is possible to conceive of economic or diplomatic
"warfare" as is often suggested by sociologists, psychologists, and even som^e political
scientists. '^'^ Von Clausewitz conceded that commerce and diplomacy were much like
warfare. But as he quickly points out. the simple struggle of interests is not war. He
states, "War is a clash between major interests, which is resolved by bloodshed -- that
is the only way in which it differs from other conflicts. ""^^ He goes on to state that,
Physical force, therefore, is the specific means of war, and it would be absurd to
introduce into the philosophy of war ...a 'principle of moderation'. Our
opponent will comply with our will if 'either he is ... disarmed or placed in such
a position that he is threatened with being disarmed'. '^^
In effect, force is the means of war and imposing our will on the enemy its
object. It is important to note here von Clausewitz's notion that political objectives
may be obtained in two ways: disarming the enemy or threatening to do so. What
von Clausewitz is doing by presenting these alternatives is differentiating between
physical and moral force. These will be dealt with in greater detail in Chapter Three
and is critical to our understanding terrorism as warfare. Whereas it is intuitiveiv
obvious that a disarmed enemy must submit to the victor's will, it is less apparent why
an enemy would submit if he still retains the means to resist. Yet, as will be
established below, virtually no war has been fought until one side is totally defenseless.
^Stephen Withey and Daniel Katz, "The Social Psychology of Human Conflict,"
The Nature of Human Conflict, edited by Elton B. McNeil (Englewood Cliffs, New
Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965) p. 65.
^^Von Clausewitz, op. cit., p. 149.
H. Rothfels, "Clausewitz," Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from
Machiavelli to Hitler, op. cit., p. 102
Von Clausewitz, op. cit., p. 85.
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We may conclude, then, that war, at its most basic level, is simply a clash of wills
between two political entities. Although the physical force will determined the type
and scale of the war, it is the will to fight that determines when the war begins and
ends. It is this human element which takes war out of the realm of the pure physical
science and permits the very weak to engage the ver^' strong in war. Otherwise,
terrorism could not exist.
E. SUMMATION
In summary, war is the result of the struggle for power between contending
parties. Power is sought because it has the ability to compel one's opponent to do
one's will. And force is used because it has utility in compelling and because there is
no higher authority than a decision made by force. War is also a conscious, recurring,
organized phenomenon, capable of being observed and ratio'^^'^' analyzed
(Thucydides, Sun Tzu). It is a transitor\' phenomenon which is only employed until a
given objective is reached (Sun Tzu). It is purposeful, goal oriented activity
inextricably linked to politics (Sun Tzu, Machiavelli). Moreover, it difiers from all
other forms of human conflict in that it involves death or the threat of death (von
Clausewitz). Above all. it is a clash of wills between contending parties (von
Clausewitz). Consequently, our definition of war for the remainder of this study is:
War is an act of lethal force between organized political entities for the purpose of
achieving political goals by compelling an enemy to modify or surrender his own
political objectives through weakening or destroying his will to resist.
This, then, is the first means by which we will test the types of terrorism to
determined which are not forms of war. It will narrow the field and help us better
focus m later chapters upon those types of terrorism that still remain.
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III. FORCE: THE PRIMARY ELEMENT OF WAR
A. INTRODUCTION
All warfare, regardless of when it is waged or the form it takes, rests upon a
single, indispensible element -- force. As noted earlier, it is force that separates
economic or diplomatic conflicts from warfare. But how, exactly, does force function in
war. It is this question that this chapter will answer. In so doing it will explore how
force becomes power and how force operates simultaneously on the physical as well as
the psychological plane. Furthermore, this chapter will examine the instruments of
force in war which include its weapon systems and military organization. Particular
emphasis will be placed upon the will to fight or 'moral force' as a prerequisite for the
creation and maintenance of cohesive mihtary units. This, in turn, will provide a better
understanding of precisely how terrorism functions as a weapon of war by establishing
how it can break down the political and social cohesion of a targeted political entity.
Finally, this chapter will add to the criteria this study will use to determine which types
of terrorism can be rejected as not being a form of war.
B. FORCE AND POWER
Force and power are not equivalent concepts. Clearly, force is a necessary
element of power, but the amount of force available to a political entity does not
necessarily indicate the amount of power it has. Japan and Saudi Arabia, for example,
enjoy considerable power in the international milieu despite the fact that both are
military pygmies. Moreover, the Vatican or scores of international corporations such
as Du Pont or Exxon enjoy a great amount of power despite having no mihtary --
force generating -- capability at all. We must conclude, therefore, that power involves
more than mere physical force.
Arleigh Burke, the former Chief of Naval Operations, argues that power is made
up of three essential components: force and persuasion, which are actually two
extremes along the same continuum of human interaction, and influence which lies
somewhere in between. To Burke, force compels a nation (or other political entity) by
removing any alternatives. The target must comply or cease to exist. Persuasion, on
the other hand, becomes power by presenting "... ideas so attractively that they not
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only seem valid intellectually but also induce a desired type of response. ""*'' He
continues.
The term 'influence' connotes the forms of power between pure force and pure
persuasion. Behavior is neither 'forced' nor is it determined by dispassionate
persuasion. Rather, the power that exercises influence obtains the desired
behavior by controlling the choices available to the 'influenced', [that is] ... the
possessor of power can add further advantage to the type of behavior desired [or]
he can ... impose additional sanctions upon the types of undesirable behavior. "^"^
The most important thing to note here is that with the use of influence or
persuasion the target can choose whether or not to comply, and,' or to what degree. By
employing ybrc^ the choice is removed unless the target can counter in kind.
Edward Luttwak would agree with this analysis to a point in that he also
perceives force to be a component of power, although only from a static perspective.
In dynamic terms, however, "... force and power are not analogous at all, but they are,
in a sense, opposites. One is an input and the other output, and efficiency requires the
minimization of the former [force] and the maximization of the latter [pov/er].""^^ He
points out that force works ...
by direct apphcation on the field of battle or in active (non-combat) deployment.
[But] ... force also works indirectly (i.e., politically) since its mere presence -- if
recognized -- may deter or compel. But the direct suasion [sic] of force, though
undoubtedly a political rather than a physical phenomenon, occurs only in the
narrowest 'tactical' dimension.'^'
Luttwak further contends that force-in-operation is basically analogous to a
physical phenomenon, equivalent to the concept of mechanical force in Newtonian
physics. "Both are consumed in application; both wane over distance to a degree that
is dependent on the means of conveyance or the medium of transmission..."."^^
'^^Arleigh Burke, "Power and Peace," Peace and War in the Modern Age:
Premises, Myths and R.ealities, edited by Frank R. Barnett, William C. Mott, and John
C. Xeff (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1965; Anchor Books
edition, 1965) p. 19.
"^^Ibid., p. 20.
Edward N. Luttwak, The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire: From the First
Century A.D. to the Third (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press. 1976;




Consequently, military force, like mechanical Force, can only be used in one place at
any given time, becomes weaker as it disperses, and weakens with distance and use.
This we may call kinetic force.
On the other hand, power, according to Luttwak, is not subject to Newtonian
physical laws. This is because power is not so much the ability to employ force as it is
a perception process on the part of the target group. Power exists when the target
group perceives the power-wielder has the ability to punish or reward and then acts
upon those perceptions. In this manner, then, power is a subjective perception, and
may be described as potential force. Luttwak describes it this way,
Perceived power does not diminish with distance, for it is not a physical
phenomenon. For the same reason, perceived power is not consumed by use.
One client king or ten can perceive the same undivided power in the empire and
can be influenced by it. Nor is the quantum of this power diminished when the
obedience of a further dozen kings is secured ... by contrast, force applied to one
sector to impose tranquility on one restless tribe is unavailable for use against
another, any increase in the number of targets diminishes the amount of force
that can be used against each.
So power is not merely the amount of physical force available to the power-
wielder, but rather the perception by the target group that the power-wielder can grant
rewards or issue punishments. Ultimately, however, power rests upon force. If one of
the target groups no longer perceive the power-wielder to be able or willing to use
force, that target group will probably become less and less influenced by that power-
wielder. If this happens, the power-wielder may attempt to use rewards or economic
sanctions to bring the rebellious group back in line with the power-wielder's policy
goals " but this leaves the decision up to the target group. The target group may
simply reject all methods of influence attempted by the power-wielders. At this point,
the power-wielding entity must decide whether to 'let this one go' -- with the probable
result that the other weaker target groups controlled by the power-wielder will no
longer perceive it to have sufficient power to warrant continued deference -- or the
power-wielder can resort to punitive means involving force. The element of force, if
applied successfully, will remove any alternatives the target group may have considered
and will result in that groups compliance once again with the power-wielder's will. In
short, force becomes power when it affects the target group's will and perceptions. We
'^^Ibid., p. 197.
^°Ibid., p. 198.
see, then, that the ultimate utility of force lies in its fundamental role in the exercise of
power.
What should be quite apparent at this point is that an entity may exert power far
and away more influential than the amount of force that entity may control. This
returns to the notion posited by von Clausewitz earlier that physical capabilities are far
less important than moral forces in affecting the will. Understanding this relationship
between force and power is absolutely essential if one is to grasp how terrorism
functions.
C. PHYSICAL FORCE, MORAL FORCE AND COMBAT POWER
In the last section it was argued that physical force became power when the
target group perceived they had no alternative but to comply with the powcr-wielder's
will. Implicit in this ai gument is that the target group regains or maintains its freedom
of action if it is able to negate the power-wielder's force. This, of course, means the
target group must have its own means to resist; that is, its own physical force sufficient
to neutralize the influence of the power-wielder's physical force. And, when both sides
employ physical force for the purpose of securing or retaining political objectives, a
state of war exists.
Since wars are violent physical struggles, it stands to reason that the side
enjoying greater physical force will always emerge victorious. If we measure physical
force in terms of the size of the armed forces and the quality of its equipment, then
determining which side will win an armed conflict can be reduced to a simple
mathematical formula. Yet histor\' is replete with examples of physically weaker
militar}' powers defeating stronger ones. What can account for this apparent
contradiction?
As was suggested by Luttwak in the last section, force and power are not
equivalent. It is the perception of the recipient of that force which converts it from
physical force to power. It is the same in combat. Physical force becomes combat
power when the recipient's actions are influenced by that force. This can occur in two
ways. First, it can occur on the physical plane where the physical force physically
disables the enemy making it impossible for him to continue to fight -- whether he
wants to or not. Second, it can occur on the psychological plane where physical force
demoralizes the enemy making him unwilling to fight, even though he still has the
means to do so. As will be shown, victory generally goes to the side that is able to
demoralize the enemy first — regardless of the overall numerical ratio of physical forces.
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If the enemy's will to fight has been destroyed, no amount of physical force can change
the equation. Physical force is inert unless it is animated by the will to use it.
For the purpose of this study, the 'vu/// to fighi' will be called moral force. Moral
force represents the ability to resist demoralization and to initiate and sustain combat
in the face of great personal danger. The elements of moral force are nebulous and
much more difficult to quantify than the elements of physical force. In his book,
Fighting Power, Martin van Creveid identifies the elements of moral force, which he
calls "fighting power," as being "... discipline and cohesion, morale and initiative,
courage and toughness, the willingness to fight and the readiness, if necessary, to
die."^^ The greater these elements the less vulnerable an armed force will be to
demoralization. Moral force, then, is critical in determining the combat power of any
belligerent.
Wars are seldom lost by the total exhaustion of the elements of physical force on
one side, but from the collapse and loss of moral force. The very fact that virtually all
battles result in the capture of healthy combatants along with perfectly functional
equipment serves as a testament to the proposition that physical force is a factor in
war only as long as it remains animated by moral force. Indeed, most militar}'
commanders strategists and students of warfare credit moral force with being of far
greater importance to victory than physical force. Military studies are replete with
arguments supporting this contention.
The great 18th century military commander Maurice de Saxe believed, "The
human heart is the starting point in all matters pertaining to war.""' This was echoed
almost a centur\' later by Napoleon Bonaparte's famous maxim "In war the moral is to
the physical as three is to one."^- And von Clausewitz put it this way, "one might say
that the physical seem little more than the wooden hilt, while moral factors are the
precious metal, the real weapon.. .".^'^ Reflecting the earlier contention that war is.
above all, a clash of wills, the French militar}^ thinker Ardant du Picq suggested that,
"In battle, two moral forces, even more than two material forces, are in conflict. The
' Martin van Creveid, Fighting Power: German and U.S. Army Performance,
1939-1945 (Westport Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1982) p. 3.
^"Maurice de Saxe, Mes Reveries (1732) As quoted in Robert D. Heinl, Jr.,
Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations (Annapohs, Maryland: The United States
Naval Institute, 1985) p. 196.
^^Sir Basil Liddell Hart, Strategy (New York: Praeger Publishers, Inc., 1968) p.
24. Quoting Napoleon Bonaparte.
Carl von Clausewitz. op. cit., p. 185.
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victor has often lost ...more [physical forces] than the vanquished.... Moral effect
inspires fear. Fear must be transformed into terror in order to conquer...". Even Sir
Basil Liddeli Hart, who admonishes his reader to remember that. "... the strongest will
is of little use ... inside a dead body,"^^ concedes that of the two, moral factors enjoy
predominance in all militarv' decisions."''' And these are but a handful of the discussions
by military' thinkers and strategists on the superiority of moral over physical force.
The reason moral force enjoys such predominance over physical force can easily
be seen by examining how physical force actually functions on the battlefield. As
mentioned earlier physical force is manifested in combat by disabling the enemy, that
is, by destroying or damaging his means to fight and by killing, wounding or capturing
the enemy's combatants. But again, this is physical force being applied in strictly a
physical sense. Physical force confronts physical force until one or the other is totally
expended. In combat, however, the total annihilation of one of the contending forces
is a relatively rare phenomenon, since the combatants on the losing side usually
perceive what is happening long before the final blow and attempt to disengage. In
this situation, physical force begins to exert extreme psychological pressure upon the
side that perceives it is losing and it becomes demoralized. Demoralization, of course,
has an immediate impact on the physical force available to the demoralized army since
the combatants lose courage and willingness to fight. In short, there is nothing with
which to animate the physical force necessarv' to defeat the enemy.
This is borne out by von Clausewitz who contends in his work that the morale of
the enemiy is a lucrative target. He notes that "A great destructive act inevitably exerts
on all other actions, and it is exactly at such times that the moral factor is, so to speak,
the most fluid element of all, and therefore spreads most easily to affect everything
else,"^^ He touches on this again when he says, "The loss of moral equilibrium ... can
attain such massive proportions that it overpowers everything by its irresistible
force. "^^
-•^Ardant du Picq, Etudes sur le Combat (Paris, 1914) pp. 121-123. As quoted in
J.F.C. Fuller, The Conduct of War, 17S9- 1961 (New York: Funk & Wagnalls
Publishing Co., Inc., 1961; Minerva Press, 1968) pp. 121-122.
^^ Liddeli Hart, op. cit., p. 24.
^^Ibid.
^^von Clausewitz, op. cit., p. 47.
-'-'Ibid., p. 232.
30
It is not necessar}', therefore, to totally disable the enemy to defeat him.
Thousands of armed combatants can be influenced to cease fighting by physically
compelling (killing, wounding or capturing) a few hundred at the right place and time.
Consequently, physical force has far greater utility in negating the enemy's physical
force on the moral rather than the physical plane. This is borne out by Liddell Hart in
the following quotation:
A strategist should think in terms of paralyzing, not of killing. Even on the
lower plane of warfare, a man killed is merely one less, whereas a man unnerved
is a highly infectious carrier of fear, capable of spreading an epidemic of panic.
On a higher plane of warfare, the impression made on the mind of the opposing
Commander can nullify the whole fighting power that his troops possess. And
still on a higher plane, psychological pressure on the government of a country
may suffice to cancel all the resources at its command — so that the sword falls
from a paralyzed hand.^^
What is important to understand here is the dynamic relationship between
physical and moral force. It is this relationship that rationalizes the fact that military
powers having smaller armed forces equipped with qualitatively inferior weapons can,
and do, defeat those having objectively superior forces. It also explains why it is so
difficult to determine the combat power of an armed force without having tested it in
combat. Indeed, it is the very nebulous nature o^ combat power that is one of the
major causes of war in the first place. As John Stoessinger notes in his book Why
Nations Go To War,
A leader's misperception of his adversaria's power is perhaps the quintessential
cause of war. It is vital to remember, however, that it is not the actual
distribution of power that precipitates a war; it is the way in which a leader
thinks that power is distributed. A war will start when nations disagree over
their perceived strength....And the war will end when the fighting nation's
perceive each other's strength more realistically.^^
War, then, is a test of the physical and moral strength of the political entities
waging it. Since even in a modern nation-state mobilized to fight a total war only a
small percentage of the population actually bears arms, the question becomes one of
how to maximize combat power with a minimum of physical force. As will be shown,
there are two means of doing so: 1) adapt current technology to improve the lethality
^•^Ibid.. p. 228.
^^John G. Stoessinger, Why Nations Go To War 4th ed., (New York: St.
Martin's Press, Inc., 1985) p. 210.
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and elTectiveness of the weapons systems and militan.' formations employed, and 2)
maximize moral force through the creation of cohesive militarv' organizations. Because
moral force is a prerequisite for physical force, it is necessar\' to address moral force
first.
D. MILITARY ORGANIZATION AND MORAL FORCE
In the search to miaximize physical force, man learned the importance of moral
force. And, in the search for the best means to generate and sustain moral force in
combat, man arrived at the militar>' organization. On the physical plane, military
organization permits the concentration of physical force into combat formations that
are responsive to the will of a single commander. On the moral plane, military
organizations socialize the individual combatant in a manner that subordinates his will
to the group and sustains his morale and courage in combat. How military'
organizations maximize moral force is the subject of this section.
From the momient the first military formation appeared on some forgotten,
ancient battlefield what ultimately determined victorv' was the ability to maintain unit
coiiesion longer than the enemy. The instant a combat unit began to break up, its
combat power rapidly dwindled to nothing and victor}' was virtually assured for the
side remaining intact. As technology improved the means of war, military
organizations became increasingly large until, by the late 18th or early 19th centur\',
the military organization encompassed the entire nation-state. Consequently, victory
was determined not only by the cohesion of the armed forces, but of the nation-state as
well. As will be shown in a later chapter, destroying a nation's cohesion is one of the
major objectives of militarv', revolutionary' and state sponsored terrorism. For the
moment, however, it is important to understand the dynamic process of developing and
sustaining moral force and cohesion in military units. This will provide a foundation
for understanding the principles behind the use of force in a terroristic manner.
In their book Crisis in Command, Richard Gabriel and Paul Savage define unit
cohesion as "... the cxpection that a military unit will attempt to perform its assigned
orders and mission irrespective of the [combat] situation and its inevitable attendant
risks. "^" But what makes men stay and fight despite those "attendant risks?" As the
Spartan general Brasidas reportedly observed, "When ever\' man is his own master in
battle, he will readily find a decent excuse for saving himself" And Hilaire Belloc,
^Richard Gabriel and Paul L Savage, Crisis in Command: Mismanagement in the
Army (New York: Hill & Wang, 1978; reprint ed. 1979) pp. 31-32.
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when writing of the battle of Poitiers, suggested, "Even/' member wishes to separate
himself form the band when it is in danger. Indeed, the wish to decamp is always
strongest ...where the group is in greatest danger. "^"^ Throughout history armies have
weathered these same circumstances, with somie consistently doing better than others.
Why do some armies maintain their cohesion longer than others?
The ancients discovered that discipline and training were elementary factors in
creation and sustaining the will to fight. This, in turn, led to cohesion in battle.
Consequently, endless drill and iron discipline became the lot of the ancient soldier. By
the first century B.C. the Roman military system was the best in the world not because
of some technical advantage, but simply due to "...insistence on constant training and
enforcement of severe discipline."^- Training gave the soldier and his commander
confidence in his ability to his job. while discipline insured ever\' soldier did his job
correctly in the face of extreme personal danger.
What no mihtar\' organization could tolerate was a man who put his personal
safety above the job he was required to do. If that man broke and ran. he could easily
affect the cohesion of the whole unit. Consequently, the usual method for dealing with
those who turned to flee was to inflict the ultimate measure of discipline on them --
that is, kill them before they could affect the others. ^^ There were, of course, lesser
punishments for lesser breaches of soldierly conduct, but clearly "organizational
compulsion" and coercion became a major instruments in insuring unit cohesion in
combat.
Organizational compulsion has carried forward through the centuries and is
operative even in today's military organizations. In his book, The Face of Battle, John
Keegan describes the use of organizational compulsion and coercion in the battle of
Agincourt (1415), Waterloo (1815) and the Somme (1916). For instance, he describes
how "friendly" cavalry were used to coerce friendly infantry at Waterloo. This was
accomplished by placing the cavalry behind unwilling infantry to keep the latter from
^Robert D. Heinl, Jr., Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations (Annapolis,
Maryland: The United States Naval Institute Press, 1985) p. 90. Quoting Brasidas of
Sparta to the Lacadaemonian Army, 423 B.C.
^^Hilaire Belloc, Poitiers (London: 1913) p. 112. As quoted in Harry H. Turney-
High, Primitive War: Its Practice ami Concepts. (Columbia, S. Carolina: The
University of S. Carolina Press, 1949; second edition 1971) p. 29.
^-Dupuy and Dupuy, op. cit., (New York: Harper & Row, 1970) p. 72.
^^Gwynne Dyer, IVar (New York: Crown Publishers, Inc., 19S5) p. IS.
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breaking and running. Keegan also mentions British NCOs shooting deserters during
World War I in order to stabalize a unit in the thick of battle and dissuade any other
men from deserting ^'^
What is abundantly clear is that without consistent and effective organizational
compulsion, militarv' discipline wanes. As George Patton observed, "There is only one
sort of discipline -- perfect discipline. If you do not enforce and maintain discipline,
you are potential murderers. "^^ Certainly without military discipline, unit cohesion is
impossible. A classic example of this is the U.S. Army in the Vietnam War. During
that war organizational compulsion was drastically curtailed. Two examples of this are
sufficient to support this contention: 1) the limited prosecution of actual and
suspected assaults upon superiors by subordinates and 2) the failure to adequately deal
with "combat refuse 1<^
"
During the last three years of American involvement in Vietnam, there were 363
cases of assault with explosives against superiors, and another 118 cases that were
deemed probable assaults. ^^ Of these 481 cases, less than ten percent resulted in the
offender being apprehended and brought to trial. '^ Equally important was the
treatment of mutiny during the war. Despite the progressive increase of "combat
refusals" from 68 in 1968 to approximately 245 in 1970,'" there was virtually no
administrative change in how to deal with the problem. Certainly there were no
executions of the type described by Keegan. The ultimate result, of course, is that by
the time the American Army left Vietnam its military cohesion was in a state of
advanced disintegration.'^ The lack of consistent and elTective organizational
compulsion was clearly a contributing factor.
Aside from organizational compulsion, there are three other major factors in the
generation of moral force and unit cohesion. These are: group {peer) pressure, the
survival instinct and leadership. It was the French militan.' thinker Ardant du Picq who
John Keegan, The Face of Battle: A Study of Agincourt, Waterloo and the
Somrne. (New York: The Viking Press, 1976; Penguin Books, 1985) pp. 330-331.
^^Ibid., p. 282.
^"^Gcorge S. Patton, Jr., "Instructions to Third Army Corps and Division
Commanders," (1944). As quoted in Hcinl, op. cit., p. 94.





first began to examine the concept of group pressure as a factor in group cohesion.
During the mid- i 9th century he proposed that, "Success in war depends upon
individual valor ... and this in turn depends upon mutual moral pressure and mutual
supervision of men 'who know each other well'.""^ This line of reasoning v/as again
taken up during World War II by the military historian, General S.L.A. Marshall.
Examining du Picq's hypothesis as it functioned on the modern battlefield, Marshall
found that group pressure was one of the primary cohesive elements in American
military units. In his book Men Against Fire he writes:
Whenever one surveys the forces of the battlefield, it is to see that fear is general
among men, but to observe further that men are commonly loathe that their fear
will be expressed in specific acts which their comrades will recognize as cowardice
.... When a soldier is known to men around him, he ... has reason to fear losing
the one thing he is likely to value more highly than life -- his reputation as a man
among men.
The key factor in both du Picq's and Marshall's observations is that group
pressure -- the desire not to let one's comrades down and/or show cowardice -- is only
operative if the actor is well known and also an accepted member of the group.
Consequently, both Marshall and du Picq conclude that armies must organize in a
manner to allow such a relationship to build between the men. This idea has been
further reinforced by Morris Janowitz who examined cohesion and disintegration in the
German Wehrmacht during World War II. In this study Janowitz noted,
It appears that a soldier's ability to resist is a function of the capacity of his
immediate primary group [his squad or section] to avoid social disintegration.
When that individual's immediate group, and its supporting formations, met his
basic organic needs, offered him affection and esteem ... supplied him with a
sense of power and adequately regulated his relations with authority, the element
of self concern in battle ... was minimized.
Janowitz concludes his study by observing that the remarkable cohesion of the
German Army was due in large part to its careful nurturing of the primary' group.
"^
"^Stefan T. Possony and Etienne Mantoux, "Du Picq and Foch: The Military
School," Makers of Modern Strategy, op. cit., p. 210.
Keegan, op. cit., pp. 71-72. Quoting S.L.A. Marshall from his book, Men
Against Fire.
Morris Janowitz, Military Conjlicf. Essays in the Institutional Analysis of War
and Peace (London: Sage Publications, Ltd., 1975) p. 178. (Emphasis added.)
^'Ibid.,p. 183.
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Perhaps the major factor in insuring these groups were formed was the unique German
replacem.ent system. UnUke the American system whereby combat units remained on
the front lines for protracted periods and were kept up to strength by a steady stream
of individual replacements, the German system rotated whole divisions out of the front
lines which allowed the reconstitution of the priman,^ group before the unit returned to
combat.'^ The efficacy of the German system can be readily seen by the relative
combat effectiveness of the Wehrmacht and the U.S. Army during World War II. In
fifty combat engagements between 1942 and 1945 the average combat effectiveness of
similarly equipped combat units of roughly equal size was 1:1.55. That is to say, on
the average, German combat units were 20 percent more efTective than American units
of similar size and like equipment. Certainly, the American replacement system, which
hindered the formation of primar}" groups, contributed to this disparity.
The third major element in creating and maintaining group cohesion is far more
primordial than the first two. It is, paradoxically enough, the survival instinct.
Whereas organizational compulsion and peer group pressure are particularly efTective
in getting men to the battlefield and function in certain Vv-ays to keep men figiiting,
once on the battlefield a man's survival instinct becomes an additional factor. If a man
is placed in a situation where he simply cannot physically disengage the enemy due to
the mere fact that safety is too far away, the survival instinct can make a man a
ferocious fighter — particularly if it is a fight or die situation. Since he perceives that
he cannot run away with any hope of success, the soldier determines his only hope of
survival is to stay with his unit and subdue the enemy. It is what du Picq referred to
as "... escape by attack. "^^ Unit cohesion is thereby enhanced by the soldiers
perception that his unit ofTers him security.
The fourth, and final instrument of group cohesion is military leadership. As
Gabriel and Savage succinctly put it, "One factor virtually guaranteeing poor military
performance is bad leadership and its destructive efibrt upon group cohesion."^^ A
good leader, of course, has the opposite result. His primary function in combat,
besides carrying out the orders of his superiors, is to maintain the cohesion of his unit.
He does this by sustaining his men's courage and morale through a combination of
coercion, and leadership by example. To be efTective, the leader requires two elements:
'^Gabriel and Savage, op. cit., p. 38.
Van Crevcld. op. cit., pp. 5-9.
^^Possony and Mantoux, op. cii., pp. 211-212.
^^ Gabriel and Savage, op. cit., p. 51.
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the respect, and the loyalty of his men. This is secured in many ways, but three o[ the
most important are: 1) that the men are aware the leader is concerned about their
vv'elfare, 2) that the leader shows he is willing to share the same risks and sacrifices as
his men and 3) that the men perceive the leader to be a competent combat coinmander
who is unlikely to risk his men's lives needlessly. When units are led by such men,
they can endure incredible hardships and face hopeless odds without losing their
cohesion. Despite the fact that their entire nation was crumbling around them, soldiers
of the German Wehrmacht fought tenaciously to the ver\' last. As Janowitz noted, the
German soldier was "... likely to go on fighting, providing he had the necessarv'
weapons, as long as the group possessed leadership with which he could identify
himself, and as long as he gave affection to and received affection from [his primary
group]. "^-^
Organizational compulsion, group pressure, the survival instinct and leadership
are, then, the primary components of moral force and unit cohesion at the combat unit
level. But these organizational dynamics also play important roles in higher echelons,
even into the governmental structure itself Obviously the belligerent best able to
mobilize its war-fighting resources in the most efficient and effective manner will enjoy
a greater advantage over an enemy that does not or cannot. As with combat power on
the battlefield, moral force is the primary factor in mobilizing a city-state, kingdom or
nation-state for war. Just as the combat unit must be a cohesive body, so must the
political entity that sends it into combat. It is interesting to note that the French
Revolutionary Convention relied on all four of the component factors of unit cohesion
when, on August 23, 1794 it called for a levee en masse. The leadership component, of
course, was provided by the convention. The other three can be clearly seen in the
order itself
From now until such time as its enemies have been driven out of the territor}' to
the Republic [survival instinct] all Frenchmien are permanently requisitioned for
the service of the armies [organizational compulsion]. The young shall go and
fight, the married men shall forge weapons and transport food, the women shall
make tents and clothes and serve in the hospitals, the old men shall [go] ... into
public places to rouse the courage of warriors and preach hatred of kings and the
unity of the nation [group pressure]. ^"^
^-Ibid., p. 55.
^^Janowitz, op. cit., p. 181
Will and Ariel Durant, The Story of Civilization, vol. 11. The Age of Napoleon
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 1975) p. 63.
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Even the most powerful nation on earth cannot ignore the need for
organizational cohesion, particularly between the government, the armed forces, and
the people of which they are made. Harry Summers in his book On Strategy points out
how the failure to mobilize the v/ill of the people eventually resulted in the U.S. defeat
in Vietnam despite the latter's extreme military weakness. ^"^ When America's moral
force gave way, national cohesion failed and the military might of the United States
rapidly dwindled until it was no longer a match for a tiny, third world nation.
To summarize this section, then, we have seen the central role played by moral
force in the generation and maintenance of combat power. Moreover, moral force is
enhanced by the organizational dynamics of organizational compulsion, group
pressure, survival instinct and leadership; all of which contribute to maximizing unit
cohesion. Cohesion is a critical factor at all echelons in war for without it, the
organization melts away into disjointed mdividual parts, each seeking its own interests
over the good of the whole. Finally, and most importantly, this section has sought to
estabhsh that the most effective use of physical force is not in the negation of the
enemy's physical force directly, but by the destruction of his moral force. If the will to
use it is no longer there, then physical force is meaningless. It is upon this concept
that terrorism functions. It makes possible the generation of immense pohtical power
with miniscule military force.
E. WEAPON SYSTEMS: THE INSTRUMENTS OF FORCE
Weapon systems are the means of war. It is they that facilitate the conversion of
moral force — the will to fight -- into physical force. In the last section it was argued
that military organizations permitted the generation of the greatest possible physical
force by concentrating it into cohesive military formations that were responsive to the
will of a single commander. Certainly it is true that the side able to maintain its
cohesion the longest will emerge victorious. But while cohesion is maintained by moral
force, it is destroyed by the use or the threat of the use of physical force. It stands to
reason, therefore, that the more lethal the physical force the greater its influence upon
cohesion. Once both sides had developed cohesive miUtary units ancient commanders
realized that what could give them an edge on the enemy was to make his individual
soldiers more deadly than their counterparts. The most obvious way to do this, of
course, was by the simple expedient of equipping him with better v/eaponry.
^^Harry G. Summers, Jr., On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War
(Novato, California: Presidio Press, 1982; 4th reprinting, 1934) pp. 12-13.
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The Dictionary of Weapons and Military Terms defines a weapon as, "An
instrument of combat, either offensive or defensive, used to destroy, injure, defeat or
threaten an enemy. "^^ These may be categorized according to two widely recognized
fjnctional groupings: shock and fire. This section will address the different purposes
and capabilities of each of these types of weapons, which, in turn, will aid in
understanding why terrorists employ physical force in the manner they do.
Fire-weapons "... are devices for getting at a distant enemy while at the same
7
time actually or wishfully remaining safe from his striking power.' Fire-weapons
generally rely upon the use of projectiles or missiles and can be anything form a rock
to an ICBM. As technology improved, explosive devices were added making mine-
warfare a new element in the fire-weapon inventory. Although they are quite useful in
warfare, all fire-weapons have a definite weakness. As the sociologist Turney-High
observed,
Fire weapons may be able to drive an enemy from a position ... they may also be
used defensively to minimize the strength of an enemy assault before the moment
of contact. Prohibitive fire may also prevent an enemy from occupying a
locaUty, but it is costly and of limited effectiveness. In spite of all these virtues,
fire troops can [occupy] but can hold a position in the open only with difficulty.
Fire fighters may hold with effectiveness only behind ... cover. Fire, and fire
[alone] is hopeless if the enemy ever makes contact.^^
Although Turney-High is primarily speaking of war in the age before gunpowder,
his observations still apply today. Fire troops in modern armies consist primarv' of
artillery and airforccs, neither of which can hold their positions alone when confronted
v/ith shock forces. Consequently, fire troops are considered combat support forces, to
denote their specialized and somewhat limited function in combat.
According to Turney-High, 'Tt is shock or the threat of shock which works one's
will on the enemy. The victor in a fire fight is a long way from his objective; the victor
in a shock fight is right there. "^^ It is shock weapons — clubs, swords, bayonet,
mounted knight, tank, and so on — that enables the combatant to take and hold
John Quick, Dictionary of Weapons and Military Terms (New York: McGraw-
Hill Book Co., Inc., 1973) p. 498.
Harry H. Turney-High, Primitive War: Its Practice and Concepts. (Columbia.





territory. As will be shown in the chapter on the Principles of War, occupying the
enemy's territon.' is one of the primary' means of disarming him since it denies that
territor\''s resources to him and perinits you to exploit them for your own war elTort.
Seizing territory also provides you with a bargaining chip at tlic peace table and
if the enemy prizes that territory highly enough you will have great leverage compelling
him to make political concessions. As will be seen, terrorist shock operations
invariably seek to seize a piece of enemy "territory'" in order to force the target entity
to make political concessions -- even if that piece of "territory" is only a single airliner
or even a single hostage for whom the targeted entity is responsible. Consequently, of
the two, pure shock weapons have greater utility than pure fire. This goes far in
explaining why com.batants expose themselves to fire to seize an objective. Fire by
itself can render a niece of real-estate (bridge, fortification, city, etc.) useless for a time,
but shock forces may seize them for their own use. Nuclear fire weapons, of course,
enjoy unprecedented destructive capacity, but still, they can only deny -- not seize --
territor}'.
. Another advantage shock weapons have over fire is that shock weapons are able
to capture prisoners. Fire weapons are able to compel the enemy by wounding or
killing, but the enemy has the option of leaving the target area or digging-in to mitigate
the effectiveness of fire weapons. Shock weapons remove these options. Either the
enemy defeats the shock attack or he leaves his position. If he does not, or cannot
leave, the enemy is made a prisoner. As World War II clearly established capturing
prisoners was the most effective and efiicient means of destroying the enemy's combat
power on the physical plane. By concentrating armored shock forces to break through
and surround the enemy's armed forces, it is often possible to cause them to surrender
without fighting due to their inability to be resupplied or reinforced. For instance, in
the spring of 1940 the Germans captured over a million French, British, Dutch and
Belgian prisoners in three short weeks, while losing only 60,000 casualties in return. ^"^
Nor was this an isolated case. It was repeated by the Germans in the summer of 1941
when they invaded Russia, and again by the Soviets at Stalingrad in 1942, and by the
Anglo-Allied forces in France in 1944. By the end of World War II, nearly every major
power was using armored shock forces to neutralize large elements of the enemy's
forces by surrounding and capturing them.
Brian Bond, "Battle of France," Decisive Baitles of the 20th Ceniwy: Land, Sea
and Air, edited by Noble Frankland and Christopher Dowling (New York: David
McCay Co., Inc., 1976) p. 110.
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Not only do shock forces enjoy a greater capacity for neutralizing the enemy's
physical forces, they cilso have a larger impact on enemy morale than fire weapons.
Although artillery and aerial bombardment can undermine enemy morale, as was
mentioned above, their effects can be mitigated by either leaving the target area or
finding suitable cover. Additionally, studies of the inhabitants of cities suffering aerial
bombardment during World War II reveal that sustained or regular bombardments did
not break the enemy's morale, but merely numbed and inured them to further
violence.^^ As Alexander McKee noted in his book Dresden 1945, civilian populations
incurred incredible destruction without having their morale "crack". Moreover, John
Keegan describes the seven day long artillery bombardment prior to the infantry attack
in the battle of the Som.me as a failure, despite firing over 1.5 milhon artillery shells
into a 50 square mile area.^^ When the British attacked, not only weic the vast
majority of the Germans still alive, few if any were demoralized.^'^
Shock v/eapons, on the other hand, have a much greater effect on morale. This
is no doubt due, in part, to the ability of a shock attack to press the issue to the
ultimate decision. At the moment a shock attack begins, both the attacker and
defender know that only one or the other will emerge victorious. And. as argued in the
last section, it is the side that manages to keep from becoming demoralized the longest
that will emerge the victor.
These, then, are the two basic weapon-types and how they function in war. Of
the two, shock are superior because they can seize territory can capture prisoners and
have a larger impact on the enemy's morale. Fire forces, on the other hand, permit a
beUigerent to hit the enemv from a distance while remaining under cover and therebv
reduces the risk to the side that employs it. Except for nuclear weapons, fire weapons,
tend to be the primary weapon of weaker forces fighting defensively, while shock
remains the primary weapon for attack. Used defensively, fire weapons generally only
P.E. Vernon, "Psychological effect of air raids," Journal of Abnormal ami Social
Psychology, 1941, p. 36, and pp. 457-476. As quoted in Grant Wardlaw, Political
Terrorism: Theory, Tactics and Countermeasures. (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1984) pp. 35-36.
^^Alexander McKee, Dresden 1945: The Devil's Tinderbox (London: Souvenir
Press, Ltd., 1982) pp. 58-59.
Q "*
Keegan, op. cit., p. 235.
^"^Ibid., pp. 236-237.
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add to the cost of an enemy's desired objective. Fire weapons, by themselves, seldom
compel the enemy to surrender his political goals, particularly if they are defensive.
F. SUMMATION
Force is the primary element of war. Only by force is it possible to compel an
enemy to modify or surrender his political goals. It is in the act of compelling that
force is converted to power. But force may exist in one of two states — kinetic or
potential. Kinetic force physically compels by removing all alternatives and options
the target body may be considering compelling it to act in accordance with the force-
wielder's will. Potential force, on the other hand, operates on the psychological plane
inducing the target to act in accordance with the force-wielder's \\'ill on the
understanding that if he does not, then potential force will be converted to kinetic
force. Force, therefore, can be of two types -- moral anv' ..! ysical. It is the dynamic
interaction of these two that determines a belligerent's combat power, and, of the two,
moral force is by far the most important.
Moral force represents the ability to animate physical force, converting it from
potential to kinetic energy, and equally important, the ability to resist demoralization
in the face of the enemy's physical force. In short, without moral force, physical force
is impossible. But of the two types o^ force, moral force is by far the most vulnerable
and the most costly if it fails. Thousands or, as in the example of the German
blitzkrieg into France in May 1940, even millions of combatants can be rendered
useless by destroying their will to resist. This brings to mind once again Liddell Hart's
comment that, "the strategist should think in terms of paralyzing not of killing." In
other words, the enemy's moral force should be specifically targeted. By the same token
friendly moral force should be nurtured and protected at all costs.
The best means of creating and sustaining moral force in combat is through
building cohesive military organizations. These organizations inculcate moral force in
the individual combatant by four methods: organizational compulsion, survival instinct,
group pressure and leadership. Organizational compulsion involves the judicious use of
discipline and coercion to make the soldier do what he normally would not do were he
loft to his own instincts. Survival instinct builds in the soldier the feeling that safety
lies in his unit. Group Pressure is in many ways the most important method. It
socializes the soldier into a small body of trusted comrades the soldier needs and relies
upon and who need and rely upon him. These bonds of mutual support appear to go
further than any other factor in assuring a unit's cohesion holds in the face of great
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personal danger. Leadership, of course, is required to make certain the other three
elements exist and in precisely the correct mixture to maximize moral force -- both to
resist being influenced by the enemy's physical force and to generate the maximum
friendly physical force as well.
The instruments of physical force are shock and fire weapons. Fire weapons
permit the user to attack the enemy form cover and from a distance thereby reducing
the risk to the user. But fire weapons are unable to seize territory held by the enemy
and by themselves cannot hold friendly territory being attacked by enemy shock forces.
Shock forces are the decisive weapon. When shock forces are employed, a decision is
reached. Either the attack fails or the enemy is killed, captured or forced to retreat.
But shock forces must expose themselves to enemy fire and are therefore more costly
to employ than fire troops. As will be shown later, shock is an instrument that must
be very carefully applied by extremely weak terrorist forces, but as in conventional
warfare, is also the weapon that pays the highest dividends if properly employed.
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IV. THE PRIiNCIPLES OF WAR: FACTORS GOVERNING THE USE OF
FORCE IN WAR
A. INTRODUCTION
Although von Clausewitz is most widely known for his proposition that war is
linked and subordinate to politics, from the technological/reahst perspective his most
important contribution to understanding warfare are his principles of war. These
principles govern the use and manipulation of force by the political entity in the quest
for power and are the fundamental rules on how to employ miHtar\' force in order to
maximize the chances of success in war.
These principles will be divided into two basic types: 1) Those that govern the
use of force in terms of achieving a political victory and 2) those that govern the
maximization of friendly force against enemy force on the field of battle. The first we
shall call the principles of war and the second, the principles of combat. What is
important to understand from the outset is that both types of principles apply and are
operational regardless whether the war is total or limited, long or short, conventional
or unconventional, or even nuclear.
This chapter will introduce five major principles of war found in von Clausewitz's
book On War. These five are not necessarily exhaustive, since von Clausewitz posited
many others. But these five do establish how force should be applied to achieve the
political end for which the war is being waged. Once these have been introduced and
discussed in detail, we will then examine what this essay has labelled the seven
principles of combat. Each will be defined and discussed from the perspective of von
Clausewitz, as well as many other military' writers such as Sun Tzu, Liddell Hart and so
on. These seven principles essentially govern how military force is to be applied in
order to counter and overcome the enemy's military force on the battlefield.
B. FIVE MAJOR PRINCIPLES OF WAR
According to von Clausewitz there is only one means of war, and that is through
the Principle of Engagement or armed combat. Von Clausewitz considered this to be
the preeminent principle of war which drives all else. This is reflected in his statement
that,
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However many forms combat takes, however far it may be removed from the
brute discharge of hatred and enmity of a physical encounter, however many
forces may intrude which themselves are not part of the fighting, it is inherent in
the very concept of war that everything that occurs must originally derive from
combat.^^
By coupling von Clausewitz's preeminent principle of war with his definition of
war presented in Chapter Two we quickly see that war is a physical struggle between
political entities which is resolved by only one means — armed combat. That is to say
that war exists only when there is a clash of arms between opposing political entities
each wishing to compel the other. Consequently, if armed force is applied on only one
side -- such as the NAZI genocide campaign against the Jews during World War II --
then it is not a form of war. This distinction will become extremely helpful in
distinguishing between the types of terrorism that are or are not a form of war.
To von Clausewitz, however, war was not merely random clashes upon random
battlefields, but rather combat for a desired end.^^ In order to achieve the desired
results from combat it is necessary to not merely win a victor^', but a victory from
which farther victories are assured or at least probable. This brings us to four
additional principles of war: the objective, the center of gravity, the defense, and the
offense. These are what inform us of when, where, and how to engage an opponent
not only to win a battle, but to achieve the purpose for which the war is being fought.
These five principles combine to provide the driving factors behind all warfare.
While the engagement is the preeminent principle of the means of war, the
military or operational objective is the most important principle of the purpose of war.
It is the objective that subordinates war to policy. It insures policy is correctly
translated into force -- that the engagement will result in the realization of policy goals.
According to von Clausewitz,
No one starts a war - or rather no one in his right senses ought to do so —
without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and
how he intends to conduct it, the former is its political purpose; the latter its
operational objective. This is the governing principle which will set its course,
prescribe the scale of means and effort which is required, and make its influence
felt ... down to the smallest operational detail,^^




Liddell Hart concurs with von Clausewitz, stating, "In discussing the subject of
'the objective' in war it is essential to be clear about ... the distinction between Che
political and military' objective. The two are different, but not separate. For nations
do not wage war for war's sake, but in pursuance of policy. The militar>' objective is
only the means to a political end."^° He goes on to admonish us, however, that
"History shows that gaining a military victor}' is not in itself equivalent to gaining the
object of policy."^^ According to U.S. Army Field Manual 100-5,
There is no simple formula for winning wars. Defeating enemy forces in battle
will not always insure victory. Other national instruments of power and
persuasion will influence or even determine the results of wars. Wars cannot be
won, however, without a national will and military forces equal to the task.
Although successful military operations do not guarantee victory, they are an
indispensnb-v part of winning. ^^^
Thus, the problem becomes one of determining which military objective will result in
achieving the political purpose for which the war is being fought.
Von Clausewitz was aware of this problem and to meet it conceived his second
great principle of war: the center of gravity. Basically, the center of gravity is "That
point in the enemy's organism -- military, political, social, etc. -- at which, should he be
defeated, or should he lose it, the whole structure of national power will collapse." It
should be stressed that the center of gravity will vary from enemy to enemy depending
upon military, political, and/or social circumstances. Von Clausewitz offers these
examples:
For Alexander. Gustavus Adolphus, Charles XII, and Fredric(k) the Great the
center of gravity was their army. If the army had been destroyed, they would
have all gone down in history as failures. In countries subject to domestic strife,
the center of gravity is generally the capital. In small countries that rely on
larger ones, it is usually the army of their protector. Among alliances, it lies in
the community of interest, and in popular uprisings it is the personalities of the
leaders and public opinion. It is against these our energies should be directed. ^'^•^
^^Liddell Hart, op. cit., p. 351.
^•^Ibid.
^^'^Field Manual 100-5, Field Service Regulations -- Operations (Washington,
D.C.: Government Printing OfTice, 1982) p. 1-1.
Von Clausewitz, op. cit., p. 597.
^O^Ibid.
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To arrive at the militar\' objective, a political entity at war with another must
reduce the substance of the enemy's power to the fewest possible sources -- preferably
to only one. This vv^ill expose the enemy's center of gravity which should then become
the primary- military objective. ^^^ Failure to do so will invariably result in military
defeat and inability to achieve the political purpose of the goal of the war. According
to Harry Summers, this is precisely why the United States lost the war in Vietnam.
[...] we had adopted a strategy that focused on none of the possible North
Vietnamese centers of gravity -- their army, their capital, the army of their
protector, the community of interest with their allies, or public opinion. The
center of gravity could not be the North Vietnamese Army because we had made
a conscious decision not to invade North Vietnam to seek, and destroy its armed
forces. For the same reason it could not be Hanoi, the North Vietnam.ese
capital. Our desire to limit the conflict and our fear of direct Soviet and Chinese
involvement prevented us from destroying 'the army of their protector' ... the
same fears prevented us from striking at the community of interest among North
Vietnam, the Soviet Union and China. Certainly, 'the personalities of the
leaders' and 'public opinion' were never targets the United States could exploit.
Instead, by seeing the Viet Cong as a separate entity rather than an instrument
of North Vietnam, we chose a center of gravity which in fact did not exist [as] ...
was demonstrated during TET-68, when, even though they were virtually
destroyed, the war continued unabated.^^'*
Other than selecting and concentrating on the wrong center of gravity, von
Clausewitz identifies three more barriers to achieving victory. First, he admits there
may be instances where it is impossible to reduce several centers of gravity to one.
When this is so, there ...
is admittedly no alternative but to act as if there were two wars or even more,
each with its own object. This assumes the existence of several independent
opponents, and consequently great superiority on their part. When this is the
case, to defeat the enemy is [probably] out of the question. ^^•''
But as von Clausewitz points out, such cases are usually quite rare. The second
barrier is the stren2th of vour forces. These must be strong enoush to score a decisive
victory over the enemy's forces and to be able to make the effort necessary to pursue
victory to the point where "the balance is beyond redress." ^'^^ The fmal barrier is the
^O^ibid.
^^'^Harry G. Summers, Jr., op. cit., p. 129.
Von Clausewitz, op. cit., p. 597.
^o^ibid.
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political environment. To assure victor\' you must make certain your political position
is so secure that success will not bring further enemies against you who could force you
to abandon your efTorts against your original opponent. -^^"^
Selecting and concentrating on the correct center of gravity is obviously simply a
function of good militap/' intelligence, planning and political resolve. The remaining
three barriers are more problematic. They are particularly important to this study in
that it almost perfectly describes the situation in which the modern political terrorist is
likely to find himself. Although this point will be elaborated upon later, it is important
to note that relative to the terrorist, the enemy usually enjoys massive superiority in
political and miUtar\' power. While these appear to have many centers of gravity, as
will be seen, these can be reduced to one, namely: the target entity's forces of coercion.
The military forces available to the terrorist are extremely weak and com.pletely
incapable of overcoming its enemy's armed forces excepi in the most limited tactical
sense. In addition, terrorists are virtually always in a weak political position vis-a-vis
their enemy. How, then, is it possible for the weaker side to emerge victorious? Von
Clausewitz provides us with two answers: the factor of time and the principle of
defense.
Of all the resources used on the field of battle, time is the only one which is not
renewable or reconquerable. To Napoleon, time was the most critical factor in war.
He states, 'Tn the art of war, as in mechanics, time is the grand element between
weight and force. "^^^ "The loss of time is irreparable in war ... operations only fail
through delays. "^^^ Thus, "strategy is the art of making use of time and space ... space
we can recover, lost time never." While this establishes the importance of time in
war, it does not explain why time benefits the weaker over the stronger belligerent.
As von Clausewitz points out, at first glance it would appear that time is
mutually beneficial to both belligerents. Upon closer scrutiny, it becomes obvious that
the stronger belligerent has little to gain from prolonging the war. By not achieving a
quick victory the stronger political entity affords the weaker belligerent an opportunity
^o^Ibid.
1 no
Napoleon Bonaparte, "Correspondance Inedite de Napoleon ler. Conserve
Aux Archives de la Guerre," XVIII, No. 14707, edited by Ernest Picard and Louis
Tuety (1912). As quoted in J.F.C. Fuller, op. cit., p. 50.
^^^Napoleon Bonaparte, "Correspondance," XII, No. 9997. As quoted in J.F.C.
Fuller, op. cit., p. 50.
^^^Napoleon Bonaparte, (In a letter to General Stein, written on January 7, 1814
— as quoted in J.F.C. Fuller, op. cit., p. 50.)
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to wear doA^Ti his stronger foe -- both physically and morally.^ ^^ Given enough time,
the weaker power may be able to strengthen its own combat power, erode that of its
enemy and/or create a more favorable political environment. Gaining time is, therefore,
critical to the weaker belligerent, and buying time is one of the priman/ purposes of the
principle of defense. Indeed, for von Clausewitz, the purpose of defense is simple
preservation.
It is easier to hold ground than to take it. It follows that defense is easier than
attack, assuming both sides have equal means. [But] just what is it that makes
preser^^ation and protection so much easier? It is the fact that time which is
allowed to pass unused accumulates to the credit of the defender. He reaps
where he did not sow. Any omission of attack — whether from bad judgement,
fear, or indolence -- accrues to the defender's benefit.
Having established that defense is easier than offense, von Clausewitz concludes
that the defense is the stronger form of war.^^^ Sun Tzu also came to the same
conclusion. He declared, "Invincibility lies in the defense; the possibility of victory in
the attack. One defends when his strength is inadequate; he attacks when it is
abundant."^ ^'^
In effect, though weaker than your opponent, you may, by electing to fight
defensively, offset his superiority. Even victorious attackers experience great wastage
of their armed forces as they are spread over the conquered territory- for garrison and
police purposes. Perhaps one of the best descriptions of this phenomenon is given by
General Horace Porter in his discussion of the Union Army of the Patomac's last
offensive against the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia during the American Civil
War. He notes that despite the fact the Union army consisted of nearly twice the
number of troops of their Confederate counterpart commanded by Robert E. Lee --
116,000 to 70,000 - the advantages were with the latter because he was on the
defensive. He writes,
Those familiar with military operations ... will concede that, notwithstanding
Lee's inferiority in numbers, the advantages were, nevertheless, in his favor....
Having interior lines, he was able to move by shorter marches, and to act
constantly on the defensive ... forc[ing] the invading army continually to assault
111Von Clausewitz, op. cit., pp. 597-59S.
^^-Ibid., p. 357.
^^-Ibid., p. 358.
Sun Tzu. op. dr., p. 85.
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fortified positions.... Lee and his oiricers were familiar witii ever\' foot of ground,
and every inhabitant was eager to give them information. His army was in a
friendly country, from which provisions could be drawn from all directions, and
few troops had to be detached to guard lines of supply. The Union army, on the
contrar>', was unfamiliar with the country', was without accurate maps, couid
seldom secure trustworthy guides, and had to detach large bodies of troops to
guard its long lines of communication, protect its supply trains, and conduct
wounded to points of safety. ^^^
As can be easily seen from the above the attacker is continuously spread thinner
and grows relatively weaker, while the defender grows increasingly strong relative to
the attacker. During this phase, the defender should not remain passive, but do
everything possible to increase the attacker's expenditure of effort in all aspects of his
war-making resources. As von Clausewitz put it, the defense is not merely "... a simple
shield, but a shield made up of well directed blows. "^^^ U.S. Army Field Manual 100-5
echoes von Clausewitz when it states:
Some military theorist think defense is the stronger form of war because denying
success is easier than achieving it. Indeed, the defender does have significant
advantages over the attacker. In most cases he not only knov/s the ground better,
but having occupied it first, he has strengthened his position and massed his
forces. He is under the cover of his own artillery and air defense. Once the
battle begins, the defender fights from cover against an exposed enemy ... [and]
the effects of obstacles, airpower, and conventional weapons on exposed troops
... favor the defender.^ ^^
The U.S. Army acknowledges six primary objectives for the defense: 1) cause the
enemy attack to fail, 2) gain time, 3) concentrate forces elsewhere, 4) control essential
terrain, 5) wear down the enemy forces as a prelude to offensive operations and 6)
retain control of tactical, strategic, or political objectives.
Ultimately, the purpose of the defense is negative. That is, it is oriented
primarily towards negating the offense and preserving the defense. ^^^ This is not done
by mere passive defense, but by counter-attacking when and where possible in order to
^
^•''Horace Porter, Campaigning With Grant (New York: 1897; Da Capo Press,
Inc., 19S6) pp. 39-40.
^^^Von Clausewitz, op. cii., p. 357.
1^
'Field Manual 100-5, op. at., p. 10-3.
il^Ibid.
^^^Von Clausewitz, op. cit., p. 358.
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slowly wear down the offensive forces by forcing them to increase their expenditure of
effort. As von Clausewitz notes, since ...
the defense is the stronger form of war, yet has a negative object, it follows that
it should be used only so long as weakness compels, and be abandoned as soon
as we are strong enough to pursue a positive object. When one has used
defensive measures successfully, a more favorable balance is usually created; thus,
the natural course in war is to begin defensively and end by attacking.
In other words, only by eventually taking the offensive can one hope to achieve
victory. This is true even if your political goals are totally defensive and your only
purpose for waging war is self-preservation.^^^
It is the principle of the offense, then, that enables you to achieve victory.
Whereas defense has a negative purpose -- preservation -- the offense has a positive
one — conquest. And, it is the ofTense which enables the belligerent to increase his
capacity to wage war.^^^ It does this by destroying the enemy's fighting forces,
securing decisive terrain, depriving the enemy of resources (and alternately, gaining
those resources for the attacker), gaining information and deceiving or diverting the
enemy's strength. ^^^ The noted militarv- historian Hew Strachan appears to contradict
von Clausew^itz by calling the offense the stronger form of war "... as it affirms morale
and only it can lead to victory. The defense is weaker because it ... yields the initiative
to the enemy, and is therefore acceptable only as a prelude to a counter-attack." '^
Upon closer scrutiny it is apparent that Strachan means it is the more decisive form of
^^Olbid.
^^^A perfect example of the need for the offensive in a "purely defensive" war is
the 1948 Arab-Israeli conflict. Within hours of becoming a sovereign nation-state,
Israel was invaded by the armies of Egypt, Jordan and Syria. As Israeli General Y.
Yadin described it, these forces "... were halted, and those of Egypt and Syria were
hurled back beyond the original frontiers of Palestine. The formidable British-trained
Arab legion of Jordan fought the Jews on more or less even terms [but] ... by the end
of the year, Israel had [rejestablished her frontiers by force of arms over virtually all of
the terrain which had been allotted her [by the U.N.] before the war...". Only by
counter-attacking -- going over to the offensive -- could Israel have maintained its
territory and sovereignty. Y. Yadin, "A Strategic Analysis of Last Year's Battles", The
Israel Force's Journal, September, 1949; in Appendix II to Liddell Hart, op. cit., pp.
396-401.
^^^Von Clausewitz, op. cit., p. 358.
^^^Field Manual 100-5, op. cit., p. 8-5.
" Hew Strachan, European Armies and the Conduct of War 2nd ed. (London:
George Allen and Unwin, Inc., 1983) pp. 1-2.
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war, since the oflense is the only means to achieve victory'. But what, exactly, is it that
makes this form of war so decisive?
This is a particularly difiicult question in view of the fact that we have already
claimed that the defense is the stronger form of war due to the various advantages that
accrue to it. Actually, Strachan gave us a hint when he stated that the "defense ...
yields the initiative to the enemy." U.S. field Manual 100-5 emphasizes that the
initiative is the only significant advantage the attacker possesses. "If the attacker loses
the initiative, even temporarily, he will jeopardize the success of the entire
operation."^"^ It is imperative, therefore, that we have full understanding of this
phenomenon before delving more deeply into the principle of the ofTense.
Von Clausewitz is strangely silent on the concept of the initiative. This is not to
say he was uraware of it, but that he used the term ver\' sparingly^^^ preferring instead
to discuss its component parts: speed, surprise and concentration of effort.
^""^
Consequently, we will rely on the U.S. Army's definition which states, "Initiative
implies an offensive spirit in the conduct of all operations. The underlying purpose of
[which] ... is to seize or retain independence of action." In other words, make the
enemy react to your plans; keep him off balance, confused and disorganized and
thereby vulnerable to attacks at unexpected places and times or from unexpected
directions. This makes it possible to overcome the advantage enjoyed by the defender.
As Sun Tzu observed, "A confused army leads to another's victory. "^"^
It is the ability to seize the initiative and insure independence of action that leads
directly to victory and therefore makes the offense the decisive form of war. This,
hov/ever, leads us to two basic questions: why would one of the belligerents adopt the
defensive form of war in the first place, and secondly, once having laimched an
ofTensive, why abandon it and allow the defender the opportunity to counter-attack?
The answer to both questions, as suggested earlier, is a matter of relative physical
strength at a given point in time. The defender does not voluntarily select the defense
as a means of fighting, but is compelled to do so due to his relative physical weakness.
Nor docs the attacker voluntarily give up the ofTensive, but is compelled to do so at
certain places and times by the loss of local superiority. If this occurs often enough.
^^^Field Manual 100-5, op. cii., p. 8-5.
^^^Von Clausewitz, op. ciL, p. 358.
^-'Ficld Manual 100-5, op. cit., pp. 8-4 - 8-5.
^-^Ibid., p. 2-2.
^"^Sun Tzu, op. cii., p. 82.
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the attack may be considered 'spent' or as von Clausewitz put it, has reached the
culminating point of victory and a certain equilibrium settles over the war for a period
until one side builds suflicient strength to launch or renew the attack. ^-'^ Both of these
factors are important in understanding why terrorists use certain methods of lighting.
We will digress a mom.ent to gain a better understanding of each.
This study has pointed out on several occasions that the defender gains certain
advantages over the attacker and that it is the defender's weakness that compels him to
seek this posture. A quick example will be sufficient to establish why this is so. J.F.C.
Fuller, in analyzing Ferdinand Foch's book The Principles of War, attacks Marshal
Foch's contention that improved firepower is to the attacker's advantage. Fuller
points out the basic fallacy in Marshal Foch's assumption that a rifle in the hands of
an attacking soldier is equivalent to a similar rifle in the hands of a defending soldier if
the latter is using cover. He states, "To mention one fact out of several, because [the]
defender lying prone will [physically] offer one-eighth [the] target of [the] advancing
assailant, the assailant's hits must be reduced by seven-eighths." Therefore, based on
cover alone, the defender enjoys seven times the superiority over the attacker, and if
the outcome were to rely only upon firepower alone — which, of course, it does not —
the attacker would sustain seven casualties for ever>' casualty sustained by the defender
assuming both sides are equally proficient in marksmanship. Even given the mitigating
factors of surprise and speed it is apparent the attacker must be substantially stronger
than the defender if the offensive is to be successful. Thus, the weaker belligerent is
compelled to seek the 'force-multiplying' qualities of the defense or be quickly
overwhelmed.
To the physically stronger, then, goes the privilege of taking the offense. But as
we noted earlier, even the defender may — indeed must - launch counter-attacks or
lose the war. This implies the defender is able to gain superiority over the attackers so
^^'^Von Clausewitz, op. cit., p. 528.
J.F.C. Fuller, op. cit., p. 123. It was Marshal Foch's contention that improved
technology could only aid the attacker. In his example he points out the 2,000
attackers armed with a musket capable of firing one shot per minute would only have a
1,000 bullet advantage over 1,000 defenders using a similar musket. But if these same
2,000 attackers were armed with a rifle capable of ten shots per minute they could,
according to Foch, fire 20,000 shots while the 1,000 defenders, armed with a similar
rifle, would get off 10,000 shots in the same amount of time. Thus, he concludes, the
attacker would enjoy a 10,000 shot advantage over the defender by using a more
modern rifle. Hence, concludes Foch, technology enhances the attack over the defense.
(Fuller calls this mathematical abracadabra.)
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that their roles, at least temporarily, are reversed. This is what von Clausewitz refers
to as the 'culininating point of the attack'. This situation is possible due to the fact
that the attacker generally faces a greater expenditure of effort than does the defender.
Von Clausewitz observes that, while ...
it is possible in the course of the attack for superiority to increase ... usually it
will be reduced. The attacker is purchasing advantages that may become valuable
at the peace table, but he must pay for them on the spot with his fighting forces.
If the superior strength of the attack -- which diminishes day by day - leads to
peace, the object will have been attained ... most of them [however] only lead up
to the point where their remaining strength is just enough to maintain a defense
and wait for peace. Beyond that point, the scale turns and the reaction follows
with a force that is usually much stronger than the original attacks."^ ^^
A perfect example of this scenario is the war in the Pacific during World War II
when the Japanese attacked as long as they were able and then reverted to the
defensive while the ever increasing power of the United States and its allies came to
bear. We can conclude, therefore, that it is incumbent upon the attacker to use his
rapidly waning superiority in strength to achieve a decisive victory' over the defender
before the culmination point is reached. ^^"^
As we discussed earlier, what both sides are attempting to do is to gain and.' or
maintain superiority in their war-making assets by maximizing the other's expenditure
of effort. The side enjoying the greater military strength will elect to employ the
principle of the offense, since it is the most decisive means of eroding your opponent's
remaining military strength and the only means of achieving victory in war. We may
conclude, then, that the most important factor in war is to gain and maintain superior
military strength, or as von Clausewitz wrote, "The best strategy is always to be very
strong; first in general, and then at the decisive point."^"^^ If we analyze this last
statement closely, it becomes evident that it is possible to be strong in general and
^^^Von Clausewitz, op. cit., p. 528.
l^^Ibid.
^^"^Ibid., pp. 566-567. Here von Clausewitz outlines why the defender and
attacker lose and/or gain strength relative to each other. War is basically a negative-
sum game where both sides usually lose strength in every operation. While the defender
loses forces, installations, resources, cohesion and morale when facing a continuously
successful offensive, the attacker's strength is eroded by garrisoning occupied territory,
lengthening supply lines which cause delays in replenishing losses and so on. The secret
to victory", of coarse, is to cause your enemy to lose at a faster rate than you do.
^^^Ibid., p. 204.
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weak at the decisive point or even vice versa. Put in more military' terminology, it is
possible to be strong strategically and be weak tactically and vice versa. This would
explain how the defender, who is by definition the weaker belligerent, can launch a
counter-attack. The defender may be weak strategically but may be able to gain
tactical (i.e. local) superiority at the decisive point. We will discuss how to achieve
local superiority in more detail when we examine the principles of combat. For the
moment, it will be helpful to gain a better understanding of the difference between
strategic and tactical warfare.
Von Clausewitz differentiated the concepts of strategic and tactical in terms of
their ability to achieve the war's political objective. "In other words," writes von
Clausewitz, "the offensive is strategic when it leads directly to the political objective -
the purpose for which the war is being waged. When it does not lead directly to the
objective it is subsidiary and its value tactical rather than strategic."^ -^ Quincy Wright
offers this definition,
The management of military operations in direct contact with the enemy in order
to win battle is called 'tactics'. The manasement of operations so as to effect
such contact under the maximum advantage ... is called 'strategy'.
There are probably scores of other definitions as well, and they often contradict
one another. In general, however strategy involves the employment of forces to secure
militar>' and political objectives that will have a direct bearing on the enemy's collapse,
while tactics involve forces in direct contact with enemy and whose purpose is to secure
objectives from which further military' operations are not only possible but are
enhanced.
As we look at these concepts more closely, it becomes apparent that one can
wage differently on a tactical and a strategic level — i.e. tactical offense and strategic
defense. Very weak belligerents such as guerrillas and terrorist are too weak to secure
strategic objectives and win the war out right. Therefore, they must operate on the
strategic defensive — that is, with the strategic objective of negating their own total
destruction by the enemy. But, they are also capable of launching tactical offensives,
seeking tactical military' victories with the aim of increasing the enemy's expenditure of
effort, wearing him down physically and morally, and hoping to eventually achieve
sufficient strength to launch a strategic offensive.
^^^Von Clausewitz, op. cit., p. 143. (As quoted in Summers, pp. 108-109.)
^^^Quincy Wright, op. cit., pp. 291-292.
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Von der Goltz, a noted nineteenth centun' military strategist and student of von
Clausewitz sumrried up the four combinations of strategy, tactics, the offense and the L,
defense, including the maximum results that could be expected from each in a simple
matrix. This is shown below in Table 1.
TABLE 1





















Victory on the battle
field without general
results for the cam-
gaign or war. ( At





Destruction of the enemy,
conauest of his territory.
(A total military victory
from which the political
goal(s) for which the war
is being waged can be
achieved.
)
[Source: Baron yon der Goltz, The Conduct of War. A brief Studv of its Most Important
"
" by Joseph T. Dickman. [Kansas City, Missouri: ThePrinciples and Forms, translated
Franklin Hudson Publishing Co., r896) p\ 32. As quoted in Summers,' op. cit., p. no.
From this table it becomes apparent that if the enemy is allowed to continuously
fi2ht otTensivelv at both the strategic and tactical levels, the defender is doomed to
defeat. Therefore, the defender must conduct tactical offensives as often as possible or
be forced to surrender their pohtical goals and cease fighting. The question becomes
one of how to establish local superiority in order to launch a tactical offensive. This is
where the remaining principles of war come into play.
C. THE SEVEN PRINCIPLES OF COMBAT
Thus far we have identified five major principles of war. They are: the
engagement, the objective, the center of gravity, the defense and the offense. The
remaining seven principles of war govern the actual employment of combat forces for
the purpose of securing, maintaining, or exploiting superiority in combat power at the
strategic or tactical level. These seven principles are: mass, economy of force,
maneuver, unity of command, security, surprise and simplicity.
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As already intimated, there is a subtle difference between these seven and the first
five principles of war. These seven are primarily concerned with how to maximize
combat power for the purpose of winnmg an engagement. This is sometimes referred
to as force-multiplication and essentially concerns the enhancement of combat efficiency
and effectiveness in achieving specific military objectives.
Some purists may argue that the military' objective is also a force-multiplier in
that it prevents the wastage of combat power on non-essential missions. While this is
true, we will shortly see that this concept is subsumed within the principles of mass,
economy of force, and unity of command, which between them insure that combat
power is focused on the right place and insures the effort is coordinated with minimum
combat power wasted on peripheral areas. Given this, we can conclude that the
objective is the desired while the seven principles just introduced are the means. For
the purpose of this study, these seven principles will be called henceforth the principles
of combat and the original five will be called the principles of^A-ar.
The short definitions shown in Table 2 below are taken from U.S. Army Field
Manual 100- 1 - The Army. This manual admonishes, "... it must be understood ...
these principles are interdependent and interrelated. No single principle can be blindly
adhered to, or observed, to the exclusion of the others; none can assure victor}' in
battle without reinforcement from one or more of the others. "^-^
These principles are able to work because it is impossible for the enemy to be
equally strong ever}'where you may wish to attack. Consequently, even if your enemy
has overall superiority, you may, by correctly employing these principles, concentrate
superior combat power at a given point, surprise and overwhelm the enemy forces
located there. Such an action m.ay be a simple ambush of an enemy supply column or
it may be a major offensive on an unexpected avenue of advance. Sun Tzu succinctly
describes these principles as follows:
If I am able to determine the enemy's dispositions while at the same time I
conceal my own, I can concentrate while he divides [to search for me], I can use
my entire strength to attack a fraction of his. There I will be superior. Then, if I
am able to use many to strike few at a selected point, those I deal with will be in
dire straits. '-^^
^^^"Principles of War and the Operational Dimension," Field Manual 100- 1 - The
Army. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1981) Chapter Three. As
quoted in Summers, p. 204.




Mass -- concentrate combat power at the decisive place and time.
Economy of Force - allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts.
Maneuver — place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the flexible
application of combat power.
Unlrv of Command — for every objective there should be unity of effort under one
responsible commander.
Security — never permit the enemy to acquire an unexpected advantage.
Surprise — strike the enemy at a time and,' or place and in a manner for which he is
unprepared.
Simplicity -• prepare clear, uncomplicated plans and clear, concise orders to ensure a
thoroi i^r. anaerstanding of all participants.
(Source: Field Manual 100-1, Chapter Three. As quoted in Summers, op. cit., pp.
199-204.)
What Sun Tzu has described is a simple plan, using mass to strike at a selected
point where he knows he will have superior combat power. The plan uses maneuver to
concentrate his forces, and security and surprise to avoid the main enemy forces and
strike where the enemy least expects him. Since Sun Tzu is speaking in the first
person, we may assume he is employing unity of command. The only principle not
specifically touched on here is economy offorce, although we may also assume Sun Tzu
has dispatched a minimal force to keep the enemy's main forces busy while Sun Tzu's
forces lands its blow on his selected target. In this way, then, it is possible for
generally weaker forces to attack stronger ones. Now let us look at each principle in
more detail.
Mass has long been recognized as a major principle of combat. According to
von Clausewitz, "An impartial student of modern war must admit that superior
num.bers are becoming more decisive with each passing day. The principle of bringing
maximum possible strength to the decisive engagement must therefore rank higher than
it did in the past."^'^^ The military thinker, Antoine Jomini, believed the center and the
heart of all military operations "... consists of putting into action the greatest possible
number of forces at the decisive point in the theater of operations ... [by using] the
correct line of operations."
^^^Von Clausewitz, op. cit., p. 282.
^"^^Antione H. Jomini, Precis d I' art de la Guerre (Paris, 1838) p. 254. As quoted
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During World War II this concept was borne out by the Germans, who mastered
the art of employing the principle of mass in their Blitzkrieg strategy. They called the
decisive point where the main effort was concentrated the schwerpunkt. This pomt
was either lightly defended, or able to be quickly overwhelmed by combined armor,
artillery and air attacks. ^'^'^ In this way the Germans were able to repeatedly gain
superiority in combat power at a decisive point and time.
Economy of force is generally considered "... reciprocal to the principle of
mass.''^'* It refers to the notion of not wasting forces on secondary, tactical objectives.
In order to concentrate forces to meet the principles of mass, it becomes necessary to
weaken forces elsewhere. As Sun Tzu observed, "For if he prepares to the front his
rear will be weak, and if to the rear his front will be fragile ... and when he prepares
everywhere, he will be weak everywhere. "^^^
Von Clausewitz noted the importance of economically employing your forces to
ensure none were wasted or idle, particularly during an engagement. He states, "W^ien
the time for action comes, the first requirement should be that all parts must act: even
the least appropriate [action] will occupy some of the enemy's forces and reduce his
overall strength, while completely inactive troops are [unilaterally] neutralized...".^'*^ In
other words, since victory usually goes to the side that is consistently able to bring
superior combat power to bear, wasting forces on mundane, secondary tasks, or 'trying
everywhere to be strong' will erode the combat power available to you at the critical
point and time.
Maneuvering your forces so as to place the enemy in a disadvantaged position
while maintaining flexibility allows you to "... sustain the initiative, to exploit success,
to preserve freedom of action and reduce your own vulnerability."^'*' Sun Tzu called
speed the 'essence of war',^^^ and admonished the commander of numerically weak
in Craine Brinton, Gordon Craig and Felix Gilbert, "Jomini", Makers of Modern
Strategy, op. cit.. p. 86.
^"^^Len Deighton, Blitzkrieg: From the Rise of Hitler to the Fall of Dunkirk.
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf. Inc., 19SC) p. 157.
^^^Ibid.
^'^'^Field Manual 100-5, op. cit., p. B-2.
^'^^Sun Tzu, op. cii., p. 57.
^'^^Von Clausewitz, op. cit., p. 213.
^"^^Field Manual 100-5, op. cit., p. B-3.
^"^^Sun Tzu, op. cit., p. 134.
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forces to be able to avoid stronger forces "... for a small force is but booty for one
more powerful." ^"^^ Few would argue the need for olTensive forces to have mobility.
Certainly the most heralded use of maneuver of the field of battle this century is, once
again, the German Blitzkriegs of World War II where "... vastly improved mobile
ordnance, fast tanks ... and other cross countn,' vehicles combined to produce a
doctrine of mobile warfare at speeds here-to-fore impossible." The defense, too, can
use mobility to maintain flexibility and to preserve freedom of action. This is shown in
the concept of the elastic defense which ...
entails the complete abandonment of the perimeter with its fortifications and
associated infrastructure. Instead, defense is to rely exclusively on mobile forces,
which should be at least as mobile as those of the offense. The two fight on
equal footing: the defense can be as concentrated as the olTense, since it need
not assign any troops to ... protect territory': ?• the other hand, the defense
thereby sacrifices all tactical advantages norm.ally inherent in its role (except
knowledge of terrain), since neither side can choose its ground, let alone fortify it
in advance. '"^^
As we will see later in this essay, maneuver will be the paramount principle of combat
used in guerrilla and terrorist operations as they fight their wars of evasion and
surprise.
Unity of command is as old as war itself, but as war has become more complex,
this principle of war has often been forgotten. Von Moltke warns us, "No war council
could direct an armv, the Chief of Staff should be the onlv adviser to the commander
... even a faulty plan, provided it was executed firmly, was preferable to a synthetic
product."^"" Harrv Summers sees the lack of unity of command to be one of the
primary causes of the U.S. defeat in Vietnam. Quoting former Under Secretary of the
Air Force Townsend Hoopes, Summers writes, "In his criticism of the Vietnam War,
Hoopes notes that the United States was actually fighting 'three separate or only
loosely related struggles.' There was the large scale, conventional war ... there was the
confused 'pacification' effort ... and there was the curiously remote air war against
North Vietnam." '^^ Summers continues.
^^"^^Ibid., p. 80.
^"'^'^Dupuy and Dupuy, op. cit., p. 1017.
^^^Edward N. Luttwak, op. cit.. pp. 130-131.
^^"Hajo Flolborn, "Moltke and Schliefien: The Prussian-German School,"
Makers of Modern Strategy', op. cit., p. 180.
^^^Summcrs, op. cit., p. 148. Quoting Townsend Hoopes, The Limits of
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In comparison with the Korean War (especially in the early period) where all of
the strategic direction came from General MacArthur's GHQ Far East
Command, there was no equivalent headquarters for the Vietnam War. General
Westmoreland was only the tactical commander -- the equivalent of the Eighth
Army Commander in the Korean War. Part of the strategic direction (especially
air and naval matters) came from Honolulu, part came from Washington and
there was no coordinated unity of effort.-^ ^'^
As Ambassador Robert W. Komar concluded, "The bureaucratic fact is that below the
Presidential level everybody was responsible [for the Vietnam War].'
Security is the principle that denies the enemy the advantage of surprise. In the
above quote by Sun Tzu the enemy had to divide his forces to search for Sun Tzu's
army while Sun Tzu, knowing the location of the enemy, was able to select one portion
of the dispersed enemy army and overwhelm it. Security means, then, denying the
enemy information about your own forces - which some call deception. Sun Tzu
contends that "Ail warfare is based on deception. Therefore, when capable, feign
incapacity; when active, inactivity. When near, make it appear you are far away; when
far away, that you are near. Offer the enemy a bait to lure him; feign disorder and
strike him."^"^
The principle of surprise is possibly the ultimate force-multiplier. Von Clausewitz
credits surprise with being "... the means to gain superiority."-^^ It allows the
commander to mass forces at an unexpected point and can result in victories far
exceeding that which could be expected from the same amount of force had the enemy
been alerted. Histor>' is replete with examples of this; two of the most famous being
the Trojan Horse and Pearl Harbor. But as von Clausewitz stresses, the true
advantage to surprise is its psychological impact on the enemy. "Whenever it is
achieved on a grand scale," he writes, "it confuses the enemy and lowers his morale;
many examples, great and small, show how this in turn multiplies the results"^ ^^^
Intervention. (New York: David McCay Co., 1969) p. 3.
^^'^Summers, p. 148. op. cit., p. 148.
R.W. Komer, Bureaucracy does its thing: institutional constraints on US-GVN
performance in Vietnam. (Santa Monica, California: Rand Corporation, August 1972)
pp. ix, 75-84. (As quoted in Summers, op. cit., p. 147.)
^"^Sun Tzu, op. cit., p. 67.
^^^Von Clausewitz, op. cit., p. 198.
^-^^Ibid.
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The principle of simplicity essentially ties all the other principles together,
including the five principles of war: the engagement, the objective, the center of gravity,
the defense, and the offense. It is as Harr}' Summers calls it, a "litmus test",^'^ the
purpose of which is to insure that ail echelons have a clear understanding of what they
are to do and how they are to do it. As von Clausewitz noted, in war ... "Ever\'thing
looks simple; the knowledge required does not look remarkable, the strategic options
are so obvious that by comparison the simplest problem of higher mathematics has an
impressive scientific dignity. "^^° He continues, however, by concluding that although
the military is a ver>' simple and relatively easily managed machine, "... we should bear
in mind that none of its components is of one piece: each part is composed of
individuals, everv^ one of whom retains his potential for friction and
misunderstanding. " ^ ^^
These, then, are the seven principles of combat. When properly employed they
make it possible for even very weak forces to be able to attack an enemy that enjoys
an overall overwhelming superiority in combat power at least at the tactical level. As
we will see later in the essay, these principles -- particularly mass, security and surprise
" allow terrorist to achieve 'victories' of far greater importance than their extremely
limited numbers would suggest possible.
D. SUMMATION: THE THREE TEST CRITERION OF WARFARE
The summary of this chapter will also summarize the first part of this study
pertaining to the basic, immutable elements of war that will be used in the coming
chapters to test whether a specific form of terrorism is a form of war. These three
criteria were derived by analyzing war from its most basic level of abstraction and
through the eyes of a wide spectrum of classical military thinkers. In this way, no
single individual opinion colored the outcome and helped to ensure these characteristics
are, infact, a valid test of whether any given activity constitutes a fonri of war.
The first, and probably most widely accepted criterion is summed up in von
Clausewitz's famous dictum, "War is the continuation of policy by other means." In
other words, war involves the employment of lethal force for a political end. .As will be
seen in Chapter Seven, however, there can be some question as to what constitutes a
political end. Consequently, two further criterion will be employed to test whether an
I
Summers, op. cit., p. 163.
^^^Von Clausewitz, op. cit., p. 119.
^^^Ibid.
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activity is a form of war; both of which entail an examination not to what end, but
rather by what means this force is employed.
The second criteria used in this test is to determine whether or not the activity
involves the employment of force on the moral plane. This is operationalized by
ascertaining if the cohesion of some entity is being targeted. Cohesion is used as a
determining factor since it, more than any other element in war, signifies the m.oral and
psychological bonds that bind human beings to higher sociological organisms.
Although traditional examinations of this phenomenon tend to focus only upon the
combat unit, given the nature of modern war as well as the unique features of
terrorism, this study will expand the level of analysis to include any political entity --
subnational, national, empire, alliance system, etc. — which employs force for a
common politiccl end recognized and embraced by all of the constituent parts.
The third and final immutable factor of war which this study will use in this test
is the employment of force against force on the physical plane. This element is
essentially von Clausewitz's principle of engagement and is operationalized by
determining whether the force employed is subject to the principles of combat that
govern the manipulation of physical force against physical force in war. If it can be
established that the presence or absence of these principles has no bearing on whether
or not a given type of terrorism can achieve its specific political end, then clearly this
activity does not involve the employment of physical force against physical force and
therefore is not a form of war.
Each of these three criterion are insufficient in and of themselves to determine
whether a given activity is a form of war. A specific form of terrorism can be
considered a form of war only if it can meet and satisfy all three criterion together.
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V. VARIABLE ELEiMENTS AND FACTORS !N WAR
A. INTRODUCTION
To this point we have discussed only those elements and factors in warfare that
remain constant regardless of time or space. In this chapter we will examine some of
the nonconstant elements of war which play a major role in determining how lethal
force is most effectively employed. First, we will examine the six characteristics which
influence the type of war a belligerent may wage. This is important to the present study
since, for instance, the factors governing a conventional, total war of annihilation are
q Ilv different from those that govern a limited war of attrition and evasion -- the type
of war in which terrorism plays a major role. Consequently, understanding the
different types of war and the variable characteristics upon which they rest will become
quite helpful in isolating those types of conditions in which terrorism has the greatest
utility. Following this, we will take a brief look at the process by wliich modern
warfare has evolved. As will be seen through this analysis, each era or phase in this
evolutionary process has resulted from the introduction of a new warfighting skill
which is critical to the maximization of combat force m war. What is important here is
that the conditions germane to the use of the type of warfighting skills in which
terrorism may play a major role does not occur until the latest phase of the evolution
of modern warfare. This latest phase, which is governed by what this study has labeled
social warfare, will be the subject of the third section of this chapter. Here we will
analyze the goals and means of social warfare as well as isolate terrorism's role within
this form of war. All three sections will provide not only a better understanding of
warfare per se, but also the role of terroristic force within warfare as well. Equally
important, this chapter will also provide a better foundation for understanding why
terrorism exists and how it functions.
B. TYPES OF WAR
Wars can be classified in two ways: 1) by the objectives sought in the war, and 2)
by the methods used. In the former, the objectives can be either total or limited, which
in turn determines the amount of force necessary to achieve victory. The second
method involves determining how that force is employed. Political entities enjoying
relatively large amounts of armed force may employ that force in positional warfare to
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seize and hold territory. Weaker political entities, however, must employ their forces in
wars of evasion. In such wars the belligerent's armed forces do not attempt to seize
and hold terrain, but rather employ security and maneuver to evade the enemy's
stronger armed forces, hitting them only when and where local superiority can be
assured. War can also be waged by annihilating the enemy's armed forces in battle or
eroding his political, economic, social as well as military resources in a war of attrition.
It should be pointed out here that these six possible types of war are not mutually
exclusive. For instance, while a war may only be total or limited at any given point in
time, it is entirely possible that in a large war a belligerent may be fighting a positional
war of annihilation in one theater of operations and a positional or even an evasive war
of attrition in another theater. This section will address these six characteristics of
warfare which will provide a better understanding of precisely what terrorism is trying
to accomplish and why it operates the way it does.
In its most abstract form the purpose of war is to render your opponent
powerless to resist your will by destroying his war-fighting capabilities, or as von
Clausewitz put it, to 'disarm him'. Disarming the enemy consists of three main
objectives "... which between them cover everything: the armed forces, the countr>' and
the enemy's will."^^' He continues,
The fighting forces must be destroyed: that is they must be put in such a
condition that they can no longer carr\' on the fight. The country must be
occupied; otherwise the enemy could raise fresh forces. Yet both of these may be
done and the war ... cannot be considered [won] so long as the enemy's will has
not been broken. ^^"^
These, then, are the military' or operational objectives of total war. The political
objective of such a war is to eliniinate one of the belligerents as a political entity.
There are, however, wars for lesser purposes, and these are known as limited wars.
Limited wars are far and away the most common type of war found in history. General
David Palmer has observed that,
Most wars, it can be argued, have been limited. One can dig way back in history
to say [that] the final Punic War -- when Rome defeated Carthage, slaughtered
the population, razed the city, plowed under the ruins and sowed the furrows
with salt -- was not in any way limited ... but it is hard to find other examples; in
some manner or other a limiting factor was always present. ^^'^
1 f\^Von Clausewitz, op. cit., p. 90.
^^^Ibid.
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This, however, is taking the concept of total war a bit far and restricts it to an
overly narrow definition. Most military scholars would probably agree :hat what von
Clausewitz meant by total war is one in which the political entity governing a nation is
destroyed and replaced by one more amenable to the victor, such as the American
Revolutionary War or the coahtion wars against Napoleon. Yet even with this less
narrow definition, General Palmer's contention remains correct; there have indeed been
far more limited than total wars throughout history. As von Clausewitz himself said,
"The object of war in the abstract ... the disarming of the enemy, is rarely attained in
practice and is not a condition necessary to peace. "^^^ But in a limited war, what is the
"condition necessary to peace?" Von Clausewitz answers this question by stating that,
Not every war need be fought until one side collapses. When the motives and
tensions of war are slight ... the very faintest prospect of defeat might be enough
to cause one side to yield. If from the very start [one] side feels this is probable,
it will obviously concentrate on bringing [this] about ... rather than take the long
way around and totally defeat the enemy. War is not an act of senseless passion
but is controlled by a political objective, the value of this objective must
determine the sacrifices made for it in magnitude and duration. Once the
expenditure of effort exceeds the value of the political object, the object must be
renounced and peace must follow. ^^^
In a limited war, then, each belligerent seeks not to render the other totally
powerless, but rather to continuously raise the cost of continuing the war until the side
less willing to sustain such cost(s) concedes victory' to the other. While total war
achieves its purpose by rendering the enemy powerless, a limited war accomplishes its
objective by making the cost of victor}' greater than the opponent is willing to bear. It
is interesting to note that von Clausewitz saw the basic means for achieving victory to
be essentially the same whether one is waging a total or limited form of war. He
believed the best way to assure victory in war is to maximize your enemy's expenditure
of effort while minimizing your own.'^"^ Consequently, in a total war you erode your
enemy's power base so that he becomes unable to fight, and in a limited war you
maximize his cost(s) until he becomes unwilling to continue to fight. According to von
'^David R. Palmer, Summons of the Trumpet: US-Vietnam in Perspective (San
Rafael, CA: Presidio Press, 1978) p. xix. As quoted in Harr\' G. Summers, op. cit., p.
68.
Liddell Hart, op. cit., p. 354. (Quoting von Clausewitz).
^^^Von Clausewitz, op. cit., pp. 91-92.
^^^'Ibid.. p. 100.
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Clausewitz there arc three primar\' methods of influencing the enemy's expenditure of
eflbrt:
The first of these is the seizure of enemy territory not with the object of retaining
it but in order to exact financial contributions or lay it waste. The second
method is to give priority to operations that will increase the enemy's suffering....
The third, and by far the most important method ... is to wear down the enemy
... [by] using the duration of the war to bring about a gradual exhaustion of his
physical and moral resistance.
The key to this line of logic is, of course, to create a situation wherein the enemy
perceives the cost of continuing the war to be greater than any gains he might expect
should he continue the fight. As Liddell Hart noted, "Perseverance in war is only
justifiable if there is a good chance of a good end — the prospect of a peace that will
balance the sum of human misery incurred in the struggle."^ This lactor is
operational whether you are on the offensive or the defensive. If you are attacking it is
in your best interest that the enemy surrender long before his physical forces are
exhausted. And if you are on the defensive, your primary objective is to make the
continuance of the war too expensive for the enemy to pursue it further, and therefore
surrender or modify his original objective. In either case, the common denominator is
the enemy's will to fight. Von Clausewitz bears this out when he wrote that, "If... we
consider the total concept of victory, we find that it consists of three elements: 1) the
enemy's greater loss of material strength, 2) his loss of morale [and] 3) his open
admission of the above by giving up his intention."^ ^^
We may therefore conclude, that wars are won by using physical forces to affect
an enemy's will to resist. And, as von Clausewitz suggested, this can be done either by
total means through the destruction of the enemy's armed forces, or by limited means,
in which victory is achieved by increasing the enemy's expenditure of effort.
Consequently, according to von Clausewitz, victory in a limited war is not only
dependent upon the will of the soldiers in the field to continue fighting, but also on the
will of all those necessary to keep those soldiers in the field -- particularly civilian
workers. But as the military historian and student of von Clausewitz Hans Delbruck
has pointed out, not only could victory in a limited war be achieved through affecting
enemy civilian morale, but the same could occur in a total war.^"^^ Thus, it is possible
^''^^Ibid., pp. 92-93.
^^^ Liddell Hart, op. cit., pp. 370-371.
^^'^Von Clausewitz, op. cit., pp. 233-234.
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— as in World War I - to achieve total victory without decisively defeating the enemy's
army in the field. Delbruck labeled the strategy designed to engage and destroy the
enemy's armed forces 'the strategy of annihilation. The second strategy Delbruck
called 'the strategy of exhaustion or attrition.'^ '-^
The strategy of annihilation is the prerogative of the stronger belligerent. This
strategy represents the use of physical force on the physical plane to destroy the
enemy's armed forces, making him unable to continue to fight. The strategy of
attrition, however, is employed by belligerents that do not enjoy sufficient power to
engage and decisively defeat the enemy's armed forces in open conflict. In this form of
war "... the battle is no longer the sole aim of strategy; it is merely one of several
equally effective means of attaining political ends of the war and is essentially no more
important than the occupation of territor\', the destruction of crops or commerce, and
the blockade."^ '"^ The importance of this fact is that the means von Clausewitz
described in waging a limited war may be applied to a total war as well.
Delbruck and von Clausewitz, however, were describing conventional wars of
position in relation to these types of warfare. That is, a form of war wherein both
sides have sufficient strength to take and/or hold territory'. But for the very weak, wars
of position are exceedingly dangerous. Very weak political entities, therefore, should
wage wars of evasion rather than position. As Barrie Paskins and Michael Dockrill
have noted, "One ... [wages] evasive land warfare ... because one lacks the military
strength to wage the kind of land war that employs concentrations of military force
[able to fight] ... decisive battles."
A belligerent waging a war of evasion does its best to avoid being attacked and,
by the same token, only engaging the enemy when and where it has achieved local
superiority. This is perhaps best stated in Mao Tse-Tung's sixteen character slogan,
"When the enemy advances, we retreat. When the enemy halts, we harass. When the
enemy seeks to avoid battle, we attack. When the enemy retreats, we pursue."^ '^ The
^^^Gordon A. Craig, "Delbruck: The Military Historian," Makers of Modern




^^^Paskins and Dockrill, op. cit., p. 88.
1 n f
^"Samuel B. Griffith, ed. "Sun Tzu and Mao Tse Tung," The Art of War
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963; Oxford Paperback edition. 1971) p. 51.
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key, of course, is to exhaust the enemy physically and morally, while at the same time
preserving your own, ver\' weak and vulnerable forces.
Wars, therefore, can be catagorized by several, often overlapping categories.
They can have a total political objective wherein the complete destruction of a targeted
political entity is called for, or the war can have a limited political objective in which a
political entity is simply forced to modify or surrender a given political goal.
Additionally, wars can be waged with two basic strategies: annihilation or attrition.
Although both ultimately depend upon destroying the enemy's will to resist to secure
victory, a war of annihilation seeks to achieve this demoralization primarily through
the destruction of the enemy's armed forces, whereas a war of attrition involves the
erosion not only of the enemy's military, but economic, political, and social resources
as well. Finallv. wars can be of a positional nature; that is with both sides taking
and/or holding territory; or wars can be of an evasive nature where one side's weakness
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Depending upon the objectives of each belligerent, it is possible for each to be
fighting the same war for totally different purposes and thresholds of victor}'. For
instance, in the American Revolutionary War, the United States was fighting a limited,
positional war of attrition in the north and a limited, evasive war of attrition on the
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south. Washington's ultimate objective was to force Great Britain to modify its
political objectives vis-a-vis the American Colonies. Washington's strategy in the north
was to hold only those strategic positions he was capable, and to wear down the British
on both the physical and moral plane by hittmg the British army when and where it
was Vv'eakest — as at Trenton or Monmouth.^"^' The British, on the other hand, were
waging a total, positional war of annihilation in which they sought to occupy rebel
territory, destroy the rebel's armed forces, and disband the American Continental
Congress, restoring the Colonies to British rule. Victory for both sides was therefore
based upon entirely different criteria and achieved by different means. Using these
same criteria it therefore becomes apparent that terrorism -- especially revolutionary'
terrorism -- is a total, evasive war of attrition. This will be described in greater detail
i^ a later chapter.
Determining which form of war to select and how to secure victory is therefore
dependent upon the relative strength of your armed forces and the political objective
you seek. The dynamics of victory, however, are the same no matter which type of war
you are waging. It always entails employing your armed forces in a manner and for the
purpose of ultimately destroying the enemy's will to resist. But the collapse of his will
is not a given. Only by correctly employing the armed force available to you can you
ensure the collapse of the enemy's will. In the last chapter we saw that employing
armed force in the most effective and efficient manner was dependent upon the
principles of war and combat. As the remainder of the present chapter will show,
armed force is also subject to variable factors in warfare as well.
C. THE EVOLUTION OF MODERN WARFARE
There are three great epochs in the evolution of warfare: 1) the Primitive, 2) the
Classical and 3) the Modern. The Primitive epoch is represented by unorganized
warfare wherein human conflict was employed one-on-one in single combats between
individual warriors or often in highly ceremonial circumstances.^'^ The Classical epoch
involved all of the warfighting skills necessar}' to Modern warfare; ranging from
For an excellent description of George Washington's strategy of attrition see:
Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of Wan A History of the United States Military
Strategy and Policy (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973; Indiana University
Paperback edition, 1977) pp. 3-17.
According to Gwynnc Dyer, "Even the most warlike of Old Stone Age people
... regarded warfare much more as a ritual activity — part art form, part healthy
outdoor e.xercise -- than as a practical instrument for achieving economic and political
aims." See Dyer, op. cit., p. 10.
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physical skills to technical skills (siege warfare) to social skills (maintenance of the
Roman Empire). The primary difTerence between Classical and Modern warfare is
simply the level of technology. Consequently, rather than cover the evolution of war
from prehistoric timies to the present, which would entail a great deal of repetition, this
section will focus only upon the current or Modern epoch. But before we delve into
the evolution of war per se, it is necessary to have a basic understanding of the process
by which war evolves.
1. The Dialectical Process in the Evolution of War
The evolution of warfare is governed by a dialectical process wherein the
existing conditions (thesis) meet new conditions {antithesis) and the two combine to
form something totally new (synthesis). As in all dialectical processes, the seeds of the
antithesis are usually present long before they become significant enough to modify the
existing situation. For example, the tank provided the Entente Powers the technical
means to neutralize the benefits accruing to trench warfare during the First World
War, but these new weapons were employed in accordance with existing tactical and
strategic doctrine. Hence, the efTect of tanks upon the outcome of the First World
War was negligible. It was not until twenty years later that the tank was to come into
its own and a new mode of warfare -- the Blitzkrieg - was created to fully exploit the
potential of this new weapon system.
As will be seen, the catalyst for change in the Modem epoch are power-
enhancing mechanisms that rest upon either new organizational methods or new
tecL'inology. But as the example of the tank suggests, change does not occur simply
with the advent of new technology, but when the structural systems supporting and
eniploying the new technology are modified to fully exploit it. Moreover, it should be
stressed again, that all change in a dialectical process is a synthesis that is to say, the
old elements and characteristics of the previous structure remain but are subsumed by
the new structure that is created. Consequently, factors that were present in the
earliest forms of warfare, such as the need for physical skills, are still functioning in
war today, albeit at a much less important level.
There are two major factors that determine existing structural conditions.
These are: the political organization and 2) the social structure of an existing society. If
the political organization is highly centralized and has extensive authority throughout
the entire political structure and if that new political organization determines the new
technology to be dangerous to status quo, then it can efTcctively halt the evolutionary
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process by banning this new means of war. Likewise, if the social structure is unable
to absorb the new technology and convert it into military' hardware with its attendant
supporting elements — logistics, maintenance, production, training, etc. — then again,
no change in the means of war will occur. A quick example is sufficient to support this
contention.
Perhaps the classical example is the role of gunpowder in Asia as opposed to
Europe. Gunpowder was invented in China in the early 1200s and was employed as a
weapon of war as early as 1232.^^^ Yet, within two centuries Europe clearly had the
lead in this new technology. The answer to the question of how this happened can
only be ascertained from a structural perspective. Although the Chinese clearly had
the ability to create and employ gunpowder technology, they elected not to do so.
This was possible only because the dominant social elements did not want this new
technology and the political organization was sufficiently centralized in order to ensure
the technology was not used. The Chinese emperor simply limited the spread of
gunpowder through imperial decree, thereby ensuring both political and social siatus
quo. No such means were available in Europe, however. Although the dominant
social group -- the mounted knights — did not want this new technology, ^^^ the
political structure was extremely decentralized and proved unable to prevent the
proliferation of gunpowder weaponry. As Andrew Schmookler notes,
The central rulers of China not only had no need to strive forward, but were
actually motivated to retard change: thus the natural conservatism of culture was
accentuated by central control. In Europe, because there was no one to control
power, the rapid deployment of power-maximizing technologies was not only
possible for the system as a whole but also mandatory for each actor in the
system [if it were to be able to compete and survive].^ ^^
^
'^Ibid., p. 54.
Ibid., p. 58. Dyer writes, "There was a ... concern over the social effects of
firearms among the professional military class in Europe. At the end of the fifteenth
century, Gian Paolo Vitelli, one of the leading Italian condottieri, took to plucking out
the eyes and cutting oil the hands o^ all arquebusiers he could capture, considering it
disgraceful that noble men-at-arms should be killed from a distance by low-born
infantr}'men [armed with these early muskets]."
^^^Andrew B. Schmookler, The Parable of the Tribes: The Problem of Power in
Social Evolution (Berkeley: University of Cahfornia Press, 1984; Houghton Mifflin Co.,
Paperback edition, 1986) p. 109.
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Even more astounding is tlie case of Japan which employed fire-arms for
three-quarters of a century and then gave them up to return to the pre-gunpowder era.
Here again, the dominant social group — the Samurai - did not want this new
technology because it endangered their position at the top of the social order, and the
centralized government proved strong enough to eliminate fire-arms production
altogether. ^^-
The second structural factor that can prevent the adaptation and employment
of new technology into warfare is the inability of a given social structure to provide the
necessary division of labor necessary that sufficient numbers of the existing populace
can leave what they are currently doing and master the new technology and man its
supporting structures. For example, as will be shown, modern conventional warfare is
only possible with a massive bureaucracy capable of supporting large armies in the
field. Bureaucracies are only possible in societies where there is sufficient division of
labor so that all of the necessary food and other resources can be produced by other
workers releasing the bureaucrat to perform his specialized functions of management
and coordination on a full time basis.
Normally, however, new technology is introduced and over time it is absorbed
into the existing methods of warfighting which, in turn, slowly modifies both the social
and political structures as they change to maximize the new technology. Most new
technology represents a quantitative, i.e., an easily measured, objective improvement
over existing weapon systems. Examples of this are the quantitative improvement
between a rifle and a machine gun, or a propeller-driven verses a jet-powered aircraft.
Some new technology, however, is qualitatively better. That is, it represents the
introduction of totally new means of warfighting requiring entirely new types of skills.
Examples here include the rifle verses the sword or the radio verses messengers on
horseback. The improvements here are much less objective in that it is difficult to
determine how many swordsmen equal a rifleman or how many messengers equal a
radio. When changes of this size occur, then we have a new era or phase in the
evolution of war.
2. The Five Warskills of Modern Warfare
The most obvious advantage a belligerent can have in war is strength in
numbers. Two warriors are better than one, twenty tanks are better than ten, and so
on. But combatants can be made more lethal by giving them certain equipment and
the skills germane to its operation, maintenance and employment. In cases where there
182Dyer, op. cit., p. 58.
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is great disparity in skills and weaponry', numbers become less important for the side
having the advantage of superior skills. For example, two combatants armed with
machineguns are probably hundreds of times more powerful than two stone-age
warriors armed with clubs. By the same token, when both sides have the same relative
level of skill and equipment, then numbers again become increasingly important.
The primarv' factors determining which skills are not only available but
paramount are the political organization and social structure of a belligerent at any
given point in time. These create the underlying structure governing the evolution of
warfare. Over time, this evolution has resulted in the creation of five distinct
warskills.^^-^ These five are: 1) physical skills, 2) organizational skills, 3) technical skills,
4) administrative skills and 5) social skills. These are defined as follows:
1. Physical Skills - represent a combatant's eye-hand coordination, stamina,
reflexes and sense of timing. While this is normally associated with hand
weapons in shock [non-firing, hand-to-hand] combat, it is also germane to
modern fighter-pilots.
2. Organizational Skills -- represent the ability to create and sustain cohesive
military' organizations responsive to the will of a single commander. The critical
factor here, as was discussed in Chapter Three, is the ability to socialize the
combatant so that he willingly subordinates himself to the group. Equally
important, these skills also permit increased tactical ilexibility on the battlefield
affording the commander the ability to maneuver his forces to take advantage
of the tactical situation.
3. Technical Skills -- represent the ability to adapt new technology to warfare,
maximizing its effectiveness through adaptations of organizational, doctrinal
and socio-political systems. This has become particularly crucial since the
advent of gunpowder due to the requirement for combatants to master skills
beyond those that can be learned on the drill-field.
4. Administrative skills — are those enabling the belliserent to senerate, sustain,
and coordinate the mobilization and employment of the militar\- resources of
the modern nation-state. Aside from being able to generate massive military
force, these skills also perniit widely separated militarv- forces to operate in
unison against the same military objective.
5. Social Skills -- represent the ability not only to generate, harness and employ
the psycho-social resources of a friendly populace, but the ability to disrupt
those of the enemy as well. Essentially, it is the ability to achieve
military/political objectives by disrupting the socio-political cohesion of the
enemv and therebv defeat him without first having to destrov his armed forces
or occupy his territory.
^^^It should be understood that these warskills represent not only the specific
skill described but also the abilitv to create, wield and maintain the necessary hardware.
if any, germane to that skill.
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These five skills, then, are operative to one degree or another during all eras of
Modern warfare. The existing structural environment, however, determines which skill
is paramount in a given era. Each era and its paramount skill are depicted in Table 4.
TABLE 4











Medieval [X] - - - -
Neo-classical + [X] - - -
Early Modern + + [X] - -
Late Modern + + + [X] Jl.
Nuclear + + + + [X]
[ X] = Paramount






idarv to pa ramount skill.
= Has limited or no importance to this era of warfare.
The paramount skill of a given era is the most critical factor in determining
victory during that era. For example, if a force with a very solid advantage in technical
skills and weaponry germane to those skills were to meet an enemy with superior
organizational and physical skills, but lacking equivalent technical skills and weaponry',
the former will virtually always win. Moreover the greater the superiority of the
technology, the less important the organizational and physical skills. Clearly, a modern
twelve-man squad armed with modern weaponry could easily defeat the Hoplite
phalanxes of Alexander's Macedonian army although these same twelve men probably
enjoy neither the physical nor organizational skills of Alexander's men. Admittedly,
this is an extreme example, but the concept is sound. In general, any belligerent
capable of operating at a higher paramount skill level than an opponent can usually
expect to win the conflict — providing that belligerent can sustain that advantage.
To further reinforce this concept, it is important to note that someone with a
higher skill potential than one germane to a given era would have virtually no effect
upon that level of warfare. For instance, a person with the administrative skills of a
von Moltke or the social skills of a Mao Tse-Tung would be virtually useless in the
Medieval era when what mattered most in achieving victor}' was the ability to field the
greater number of armored knights having superior physical skills than the enemy.
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Von Moltke's adininistrative skills are simply irrelevant until the advent of the railroad,
telegraph and mass-mobilization, whereas Mao would have been entirely superfluous in
an era where field armies operated totally independent from the populace; requiring
none of the home-front support of the 19th and 20th century armies.
3. Tlie Evolutionarv- Phases of Modern Warfare
In the remainder of this section we will briefly examine each era in the
evolution of modern warfare.-^^"^ What should become apparent is that the paramount
characteristic of the previous era remains an important element of the next era in the
evolutionary process. Equally im.portant, a belligerent using a less complex, or earlier
form of warfare, has ver>' little hope of defeating a belligerent using a higher level.
This fact will become extremely important when, in later chapters, we examine ways
and means to defeat the latest form of social warfare — terrorism.
a. The Roman Military System
Medieval warfare represents the initial thesis in the evolution of modem
warfare. It represents a virtual return to pre-classical, primitive warfare wherein the
single, sutlicient skill combatants required to achieve victor^' was superior physical
skills. Indeed, as the renowTied military' historian C.W.C. Oman observed. "The young
Prankish noble deemed his military education complete when he could sit his charger
firmly and handle lance and shield with skill."^^^ Since it was just suggested above that
a less complex form of war resting upon a qualitatively inferior paramount skill simply
cannot succeed against a more complex form of war, a brief digression is necessar>' to
explain how, after 4,000 years of evolution, warfare returned almost to its ver\' earliest
form.
Few would disagree with the contention that the Roman Imperial military
system was the most complex form of warfare known in the classical era. Indeed,
using the model shown in Table 4 above, the Roman military system included all five
^^^It should be noted that although this section examines the evolution of
warfare in Western Europe, elsewhere there were parallel evolutionary" processes going
on at the same time. For example, Byzantium did not succumb to the Dark Ages with
the fall Rome, but maintained its empire with a military system ever>' bit as complex as
that of the Roman Imperial system. Indeed, it was not until 1453 that the Byzantine
Empire succumbed to the social forces unleashed by the Ottoman Turks. Rather than
digressing to describe ever}' exception, then, for the sake of space and clarity this
section will focus only upon one evolutionary' process located in one geographical area
- Western Europe.
^^^C.W.C. Oman, The An of War in the Middle Ages, revised and edited by John
H. Beeler, (London: 1SS5; Cornell University Press Paperback Edition, 1973) p. 33.
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of the skills depicted there, with the paramount skill being social skills. Clearly, the
other skills were present and important, but as you move to the left on the table, the
skills become less and less important. Physical skills were the least important, followed
by organizational, technical, and administrative skills respectively. For instance, as R.
Ernst Dupuy and Trevor Dupuy note,
Individually rarely more than 5'6" in height ... the Italian legionary had a healthy
respect for his huskier barbarian foes. In fact, until the time of Caeser, the
almost unreasoning Roman fear of Gauls and Germans ... was reflected in the
individual emotions of even veteran soldiers. Yet they [also] realized that regular
formations and discipline made them militarily superior to the barbarians....
It was organizational skills that permitted the Roman legionary to defeat
his physically and numerically superior counterpart. But it was technical and
administrative skills that permitted the Romans to mobilize and concentrate superior
combat power wherever it was needed to defend or expand the vast Roman empire. As
Luttwak notes.
Once the empire was mobilized to fight ... it was invincible ... even if the enemy
could not be drawn out to fight in close combat, or outmaneuvered in field
operations, it would still be defeated by relentless methods of Roman
'engineering' warfare.... The ability to bring large numbers of men on the scene of
combat, to construct the required infrastructures, to provide a steady supply of
food and equipment in remote and sometimes desolate places — all this reflected
the high standards of Roman military organization, ^^^
Still, as important as even technological and administrative skills obviously
were, it was the social skills of the Roman miUtary system that permitted Rome to
conquer and rule an area so vast. Again as Luttwak points out, "Above all, Romans
clearly realized that the dominant dimension of power was not physical but
psychological — the product of other's perception of Roman strength rather than the
use of this strensth."^^^ Elsewhere Luttwak writes.
Dupuy and Dupuy, op. dr., p. 99.
^^'''Luttwak, op. cit., p. 117.
^^^Ibid., p. 3.
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Together with money and manipulative diplomacy, forces visibly ready to fight
but held back from battle could serve to contrive disunity among those who
might jointly threaten the empire, to deter those who would otherwise attack, and
to control lands and people by intimidation -- ideally to a point where sufficient
security or even an effective domination could be achieved without any use of
force at all.^^^
The Romans, then, assured their military supremacy ultimately by relying
upon social skills. By employing these skills effectively they were able to destroy the
socio-political cohesion of their enemies before their potential military might could be
brought to bear against Rome. It was a system^ that was to work quite well for nearly
three centuries.
Although the collapse of the Roman empire is due to a myriad of complex
and interdependent factors, one of th-^ ^ lOSt important is a gradual erosion of the
Roman military system. As Rome began to rely more and more exclusively upon its
social skills to weaken and neutralize potential enemies, the other warfighting skills
began to wane. By 378 A.D. the Romans were no longer able to field cohesive infantry
forces with sufficient discipline to withstand a cavalry charge. According to Oman,
"Though seldom wanting in courage, the troops of the fourth centur}' had lost the self-
reliance and cohesion of the old Roman infantry... ".^^^ Thus, when the social skills
gave way due to internal neglect and general decay, there was no other skills above
sheer physical skills of the Roman legionar\' to fall back upon. In short, the entire
system collapsed, and 4,000 years of military evolution returned virtually to the starting
point. It is upon this foundation that the Modern military' system was to be built, and
the first stone in that foundation was the Medieval military system.
^^^Ibid., p. 2. Luttwak believes that the siege of Masada in A.D. 70-73 provides
one of the best examples of this psychological use of potential force -- what this study
calls social force. He writes, "Faced with the resistance of a few hundred Jews on a
mountain in the Judean desert, a place of no strategic or economic importance, the
Romans could have insulated the rebels by posting a few hundred men to guard
them.... Alternatively, the Romans could have stormed the mountain fortress.... [But]
the Romans did [neither) of these things.... Instead, at a time when the entire Roman
army had a total of only twenty-nine legions to garrison the entire empire, one legion
was deployed to besiege Vlasada, [and] to reduce the fortress by great works of
engineering.... The entire three year operation, and the ver\' insignificance of its
objective, must have had an ominous impression on all those in the East who might
otherwise have been tempted to revolt ...". (Luttwak, pp. 3-4.)
^ Oman, op. cii., p. 4.
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b. Medieval Warfare
As was stated above, the paramount skill in the Medieval military system is
the physical skill of the individual combatant. Little attempt was made to create
cohesive, disciplined formation subject to the will of a single commander. Oman
describes Medieval armies this way,
Assembled with difficulty, insubordinate, unable to maneuver, ready to melt away
from its standard the moment that its short period of service was over, a feudal
force represented an assemblage of unsoldierlike quaUties such as have seldom
been known to coexist.... As it was impossible to combine the movements of
many small bodies when the troops were neither disciplined nor accustom.ed to
act together, it was usual to form the cavalry into three great masses, or "battles"
... and launch them at the enemy.... [Moreover, even] ... the most ordinary
[tactical] precautions, such as directing a reserve on a critical point ... or selecting
a good position in which to [fight] ... were considered instances of surpassing
military skill.^^^
There are some, like Terence Wise, who suggest that assessments such as
these are overstated and that disciplined medieval armies, including many having
cohesive inlantn.' units, existed and fared well in the warfare of that age. Certainly the
Saxon Housecarls who fought dismounted behind a shield wall at the Battle of
Hastings in 1066 were disciplined infantr>'. Indeed, these 3,000 heavy infantry
accompanied by an equal number of Fyrd levies held off repeated charges by 8,000
Norman, Breton and Flemish heavy cavalry for eight hours before they finally broke.
And when they did break ranks it was to cliarge the enemy. Still such disciplined
battles were the exception rather than the rule. And as Wise himself notes,
The main problem seems not to have been the fighting quality of the troops, but
the inability to maintain discipline over them once battles commenced, [since]
loyalties within an army were widely divided, the nobles were jealous of each
other and arrogant towards the infantr\', and even kings could not control such
internally divided armies. Because of this [it often happened] ... that after the
first charge a battle degenerated into a series of individual combats in which even
leaders took part.^*^^
^^^Ibid.,pp. 57-60.
Richard Berg, "1066: Year of Decision," Strategy and Tactics Magazine, No.
110 (November-December, 1986) pp. 17-21.
Terence Wise, Medie
1976) p. 105. [Emphasis added.
val Warfare (New York: Hastings House, Publishers,
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This extremely limited system of warfighting was not due to any technical
limitation, but rather due to the socio-political structure of the period. First, m.ounted
knights came almost exclusively from the landed aristocracy who, living far from
central authority and protected by castle walls, were virtually independent political
entities in their own right. Indeed, as Schmookler notes, it was not until the advent of
gunpowder that kings were able to establish effective centralized political control. He
writes that,
It has often been observed that the centralization of power by European
monarchs at the expense of the once autonomous nobles was made possible by
the changes in technology of warfare that enabled the attacker to violate the
security of fortified castles.
^'^'^
So long as the noble lords retained any independence from the king, it was
unlikely they would perceive him to be anything other than simply a 'first among
equals.' Under such conditions, the creation of cohesive, disciplined military units,
wherein the knights willingly subordinated themselves in a setting of formalized
command and control, was simply not possible.
The alternative -- the creation of alternate militar\' forces capable of
fighting the knight on more or less equal terms - was also unlikely under the given
social and economic structure of the time. First, there was a labor shortage, requiring
every able-bodied person (other than the aristocracy, of course) to spend virtually every
waking hour in the production of food. Therefore, little time or energy was left to
train these food-producers in the art of soldiering. Secondly, there would be extreme
resistance by the noble knights to any alternate form of warfare that might threaten
their political or social stature. Warfare could only evolve, therefore, if the socio-
political system upon which it rested also changed. As shall be seen, this is precisely
what occurred. So long as Feudalism remained, however, victory in war went to the
side having the greatest number with a superior physical skill level.
c. Neo-classical Warfare
As with the emergence of classical warfare over primitive warfare in
prehistoric times, the emergence of neo-classical warfare over medieval warfare was not
due to som.e technical advantage, but rather due to superior discipline and
organization.'^^ These are what the current study has labelled, organizational skills.
^'^'^Schmooklcr, op. cit., p. 95.
^'^^Dyer, op. cit., p. 12. Dyer writes, "The first army almost certainly carried
weapons no difierent from those that hunters had been using on animals and on each
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Since the creation and maintenance of cohesive military' units was adequately described
in Chapter Three, no discussion of this dynamic process need detain us here. It is
sufficient to reiterate that the strength of this mihtar>' system is that it subordinates the
\^ill of the individual combatant to that of the commander. It is the operation of all
these individuals in concert that makes the army superior to less cohesive means of
war. Moreover, it provides the commander with the ability to perform atleast some
tactical maneuvering on the battlefield, giving the neo-classical army a degree of
flexibility not enjoyed by its medieval counterpart.
It is interesting to note that the antithesis of Medieval warfare was based
initially upon two totally different military systems; one relying upon shock and the
other relying upon fire weaponry. The system relying upon shock weaponry is
embodied in the massive phalanxes of pikemen from the Swiss Confederation, while the
other system relied upon a combination of the English longbow and mounted or
dismounted knights working in unison. Since the longbow; knight combination
represents the initial step away from the medieval system it is to this that we first turn
our attention.
Although the origins of the longbow remains obscure, the English knights
learned to respect this formidable weapon in the wars against Wales, ^^^ where the
Welsh warriors caused many casualties among the English heavy cavalry. The English
king was so impressed with the weapon that he created a corps of English bowmen,
and it was these that were to destroy the flower of French Chivalr>' at the battles of
Crecy, Poitiers and Agincourt.^^^
Wise and others are quick to point out, however, that as formidable as the
longbow was, bowmen could not, like the Swiss phalanx, stand up to cavalr\' alone.
English bowmen were always employed in concert with dism.ounted knights. As Wise
other for thousands of years.... Its strength did not lie in mere numbers; what made it
an army was discipline and organization ... it was the most awesome concentration of
power the human world had ever seen, and nothing except another army could hope to
resist it."
^^Hvise, op. c/r..pp. 110-111.
As Wise notes, "The longbow had proved so devastating because... it had
greater penetration power than any other weapon and a rapidity of lire which enabled
a skilled bowman to fire a dozen unaimed arrows a minute. [Since] ... carrying a
heavily armored knight, a horse might cover a hundred yards a minute ... every archer
could have fired 36 arrows.... At Crecy there were 5,500 archers and during the French
advances [the English] must have fired thirty volleys of 5,500 arrows -- 150,000 arrows
[total]. Ibid., p. 115.
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suggests, it was probably only the incredible arrogance and lack of discipline of the
French Chivaln.' that permitted the outnumbered English to win at Crecy and
Agincourt, since those French knights who successfully weathered the clouds of arrows
and reached the English lines felt it was beneath their dignity to fight commoners and
attacked the dismounted English knights instead of the bowmen. ^^^ At Poitiers the
French dismounted their own heavy cavalr\' and attempted to close with the English on
foot. The end result was simply to expose the French knights to arrow-fire for a much
longer time, and when the French finally reached the English lines they were in ragged
formations, exhausted, and scarcely capable of hea\7 hand-to-hand fighting with their
better-rested foes.^^^
While the longbow clearly represented a threat to the mounted knight, and
consequently to medieval warfare, by themselves these weapons did not entail a tme
antithesis to this form of war. It is evident, for instance, that the English Chivalr\'
came to terms and ultimately worked in unison with the weapon. The Swiss phalanxes,
on the other hand, represented a true antithesis to the mounted knight — one that the
knights were incapable of defeating, regardless of how well they were employed.
It should come as no surprise that the re-emergence of massed infantr\'
made up of well trained and disciplined citizen soldiers should occur in Switzerland
where the socio-political structure of feudalism began to first unravel. It was here in
the wars of independence from the Holy Roman Empire that the relatively weak Swiss
Confederation of Canons solved the problem of limited money and manpower not by
relying on a handful of mounted knights to fight their wars, but by using the same
amount of limited funds to field much larger cohesive armies made up of Swiss
citizenry. Each male citizen was to become a soldier, spending much of his off-time
learning formation drill and the manual of arms for the pike. Free-time was available
due to improved farming methods which in turn permitted an increase in the division of
labor.^'^^ This, in turn, permitted the emergence of a fledgling bourgeousie who were
^"^^Ibid., p. 114. The inescapable conclusion to be drawn of course is that the
French repeatedly lost not so much because they were employing an inferior military
system, since it is unlikely that the outnumbered and more lightly armed archers could
have defeated mounted knights in shock combat, but that the French simply misused
the system they had. Of course, we would be remiss not to note that one main reason
for fighting medieval conflicts was to capture opponents and hold them for ransom. It
is doubtful, therefore, that a knight of any nationality would have wasted precious time
and energy fighting and capturing a "worthless" commoner.
^^"^Ibid.. p. 116.
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independent of the landed aristocracy. Not only that, but the bourgeousie rapidly
began to accumulate wealth and soon the center of power was moved from the castles
of the noble lords to the towns where the money was.
The military system created by the Swiss was quite simple. It was,
essentially, a return to the ancient Greek, phalanx of massed pikemen. Its secret of
success lay in the fact that, so long as the pikemen held their ground, not even the
charge of heavy cavalr>' could break their serried ranks. This was due to the fact that
horses will not willingly charge into a row of unwavering spearpoints.'^^^ Moreover, the
phalanx enjoyed considerably more tactical flexibility than the battles in which the
mounted knights operated. Whereas the commander of a battle had difficulty forming
his formation in the first place, and once formed had only one tactical option — the
charge, or straight ahead attack -- the commander of a phalanx could move with
relative ease forward, to the rear, and to either flank. Still, once contact was made, the
phalanx commander's role became that of a common soldier since, just as when battles
of mounted cavalry met, command and control became impossible. This is
substantiated by Martin Van Creveld who writes.
Once armies had met and were, as the saying went, 'pushing shield to shield,'
there was nothing more a commander could do; so he picked up his own shield
and joined the fray. Of an attempt to coordinate various movements, much less
to exercise control or change dispositions during the engagement itself, there
could be no question whatsoever.
That the phalanx was superior to mounted cavalry there can be no doubt.
Austrian mounted knights were unable to break the phalanx in their first encounter
with it at the Battle of Mongarten (A.D. 1315).'^°-^ And, by the Battle of Sempach,
some 71 years later, the knights came to realize that they were equally helpless against
the phalanx when fighting dismounted. ^°'* Perhaps the ultimate testament to the
superiority of neo-classical over medieval methods of warfare is the Battle of St. Jacob
(A.D. 1444). It was here that a single Swiss phalanx of no more than 1,000 men
attacked a French army of over 15,000. Oman describes the battle this way,
^^^James Burke, Connections (Boston: Little, Brown and Co.. 1978) p. 66.
^^^Dyer, op. cit., p. 38. See also Keegan, op. clt., pp. 94-96 and pp. 154-160.
Martin Van Creveld, Command in War (Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard
University Press, 1985) p. 42.
^^^Oman, op. cit., p. 87.
^^^Ibid., p. 92.
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They attacked ... broke [the French] center and were then surrounded by its
overwhelming numbers. Compelled to form a [square] in order to resist the
tremendous cavalr\' charges directed against them, they remained rooted at the
spot for the remainder of the day.... Not until evening was the fighting over, and
then 2,000 [French] lay dead around the heap of Swiss corpses in the center."'^^
Although the Swiss were eventually wiped out, the horrible cost to the
French caused them to abandon their invasion of Switzerland and go home. Even
outnumbered 15-1 the organized phalanx was a formidable weapon against the much
less organized feudal cavalry fighting a less complex form of war.
Although vestiges of the armored knight were to remain in use well into the
early modem age, the phalanx and longbow marked the end for feudal Chivalry. Both
the bow and the phalanx had made warfare much more egalitarian, wherein
dismounted commoners now had th^ means to defeat the horse-mounted aristocrat.
For the purpose of the present study both systems -- but especially the Swiss phalanx
~ establish the superiority of organized warfare over forms relying predominantly upon
pure physical skill. They also represent something more sinister as well; the first step
in the dehumanization of war. No longer was war a fight between two equals who
may even know each other, but between articulated masses. Dyer puts it this way,
When the packed formations of well drilled men collided ... what happened was
quite impersonal, though every man died his own death. It was not the
traditional combat between individual warriors. The soldiers were pressed forward
by the ranks behind them against the anonymous strangers in that part of the
enemy line facing them, and though in the end it was pairs of individuals who
thrust at each other with spears for a few moments until one went down, there
was nothing personal in the exchange. ''^^
The phalanx was the first step away from war on a human scale. And the
longbow represented a second step in that direction. It was a technological devise —
albeit one requiring years of practice to master - that could in one swift motion
destroy a combatant having far more training and vastly superior physical skills. As
will be seen, this dehumanization of war will increase drastically with each new era in
the evolution of modern war.
The phalanx and the bow, then, reigned supreme on European battlefields
until a technical innovation made them obsolete. That innovation was the advent of
gunpowder and the development of field artillery.
^°^Ibid., p. 96.
2^^Dyer, op. cit., p. 12.
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d. Early Modern Warfare
In early modern warfare a new skill was added to war -- the technological
skill. The need for this new skill for victory in war was to have a profound effect of
the nature of warfare. To begin with, it was the first skill needed in modern war that
could not be gained upon the drill field. Although the majority of the combatants still
went through repeated training to gain and improve skills in hand-to-hand combat, and
to make absolutely certain every man in a formation was able to move in perfect
unison with his comrades, there was now also a need for the technically skilled
combatant, who had to be trained in the sciences; particularly chemistry, mathematics
and ballistics. Secondly, technical warfare employed military devices that consumed
supplies at an alarming rate. This, in turn, required armies to begin to have to think
and operate in terms of maintaining lines of supply as well as traditional hnes of
communication with some central depot or other supply source. Consequently, in
addition to the classical combatant, warfare in the technical, early modern age required
practical scientists known as artillerists and communication/transportation experts
known as logisticians.
That victory was no longer to be gained by physical and organizational
skills alone was proved time and again in battles of the 15th and 1 6th Centuries. Even
the vaunted Swiss-pike phalanxes were no match for armies having technical skills,
even if the technically superior army had organizationally inferior combat units. A
case in point is the Battle of Marignano (A.D. 1515) where the Swiss phalanx, made up
of men armed solely with pikes and other shock weapons, were swept from the
battlefield by artillery and the very heavy cavalr}^ the Swiss had repeatedly beaten in
the past. Oman describes the battle this way.
The system which [the French] ... employed was to dehver charge after charge of
cavalry on the flanks of the Swiss columns while the artilleiy played upon them
from the front. The [attacks] by the cavalry, though they never succeeded in
breaking the phalanx, forced it to halt and form the [square].... Of course these
attacks would by themselves be fruitless; it was the fact that they checked the
advance of the Swiss, and obliged them to stand halted under artillen,- fire that
settled the [issue].
-^"^
Clearly, the tightly packed phalanx armed only with shock weapons was no
match for artillery. One hit could, as Oman notes, "... plough through its dense ranks
[disabling up to] ... 20 men...".'^^^
"^'Oman, op. cit., p. 113.
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Equally important, artillerv' now made the offensive once again the
predominant form of war. Xo longer could dukes and princes defy the central
authority of the king by hiding behind the impregnable walls of a fortified castle. By
the middle of the 16th Century armies could be armed with artiller>' capable of firing
iron shot weighing over 1,000 pounds.^^^ No stone wall, regardless of its thickness,
could withstand such pounding. Moreover, artillery and small arms were far more
expensive than the sword and pike had been, thus, only entities enjoying great wealth,
such as kings could purchase sufficient quantities to arm an entire army. Both factors
tended to cause a general centralization of power as the kings gradually enforced their
will upon the reluctant feudal lords.
Another important factor is that as with the longbow early muskets
provided even the lowest-bom commoner the means to fight on equal or better terms
with the aristocratic mounted knights. Unlike the bow, however, the musket required
only weeks rather than years to master. Consequently, anyone having sufficient money
to arm and equip an army with firearms could, in a matter of months, create combat
power superior to that of armies dependent upon mounted knights or other
combatants whose primary factor of lethality was based upon physical skill with a
shock weapon which had taken years to master. In short, the technologically armed
combatant was not only more effective in terms of lethality on the battlefield, he was
also more efUcient in terms of training time over his classically armed and trained
opponent.
This improved lethality was not without trade-offs, however. Perhaps the
most important draw-back of the technologically armed army was its increased
dependence upon lines of supply. This, in turn, was to have a profound effect upon
how warfare was to be waged. According to Theodore Ropp,
The [classical] soldier did not use up his equipment in battle. Javelins or arrows
could be manufactured or repaired on the spot by the blacksmiths and soldiers.
Shot and powder on the other hand, were both expendable and irreplacable.
What was lost or shot away had to be provided by some central authority.... But
it was these difficulties of supply and transportation which first set sixteenth
century soldiers to thinking about strategy ... [as opposed to simply] ...
tactics.'^^'^
-°^Ibid., p. 112.
^'^*^Dyer, op. cit., p. 55.
^^
'^Theodore Ropp, War in the Modern World, revised edition, (New York: The
Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1962; Collier Books, 19S5) pp. 31-32.
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No longer was it sufficient for a commander to understand the relatively
simple mechanics of defeating an enemy on the battlefield. He must also understand
strategy -- the best m.eans to bring a battle about in a manner that would protect his
own lines of communications and supply while at the same time threaten those of his
enemy. This along with the increasing complexity in numbers and types of
technological means employed, required commanders and their officers to be full-time
professional soldiers. This, in turn led to the need for military academies to teach the
officers the technical skills required in the art and science of war.
As the early modern era was to show by the time it entered full stride in the
Thirty Years War, victory stiJl went to the side best able to maintain its cohesion, but
disrupting the enemy's cohesion was becoming increasingly dependent upon
technological means. It was the commander best able to employ these technical means
that most often emerged the victor. In this way, a pattern was established that was to
remain in effect until the present era in the evolution of war: new technology is
introduced and then organizational means are found to maximize the effectiveness of
the new technology.
The Swedish king Gustavus Adolphus was perhaps the first military
commander to make effective organizational changes in order to maximize the new
gunpowder technology. For instance, he placed musketeers in the pike phalanxes
giving these formations both a shock and fire capability.^^^ He standardized the calibre
of all artillery, placed them entirely under military command, and made them smaller
and more mobile so they could be employed more easily and with greater effectiveness
on the battlefield.^^- In short, Gustavus Adolphus' army was the first to make
firepower a truly effective offensive weapon on the battlefield. According to Dyer,
"The musket volleys and cannon fire of Gustavus Adolphus' army could shatter a
formation of pikemen from a hundred yards away, without ever coming into physical
contact with it.""^^ These innovations were so effective that bv the end of the Thirtv
Years War in 1648 nearly every European army had adopted these same techniques.
By 1700 all infantrymen were armed with muskets. In this way, although
physical and organizational skills were still necessar}', every soldier required a certain
amount of technical skill in order to emerge victorious in combat. For instance, an
-^^Dupuy and Dupuy, op. cit., p. 529.
-^^H.W. Koch, The Rise of Modern Warfare: 1618-1815 (London: Hamlyn
Publishing Group, Ltd., 1981) p. 31.
"^^Dyer, op. cit., p. 61.
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infantn'man had to perform fifty-four separate movements in precisely the correct
order m order to load and fire his weapon. ^^"^ The eminent military historian Henry
Lumpkin describes a typical 18th centur}' battle this way,
After a comparatively short artiller\' exchange, one or both [sides] would move
forward at the quick march.... At 100 yards ... [or closer], volleys were exchanged,
three to five rounds per minute. This intense fire would continue point-blank
until the commanding officer of one of the forces engaged ... decided to order a
bayonet charge. This usually occurred when the opposing side obviously had
begun to wilt under the fire storm.... The essence of this kind of fighting ... was
fire discipline -- troops so trained that they would stand unflinching and take
heavy losses while delivering a greater volume of fire at a sreater speed than the
215
enemy.
In order to fight such battles one required not only professional officers,
but professional, long-service soldiers trained in the effective use of their weapon as
well as how to perform close-order drill. As Dyer notes, this efTiciency under stress
could only be achieved through literally thousands of hours of repetitive drilling.'^^^
This was clearly beyond the part time citizen soldiers such as those employed by the
Swiss Confederation. Thus, what began as an efficient means to produce highly lethal
combatants in the shortest possible period of time by providing them with a technical
devise obviating the necessity of years of training to hone physical skills, ultimately
resulted in the creation of the need for other, equally time consuming training. Still, the
inescapable fact was that a man armed with a musket enjoyed greater lethality than
either the individual warrior knight or the combatant armed solely with a shock
weapon. What made him deadlier still were the tactical innovations introduced by
Gustavus Adolphus, and improved upon by other great captains such as Fredrick the
Great and Napoleon.
These tactical innovations should not be confused with the concept of
organizational skills introduced in the Neo-classical era. Though they are related, they
are different. These innovations were entirely dependent upon considerations of
^^^Hew Strachan, op. dr., p. 16. Strachan notes that a good musketeer could get
off one shot every two minutes. With technically superior flintlocks requiring only 26
steps to load, the rate of fire was increased to three rounds a minute, although some
Prussian units were credited with as many as five shots a minute.
"Henry Lumpkin. From Savannah to Yorktown: The American Revoiuiion in [he
South (Columbia, South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press, 1981) pp.
137-138.
-^^Dyer, op. cit., p. 65.
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maximizing physical, not moral force. Moreover, these changes were adopted in order
to most efTectively employ the technology of the day. For instance, decisions as to
whether to have 14 ranks or 6 ranks were dependent upon how fast soldiers in each
rank could load and fire so as to have a constant rolling barrage of volley fire. In this
way, these tactical innovations should be considered simply an adjunct or sub-element
of the technical skills an anny required during this era.
Organizational as well as physical skills were, of course, still extremely
important during this era. This was particularly true if both sides enjoyed equivalent
technical skills and tactical innovations. In such cases, as Lumpkin's description of an
ISth century battle clearly shows, the side that first began to break under fire usually
felt the shock of a bayonet attack thereafter. In short the coup d gras was usually
delivered in a manner germane to the neo-classical era; one with which the Swiss
pikemen would be entirely comfortable and probably superior to any 18th centur}'
army. Still, all things being equal, it was superior technical skills that provided the
edge in determining victor\' in the early modem era.
e. Late Modern Warfare
By the early 19th centur\' a new paramount skill began to be felt in war.
This is what this study has labeled administralive skills. These skills not only make it
possible to mobilize all of the necessary resources of a nation-state to fight a war, they
also permit the command, control and coordination of widely separated military forces
making it possible for them to be employed in unison against the same military
objective. Two technological inventions made this possible: 1) the railroad and 2) the
telegraph. These coupled with modern bureaucratic management techniques, made
modern mass warfare possible.
The railroad was the first major improvement in military transportation in
nearly 4,000 years. Previously, soldiers had to rely solely upon muscle power of men
and animals to move their supplies and equipment. Until the early modern era, this
served as a hinderence and nuisance, but was rarely catastrophic for armies before the
advent of gunpowder weaponry-. ^^"^ Afterwards, however, armies became increasingly
"The one major exception to this was desert warfare. Here Alexander the
Great's crossing of the Geodrosian desert in 325 B.C. can be instructive. The only
expendible and irreplacable elements in pre-gunpowder warfare were food and water in
a desert. Alexander had made elaborate plans to provide these elements for his army
by having them be carried by a fleet of over 2,000 vessels. Periodocally, Alexander
intended to rendezvous with the fleet along the desert coast-line of Persia as he and the
army marched back towards Babylon. Unfortunately, the fleet was unable to sail for
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tied dowTi to their lines of supply, particularly as armies tried to carr\' food, fodder, and
munitions with them on every campaign. This posed considerable problems since there
v,'as an increase in things that had to be carried, but no improvements in the means to
do so. Martin Blumenson and James Stokesbur\' make the following observations on
the speed and carrying capacity of an army in the pre-industrial era,
The marching man in the Hittite armies moved at the same speed as his later
counterparts in the armies of Frederick the Great. He could carry about the
same weight of material -- sixty pounds ... [over an extended period] -- and he
required the same amount of [food, shelter and other equipment].... [Moreover],
the train of the army was tied to the speed of oxen or bullocks, and they could
go only about twelve miles a day without breaking down; even then they needed
a days rest ever\- fourth day. The oxen could therefore go [only] thirty-six miles
in four days, though the soldiers [who could go easily 15 miles a day] could
march sixty miles in the same tin^c....'^^^
Blumenson and Stokesbur>' go on to note that the British Arm.y in Spain
during the Napoleonic wars continued to operate at this liesurely pace even as late as
1813. ""^^ Napoleon was the first to break away from these encumbering supply columns
by making his men carr\' their munitions - shot and powder — while having them
forage for their food. In this way Napoleon's armies were marching 60 miles every
four days while other European armies were barely able to make 36 miles in the same
amount of time. Moreover, Napoleon was less concerned about his lines of supply,
and therefore had much greater freedom of action than his counterparts.
Another major drawback in supplying a moving army was that unless large
amounts of food and fodder was brought with you, the maximum size of an army that
could live off the land in a given vicinity was no more than 20,000 m.en. Armies
larger than this had to move m widely dispersed columns of no more than 20,000 men
each, and then come together to fight a battle. Napoleon solved this problem by
creating the Corps d Armee each of which actually represented small armies having
over two months due to annual monsoons. By the time Alexander realized his
situation, it was too late to turn back. Nearly 75 percent of Alexander's army perished
in the Geodrosian desert. See Donald W. Engels, Alexander the Great and the
Logisitics of the Macedonian Army (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978) pp.
114-118.
^^^Martin Blumenson and James L. Stokesbury, Masters of the Art of Command




their own infantry, cavalry, and artillery units attached. The first corps to encounter
the enemy was expected to be able to fight a defensive holding action for at least a day
until the other corps could be notified and rushed to the point of action.-"^ But as
Martin van Crefeld points out, before the advent of modern communications
technology, only a man with the genius and energy of a Napoleon could really hope to
effectively command and control such widely dispersed forces. Indeed, even
Napoleon occassionally lost efTective control over his forces. For instance he
reportedly was unable to maintain effective control of up to five of his eight corps
engaged against the Prussian Army at the double battle of Jena-Auerstadt in 1806."
Still, Napoleon did succeed in a manner that far surpassed any of his contemporaries,
and the secret of his success appears to have rested on two important innovations: 1)
the creation of self-contained, mission-oriented strategic units, each with its own
commander, staff, and made up of all three combat arms," and 2) the creation of a
General Headquarters which took care of the ever-growing administrative problems
and details germane to coordinating, controlling and supplying these widely separated
combat units. These two elements combined were to be the foundation stones of the
late modern methods of war.
As the American Civil War clearly showed, victory in late modern warfare
usually went to the side best able to mobilize and coordinate the employment of the
greatest number of soldiers over the longest period of time. Few would argue with the
contention that, particularly early in the war, the Confederate army enjoyed the same
technical skills and probably enjoyed superior organizational skills compared to the
Union Army. But now that it was possible to have the administrative ability to
mobilize an entire nation for war. the days of a war being decided by one cataclysmic
battle were over. Now what mattered most was quantity, not quality. In other words,
the decisive factor came not from the ability to simply field and sustain a technically
and organizationally superior army, but rather the ability to field and sustain the
greatest number of such armies against the enemy. As Michael Howard has observed,
the ...





masters of operational strategy were to be found, not in the victorious armies of
the North, but among the leaders of the South.... [Consequently/'] the victory of
the North was due not to the operational capabilities of its generals, but its
capacity to mobilize its superior industrial strength and manpower into armies
which ... [could be employed] ... in such strength that the operational skills of
their adversaries were rendered almost irrelevant. ^'^•^
Even more importantly, an administratively superior army could also defeat
an army that was technically superior in many ways. Perhaps the best example of this
is the Franco-prussian War. Although the Prussians enjoyed technical superiority in
some of its field artillery, the French clearly had the technical lead in infantry weapons
with the chassepot rifle, which could accurately fire nearly three time as far as the
Prussian needlegun, and the mitrailleuse an early form oi the machinegun."" Despite
these French technical advantages, the Prussians decisively smashed every French field
army within three months of the opening campaign.
The ease and swiftness of the French defeat is clearly related to
administrative failures. First, the French were only able to mobilize 224,000 men in the
same time the Germans mobilized 475,000.'^^'^ According to Dupuy and Dupuy this
disparity was largely due to the fact that, "German mobilization and troop
concentrations followed a definate. well-directed plan, which utilized the railway net to
the full... [while] French mobilization was haphazard and incomplete.-^^ Additionally,
whereas each Prussian Army had established General Headquarters fully capable of
supporting their subordinate corps and other units, the French only belatedly created
two armies by arbitrarily combining corps together, leaving the army commanders to
operate as best they could by using one of their corps headquarter staffs to double as
an army General Stafl'.'''- All of this made a shambles not only of the mobilization of
the French arm.y, but drastically hindered effective command and control once the
army was assembled. Michael Howard describes the French mobilization this way,
""^Michael Howard, The Causes of Wars: And Other Essays, Second Edition,
Enlarged (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984) p. 103.
''Michael Howard, The Franco-Prussian War: The German Invasion of France,
1870-1871 (New York: The Macmillian Co., Inc., 1961; Collier Books, 1969) pp. 35-36.




Thus a plan already faulty in principle was further marred by faults in execution;
and as the army assembled around Metz and Strasbourg it found itself lacking
not only in men but the most elementary supplies. The trouble lay, not in the
inadequacy of stocks, but in the arrangem.ents for their distribution....
Meanwhile, the German [mobilization] had gone on as planned."
Administrative skill, then, governed who would emerge victorious in the
wars of the late modern era. By World War I the French had corrected the faults in
their mobilization plans and methods of command and control. Since both sides were
roughly equivalent in administrative skills, the war ground on until the massive influx
of American manpower and resources tipped the scales against Germany. As Ropp
notes, "... surprisingly ... neither the French nor the German commands attempted to
use their cavalry in 1914 to disrupt the enemy's mobilization."'^-^ This oversight was
corrected by the Germans in World War II who. by employing Blitzkrieg tactics were
able to surround and cut off large portions of the enemy's army robbing the enemy
commander of his operational control of these isolated pockets; neutralizing and
administrative skills the enemy might enjoy. Unfortunately for the Axis, they were
unable to disrupt administrative skills over intercontinental distances. Once again, as
in World War I, the industrial might of the United States proved decisive. And this, of
course, was prim.arily dependent upon bureaucratic/administrative skills capable of
coordinating the millions of tasks necessar}' to build, train, deploy, employ, sustain and
effectively control US armed forces operating on a massive, global scale.
As in the American Civil War, victory was ultimately a factor of quantity
over quality, especially in Europe. German tanks were better armed and armored than
American. German jet fighters and guided missiles far surpassed anything the aUies
had. Clearly, then, the side that could produce the most over the longest period of
time and effectively employ it against the enemy in well-coordinated efforts would
almost always emerge victorious -- providing they could maintain that advantage. As
will be seen in the next section, maintaining this advantage was heavily dependent
upon not only developing and maintaining the correct bureaucratic/administrative
mechanisms of command and control, but also upon the willingness of those within
this system to continue to support it.
^^^Howard, The Franco- Prussian War, op. cit., pp. 70 and 82.
^^^Ropp, op. dr., p. 201.
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/. War in the Nuclear Era
The major factor governing warfare in the nuclear era is, of course, nuclear
weaponry. Ironically, the paramount skill germane to this era does not devolve from
the use of these awesomely destructive weapons, but rather from the threat of their use.
Consequently, they, like the Roman Legions of the high classical era, establish the
environment in which force is employed. That is, like the legions, nuclear weapons are
virtually omnipotent once put into action, and all who might consider standing against
them are fully aware of the probable consequences of doing so. In this way, nuclear
weaponry' functions as potential force and therefore operates primarily in the
psychological vice the physical plane. As a result, the paramount skill in the nuclear
era involves not so much the mobilization and employment of military resources but
social.
As was stated earlier in this chapter, social skills represent the ability to
mobilize and sustain the socio-political resources of a friendly populace while at the
same time undermine, disrupt and destroy those of the enemy without first having to
destroy his armed forces. This last part is critical due to what the current study has
labeled the Brodie Paradox.
The Brodie Paradox stems from the irony that nuclear weaponry' is so
devastatingly effective and efllcient that for two nuclear powers to go to war with one
another is tantamount to virtual national suicide for both parties. Consequently, as
Bernard Brodie concluded during the late 1940s, warfare involving the mutual exchange
of nuclear weapons may not even be warfare at all -- atleast in any classical sense of
the term. Indeed, when he applied to atomic warfare von Clausewitz's dictum the
"War is a continuation of policy by other means," Brodie quickly surmised that there
was simply no rational political objective sufficient to justify the immense destruction
of nuclear warfare conducted on a massive, global scale.^^^ Furthermore, even "limited"
nuclear warfare between nuclear equipped powers had little utility since it could quite
easily and uncontrollably escalate into global, thermonuclear war.^^'^ Another political
scientist, William Kaufman, expanded upon Brodie's contention and observed that,
Traditional strategy, along with its weapons and axioms, held that the idea of
war was to destroy the enemy's will to fight.... [But] in an era when both
combatants have long-range multimegaton nuclear weapons in their arsenals ...
-^^Fred Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon (New York: Simon and Schuster,




the traditional niilitar>' objectives could not be gained without commiting
national suicide in the process, thus nullifying any Pyrric victory [that] might
have been achieved.-^'"^
In short, nuclear wars could not be fought in any traditional manner since
there are simply no objectives "... commensurate with the horribly destructive
magnatude of all out nuclear war."~-^^ Consequently, this, the most effective and
efficient technical means to wage war, in the end, has virtually no utility at all in the
actual waging of warfare per se. Nuclear equipped states are therfore compelled to
wage war by limited means and for limited objectives applying lethal force in a means
and area wherein it is not perceived to be a direct, unambiguous threat to another
nuclear state.
The unexpected means of warfare in the nuclear era became socio-political
rather than purely military. Moreover, the utility of limited wars involving internal
conflicts between factions within a given state dramatically increased. Such wars relied
upon revolutions, insurgencies, and civil wars employing conventional, guerrilla and
ten'oristic means. The purpose of these conflicts is to gain or maintain control of the
populace of a given political entity. This type of warfare has been labeled by the
present study social warfare.
Since social warfare will be discussed in detail in the next section, and in-
depth analysis need not detain us here. For the moment, it is sufficient to note that the
paramount skill in this form of war is social skill. Certainly the other skills remain
important. The combatants must meet at least minimum physical skills and be able to
maintain cohesive military units. The belligerents must also be able to supply their
armed forces with relatively modern technical means and afibrd both the combatants
and those who support them with the necessary technical skills to employ and maintain
this technology. Finally, the belligerents must be able to mobilize armed forces and
project and sustain these forces over long distances, in year-round campaigns and in
coordinated efforts. This, of course, requires administrative/ bureaucratic skills. But as
the American Revolutionary and Vietnam Wars cleraly show, the ability to field
consistently superior force, and win field engagements simply does not assure victor}'.
Perhaps the first war in modern warfare in which social skills played the
predominant role is the American Revolutionary War. Despite winning 19 of the 31





and winning a total of 37 additional minor engagements, the British still lost the
war.""^ This was certainly not due to any lack of military capability or inferior
physical, organizational, technical or administrative skills, but rather due to inferior
social skills. According to Lumpkin,
After comparatively easy captures of Savannah and Charleston, the British ...
committed one serious error after another. They overestimated the numbers of
Loyalists who would flock to their aid. They antagonized thoroughly the ver>'
people upon whose eventual support they must depend if victory were to be
achieved.... [Moreover], as it became increasingly clear that the British could not
protect their adherents or control the hinterland, an ever growing number of
southerners supported the partisans.... Both sides made blunders, but the British
mistakes could not be remidied. When they failed to subjugate Georgia and
South Carolina and win over ... the majority of the people, the British lost not
oniy the war in the South but the fmal and best chance to subdue the thirteen
colonies."^'
The same basic conclusion can be drawn for other wars in which social
skills were the predominant factor such as: Vietnam, Algeria, China. Nicaragua and
Cuba. This is clearly seen in the following observation made by Harry Summers about
Vietnam,
One of the most frustrating aspects of the Vietnam War from the Army's point
of view is that as far as logistics and tactics were concerned we succeeded in
ever^'thing we set out to do. At the height of the war the Army was able to
move almost a million soldiers a year in and out of Vietnam, feed them, clothe
them, supply them with arms and ammunition, and generally sustain them better
than any Army had ever been sustained in the field.... On the battlefield itself, the
Army was unbeatable. In engagement after engagement the forces of the Viet
Con^ and North Vietnamese were thrown back with terrible losses. Yet. in the'»
end. it was North Vietnam, not the United States that emerged victorious 238
The conclusion to be drawn here is both evident and inescapable. The
advantage the Americans enjoyed over the British and the Vietnamese over the
Americans was not technical or organizational or administrative, uut simply social.
Just as an army whose paramount skill is organizational cannot hope to defeat an
army having a technical paramount skill, so too, an army relying upon technical and
"'^^Lumpkin, op. cit., pp. 253-279. Major engagements are defined here as those
having a total of over 1,000 combatants -- atlcast 500 on each side -- involved.
-^^Ibid., p. 252.
^^^Summcrs, op. cit., p. 1.
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administrative skills cannot hope to defeat a belligerent whose paramount skill is social.
Moreover, as shall be seen in the coming chapters, relying upon administrative.
technical or organizational skills to combat the means of social warfare -- which can
include both guerrilla and terrorist methods -- are both inelTective and inappropriate.
D. SOCIAL WARFARE
Social warfare is a distinct subtype of warfare requiring its own paramount skill,
which in turn effects how best to employ force. Although social warfare has existed
since the early classical epoch and was greatly relied upon by the Roman Empire, for
the most part it has generally been regarded as a simple adjunct to the main business
of warfighting. Only after the advent of nuclear weaponry and the Brodie Paradox did
social warfare become a primary means of waging war in the modern epoch.
While there are exceptions, such as the Arab-Israeli conflicts, most conflicts
between nuclear equipped powers of their allies fall into the catagory of social warfare.
This section will briefly analyze social warfare, first as it evolved in the prenuclear eras
and then how it has developed in light of the Brodie Paradox. From this analysis we
will gain a better understanding of precisely what this form of warfare seeks to achieve
and how it does so. This, in turn, will provide a foundation for understanding not only
why terrorism exists, but how it can present a military challenge to the modern nation-
state.
1. Social Warfare Before the Nuclear Era
In order to have a fuller understanding of social warfare it is helpful to examine the
state from a structural perspective. The state, according to Barrv' Buzan, consists of
three primary- components: 1) physical, 2) institutional and 3) metaphysical. -^^^ The
physical component is the territory* and people existing within and subject to the state's
authority. The institutional component consists of the institutions o'i law and
government. Finally, and most important, the metaphysical component is the concept
or the idea of the state acknowledged and accepted by the populace itself As Buzan
notes.
We can infer from [this] ... that the state exists, or has its essence, primarily on
the social rather than on the physical plane. In other words, the state is more a
metaphysical entity, an idea held in common by a group of people, than it is a
physical organism.^'^^
" Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear. The National Security Problem in
International Relations (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1983) pp.
38-39.
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Given this we can see that should any one of these components cease to exist,
the state can no longer function as a sovereign entity within the international milieu.
Of course, the most important component is the common idea of the state. Indeed, as
the Armenian, South Moluccan and Palestinian irredentia have clearly shown, even
without sovereign territory the idea of the state - embodied in revolutionary terrorism
— is sufficient to make its presence felt within the international milieu. Viewed from a
structural perspective, the state would appear as shown in Table 5.
TABLE 5
THE COMPONENT PARTS OF THE STATE
IDEA
PHYSICAL ,. INSTITUTIONAL
(Source: Barry Buzan, People, Stares and Fear, op. cit., p. 40)
^
It is clear, then, that an attack on the state is not limited to simply destroying
the state's physical assets of territory and people, nor to disrupting its institutional
assets of command and control, but can -- and should - also entail an assault upon the
state on the social or moral plane. This is particularly true if the state in question is
already experiencing internal difficulties pertaining to questions of legitimacy of the
ruling regime, or the existing ideology or form of government. Again, according to
Buzan, "The distiguishing feature of weak states is their high level of concern with
domestically generated threats to the security of the government. """^^ This represents a
very clear weakness which should be capitalized upon by anyone seeking to wage war
upon that state.
The idea that a state could employ social forces within a targeted entity as a
weapon and means of war is a very old one. As Samuel Griffith points out. Sun Tzu
was well aware of the importance of national unity and cohesion in any struggle
between nations. Indeed, Sun Tzu stressed that no war be undertaken before the




Sun Tzu believed... war was to be preceeded by measures designed to make it
easy to win. The master conquerer frustrated the enemy's plans and broke up his
alliances. He created cleavages between sovereign and ministers, superiors and
inferiors, commanders and subordinates. His spies were everywhere, gathering
information, sowing dissention, and nurturing subversion. The enemy was
isolated and demoralized; his will to resist broken. Thus without battle his army
was conquered, his cities taken and his state overthrown." "
Using social forces to destabalize and weaken political opponents is therefore
an ancient ploy, and down through the centuries there have been many examples of
political struggles between two sovereign political entities being resolved in such a
manner. It has proven most effective in situations where the cleavages noted by Sun
Tzu already exist, are extremely pronounced and are irreconcilable.
These cleavages represent potential weaknesses in the structural cohesion of a
given political entity and provide a rough idea of how polarization might occur should
that cohesion be disrupted. From a structural perspective these cleavages can occur
vertically, horizontally or on both axes simultaneously. Vertical cleavages are social in
nature, representing such factors as race, religion, ideology and nationality. Horizontal
cleavages are those that prevent political mobility between the ruled and the rulers.
These cleavages are most pronounced, of course, when they occur on both planes
simultaneously; that is, when a group is excluded from integrating into society due to
some verticle cleavage and from participating in the political process at the same time.
As will be seen, such situations provide excellent opportunities for those willing to
exploit them.
While these factors are important in any war, they are particularly crucial in
wars in which neither belligerent has sufficient combat power to secure victory through
a war of annihilation. In such cases, both belligerents end up waging a war of attrition
wherein technical military means lose much of their importance in securing victor}^ In
such a war, military means derive their importance primarily from a defensive
perspective -- i.e.. they are important only to the point that they are able to deny
victory to the enemy. It is here that weaknesses in a beUigerent's social structure
becomes critical in determining victory. This is particularly true if the existing social
cleavages are so salient that a belligerent can harness disgruntled social forces within
the enemy camp. A few historical examples are sufficient to demonstate how this
functions.
242Sun Tzu. op dr., p. 39.
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One early, and highly effective example of a state harnessing and employing
internal social forces against a political entity is Queen Elizabeth I's support of the
Dutch rebels in the Spanish Netherlands during the 16th century. According to Will
and Ariel Durant, Elizabeth "... planned to support the revolt of the Netherlands
sufficiently to keep them, from surrendering to Spain or bequeathing themselves to
France. For as long as the revolt continued Spain would [be diverted] and stay out of
England."^^^-^
As Elizabeth quickly realized, enlisting the aid of these social forces made
combating Spanish policies an extremely efficient prospect. At the price of a relatively
small amount of gold coin, Elizabeth had a fanatically dedicated army which not only
did the bulk of the fighting and dying, it diverted vast amounts of Spanish political,
economic and militar}^ resources. In the end, the revolt in the Netherlands tipped the
scales in the favor of England. According to Theodore Ropp, "The Dutch revolt
played the same role in the decline of Spain as the Spanish revolt was to play in the fall
of Napoleon. It was the 'running sore' which drained off Spanish soldiers, Spanish
morale, and Spanish money. """^"^
As this example clearly shows, social forces can be harnessed and converted
into political;' military' power. Moreover, they are extremely efficient, promising ver>'
large returns for a relatively small investment. And, as shown above, the employment
of social forces can even be quite decisive. Equally important, ignoring these social
forces can be disasterous. Perhaps the best example of this is Hitler's invasion of the
Soviet Union on 22 June 1941.
The Soviet state which awaited Hitler's onslaught consisted of a patchwork of
dissaffected peoples verv- clearly deliniated by horizontal and vertical cleavages.
Millions had died during Stalin's collectivization of Soviet agriculture and political
purges. According to J.F.C. Fuller,
In 1941, in the Ukraine, White Russia and the Baltic States alone, some
40,000,000 people yv.drned for liberation; therefore in order to disintergrate the
colossus, all Hitler had to do was to cross the Russian frontier as a liberator, and
terminate collectivization. It would have won over to him, not only minorities,
but it would also have dissolved Stalin's armies, because they so largely consisted
of collectivized serfs. ^"^-^
1"*
"Will and Ariel Durant, The Story of Civilization, vol. 7. The Age of Reason
Begins (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1961) p. 33.
"^^Ropp, op. cit., p. 39.
245J.F.C. Fuller, op. clt., p. 262.
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In the first weeks following the invasion the Germans were recieved as
liberators. Everwhere, particularly in the Baltic States and the Ukraine German
soldiers were greated by cheering, happy people. By December nearly 2.5 million
Soviet soldiers had surrendered, many v^dshing to join Germany's crusade against
Bolshevism.-"^^ Then came Heinrich Himmler's special action detachments called the
Sichereitdienst, or SD, whose purpose was the subjugation of the inhabitants of the
newly conquered territories. It was the incredibly brutal methods employed by the SD
that saved the politically bankrupt ideology of Bolshevism. As one contemporary
German observer noted, "By rousing the Russian people to a Napoleonic fervor we
enabled the Bolsheviks to achieve a political consolidation beyond their wildest dreams
and provided their cause with the halo of a 'patriotic war'."^'* '^
The results, of course, were catastrophic for Germany. Ignoring these social
factors was a supreme error on the part of Hitler and his NAZI regime, and the lesson
it provides is quite clear. Not only can social factors be harnessed by an outside
sovereign power, failure to do so can quickly lead to disaster.
There are limitations, however, in any attempt to harness and direct social
forces located in the enemy camp. The three major drawbacks are: 1) the social forces
generally have objectives of their own which may not be compatible with those of the
sponsoring state, 2) these forces are often unpredictable and are difficult ot control,
and 3) often these social forces take years or even decades to develop to the point they
can be considered an important factor. All three of these factors are readily seen by
returning to the English conflict with Spain in the 16th century.
The English quickly learned by their support of the Dutch rebels in the
Spanish Netherlands that today's ideological ally can become tomorrow's nationahst
enemy. English support of their Protestant Dutch bretheren undoubtedly was a
decisive factor in the latter's overthrow of the Catholic Spanish colonial yoke. The end
result for England, however, was not the creation of a natural ally, but a new economic
and military rival. Within one hundred years, Holland and England would go to war
three times as both nations sought to gain supremacy of the seas.""*^
^^^Ibid., p. 263.
^'^'ibid., p. 264.
Ropp, op. dr., p. 67.
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The Spanish also found that social forces were often ver\" unpredictable and
dilTicult to control. About the same time the EngUsh began to back the Protestant
Dutch rebels, the Spanish began to support the Catholic rebels in Scotland and
Ireland. While these rebels were to eventually divert vast amounts oi^ English political
and militaPv' resources, at the time of the Spanish Armada in 1588 they were still not a
significant factor. Indeed, as the Spanish sailors from the defeated Armada quickly
learned, Ireland was no safehaven. Shipwrecked crews and landing parties alike were
hacked to pieces by the same Irish Catholic peasantry that Spain sought to use against
England.
Time was also a factor. While they were efficient, social forces often required
years, even decades to generate sufiicient power to be decisive. Certainly more was
settled between Spain and England during the ten-day naval battle of the Spanish
Armada than in the previous ten years of internecine warfare in the Netherlands.
Nations all to often simply do not have sufTicient time to adequately harness and
employ even existing social forces much less expend years of careful nurturing in the
hopes of creating such forces. Thus, for the most part, nations tended to rely upon
their own militar\' instrument to resolve disputes and achieve political objectives. They
might be less elTicient over the long-run, but they were certainly more decisive and
effective when an immediate decision was necessar}- and desired.
Even as continued technological advancements made warfare increasingly
costly, unlimited, total warfare remained an integral element of national policy well
into the rpesent century.^"^^ Ephemeral psychological and sociological factors continued
to be employed whenever possible, but were generally simply an adjunct to
conventional warfare. Military men understandibly tended to rely more heavily upon
the more tangible and more easily calculated technical aspects of armed conflict. The
results from a 'whifT of grapeshot' were simply far more easy to calculate, direct and
control than the actions of the rabble of the street. The prospect of using social forces
^"^^There were many, of course, who did question the utility of total war under
modern conditions even before the turn of the centur>\ Some students of warfare like
Ivan S. Bloch, were well aware of the horrible costs of total war between states armed
with modern weaponry. Well before the outbreak of World War I Bloch had written
that the terrible costs of such warfare rendered it counter-productive. Citing the
incredible, unprecedented slaughter, the slowly moving armies engaged in long and
indecisive battles and the incredible strain on the civil populace to sustain such a war,
Bloch questioned whether the social fabric of any nation could withstand the stresses
of m.odern war. See Ivan Bloch, The Future of War in its Technical. Economic, and
Political Relations, translated by R.C. Long {Boston, 1903).
102
as the predominant means of warfare was, for the time being, simply out of the
question.
Even nations born of revolution and built on an ideological foundation calling
for the export of social revolution, such as the Soviet Union, relied almost exclusively
upon its military instrument to consolidate and expand its own revolution. Although
Lenin had initially created the Red Army not as an army of the state but as an army of
the world Proletariat,^^^ when the revolution did not spread of its own accord across
the rest of Europe, revolutionary rhetoric quickly gave way to the pragmatic
requirements of defending the Soviet state. Until a mere forty years ago, the primary
means of expanding the Socialist revolution was through the employment of the Soviet
army. As will be seen, these conditions were to change with the advent of nuclear
weaponry, however.
2. Social Warfare in the Nuclear Era
As was seen earlier in this chapter, nuclear weaponry brought about a
profound change in the nature of war. Indeed, as established by the Brodie Paradox, a
nuclear power simply could not employ its militan.' instrument against another nuclear
power due to the fear of uncontrolled escalation to full scale nuclear war wherein
'victory' was unachievable in any classical definition of the term. In short, even hmited
conventional warfare between nuclear powers had to be avoided because the results
were too unpredictable; the situation too unstable. Clearly, lethal force would have to
come in some other form if it was to have any utility in achieving policy goals.
Ironically, what had been the least stable and most unpredictable means of
employing lethal force for political ends, now became the most stable. Rather than
rely upon unlimited total warfare requiring the mobilization of the full spectrum of a
nation's military, economic, political and social resources, states began to employ low-
intensity conflicts often using surrogate militar}^ forces.
While many nuclear equipped nations have sought to capitalize on the utility
of low-intensity conflicts, it is the Soviet Union that has probably best operationalized
the employment of social forces for the attainment of foreign policy objectives. Two
Soviet operational concepts are particularly helpful here: 1) The Correlation of Forces
and 2) Wars of National Liberation.
Michel Gardner, A History of the Soviet Army (New York: Praeger Publishers,
1966) p. 47.
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The Correlation of Forces is not equivalent to Western notions of the balance
of power. This latter concept relies almost exclusively upon measurements of militan."
power. While niilitar\' power is a major element of the Correlation of Forces, this
concept includes much more. According to A. Sergiyev,
The foreign policy potential of a state depends not only upon its own forces and
internal resources but, to a considerable extent, on such factors as the existence
of reliable socio-political allies am.ong other states, national contingents of
congenial classes, mass international movements and other political forces active
in the world scene.^"^
From this it is clear that the Soviets understand that political power is not
only subject to the availability of resources of the state initiating foreign policy actions,
but also dependent upon the socio-political environment in which those resources
operate. Vernon Aspaturian puts it this way,
Soviet leaders, in short, have long recognized that social conflicts, tensions,
frustrations and resentments... conceal tremendous reserves of pent-up social
power, which can be detected by dialectical analysis and then tapped, mobilized,
and transmuted into concrete political power subject to the manipulation of
Soviet [foreign] policy.'^""
Correlation of Forces considerations are, therefore, carefully factored into any
Soviet foreign policy decision, and major committments of Soviet resources are
extremely unlikely if the socio-political environment does not augur well for the rapid
achievement of a given policy objective. There is, however, one very important factor
that would prevent Soviet commitment to a given foreign policy objective even if the
local Correlation of Forces were ripe for exploitation, and that is if such an objective
would directly threaten the security of the Soviet state. It is here that the concept of
Wars of National Liberation comes into play.
The importance of Wars of National Liberation is that they permit the USSR
to support the expansion of Soci'^lism without directly involving the Soviet state. The
local, indigenous population provides the bulk of the necessary power in the form of
combatants and support organizations, while the USSR supplies weapons - often
--^^A. Sergiyev, "Leninism on the Correlation of Forces as a Factor of
International Relations," International Affairs, May 1975, p. 103. As quoted in Vernon
Aspaturian, "Soviet Global Power and the Correlation of Forces," Problems of
Communism, May-June 1980, p. 10.
"^^Vernon Aspaturian, "Soviet Global Power and the Correlation of Forces,"
Problems of Communism, May-June 1980, p. 10.
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laundered through a third nation -- and oflers training and technical expertise. As
Khrushchev repeatedly emphasized, these wars were not to be equated with wars
between states, but rather were wars of indigenous popular uprisings to throw ofT the
"... bonds of imperialist tyrrany."-^^
In this way, the Soviet Union is able to "peacefully coexist" within the
fraternity of nation-states, while at the same time undermine it. William Odom points
out that "peace" to the Soviet Union "... means the destruction of all nonsocialist states
... without [resorting to] interstate wars."'*'^ He continues to underscore this point by
stating, "... peaceful coexistence in the Soviet definition is a continuation of the
international class struggle by other than direct military means whenever possible.""-^
In other words, to wage the conflict and win the victorv' by employing indigenous
revolutionary' movem.ents to serve as surrogate military/political forces in the struggle
against capitalism. And, given its utility in revolutionary warfare, terrorism is often
included in these Soviet sponsored conflicts.
The objective of the Soviet Union, then, is total; the destruction of all non-
Socialist states. Its means, however, are limited. That is. the USSR is waging a total
war of attrition against the Western powers in which the political, military, economic
and social resources of the targeted nations are slowly eroded by an ever-increasing
expenditure of efibrt to contain the agitated social forces located in the areas where
Western governments are still in control. In short, it represents national revolutionary
warfare expanded to global proportions with the ultimate objective being to create
conditions wherein the targeted entity is weakened by internal strife and ultimately
collapses of its ovm. weight or is easily conquered by conventional military means.
The Soviet model, therefore, provides a means of understanding surrogate
warfare in terms of exploiting local, indigenous social forces for political objectives.
Equally important, it establishes that surrogate warfare is operative under current
structural conditions governed by the threat of nuclear warfare. It is important to
note, of course, that the Soviet Union is not the only nation to engage in surrogate
warfare. Other nations can and do benefit from the same conditions the Soviets have
so clearly operationalized. The United States supports the Nicaraguan Contras and
'Hannes Adomeit, Soviet Risk-Taking and Crisis Behavior: A Theoretical and
Empirical Analysis (Boston: George Allen and Unwin, 1982) p. 223.
'^William Odom, "Soviet Force Posture: Dilemmas and Directions," Problems of
Communism, July-August 1985, p. 2.
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the Mujahadeen in Afganistan to contain the spread of Marxism. Libya, Syria and
Iran support various Islamic factions against Israel and the West. But there is a
considerable range in the type of surrogate forces available to be supported. These
rage from conventional forces employed by allied states -- such as the Soviet use of
Cuban forces in Angola and Ethiopia -- to guerrilla forces, to terrorism.
The conditions of the nuclear era have made it possible to employ terrorism as
a viable means to effect policy goals. This is particularly true regarding conflicts
between nuclear equipped powers and their allies. As the French author R. Gaucher
has observed,
The truth is, at a time when it is difficult to mobilize great masses of people
without provoking a global conflict with irreparable damage, terrorism tends to
become a substitute for [classical] war.'^'^
There are some who even suggest that state sponsored terrorism is a new form
of world war. For instance, the Dutch political scientist Hylke Tromp believes that
surrogate terrorism is a "Third World War which has assumed the completely
unexpected form of 'protracted' warfare by terroristic methods..."."^ Terrorism, then,
is clearly considered by many to be a viable means of conflict resolution under current
conditions of the Nuclear Era.
E. SUMMATION
Although all warfare is based upon immutable laws and principles the methods of
war vary according to the objectives sought, the means employed, and the conditions
which govern the era in which the war is being waged. As shown in Table 3, war can
be classified according to six characteristics: 1) total, 2) limited, 3) positional, 4)
evasion, 5) annihilation, and 6) attrition. It is the various combinations of these six
characteristics which determines the type of war that is being waged at a given time.
Additionally, depending upon the evolutionary- era in which the war is being waged,
different types of warfighting skills are necessary in order to assure or atleast enhance
the chances of victorv'. In the unorganized warfare of the Medieval Era, the
^^^R. Gaucher, Les Terroristes (Paris: 1965) p. 359. As quoted in Alex P.
Schmid, Political Terrorism: A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, Data Bases and
Literature (Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing Co., 1983; Transaction Books, 1985)
p. 206.
"^"^Hylke Tromp, "Politiek Terrorisme: De Derde Wereldoorlog in een Volstrekt
Onverwachte Vorm?" Universiteitskrant (Gronigen: 1978) p. 11. As quoted in Schmid,
Ibid., p. 208.
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paramount skill is the physical skill of the primar>' combatant -- the mounted knight.
This form of warfare gave way to the organized warfare of the Neo-Classical Era.
Here the paramount skill is the ability to create and maintian cohesive combat units on
the battlefield which are able to fight and maneuver at the will of a single commander
-- i.e., organizational skills. Neo-Classical warfare gave way to Early Modern warfare
wherein the paramount skill became the ability to field, employ, and support superior
technological means of waging war. The paramount skill in Late Modem warfare
became the ability to mobilize and coordinate the full range of warfighting resources
available to the belligerent. Although other skills v/ere to remain important, even
armed forces having inferior physical, organizational, and technical skills could emerge
victorious providing it enjoyed superior administrative skills.
Finally, the paramount skill found in the Nuclear Era is social skills, which
represents the belligerent's ability to directly manipulate the enemy's will to fight
without first having to engage and defeat its armed forces. Again, other warfighting
skills are important -- but the ultimate and sufficient requirement of militarv' force is
primarily defensive, that is it preserves the belligerent's ability to continue to wage the
war. It is not annihilative victories, superior technical or administrative means, more
cohesive combat units or physically superior combatants which secure victor}' in social
warfare, but the ability to wear down the resolve of the populace of the targeted entity
to continue the war that determines victory. As will be seen in the coming chapters,




This chapter introduces terrorism providing a basic definition of the phenomenon
and describing how it employs force. Like war, terrorism is a highly specialized activity
having unique characteristics that can be isolated, studied and understood. It is a
recurring phenomenon consisting of individual events that are, never-the-less, based
upon the same basic patterns of activities and motives. This chapter will identify the
consistencies and patterns that provide the foundation and common denominator for
all terrorist activities. This will provide, in turn, a basic understanding of the various
types of terrorism that will be discussed in successive chapters. These include:
apolitical terrorism, state terrorism and revolutionary terrorism. In addition to
explaining the unique characteristics of each of the forms of terrorism introduced, the
successive chapters will also analyze each type from the perspective of the purpose and
function of war introduced in the first three chapters of this work. In this manner it
will become possible to identify which of the various forms of terrorism are also forms
of war.
B. DEFINING TERRORISM
Nearly every discussion of terrorism necessarily begins with wrestling with the
definition of terror and terrorism. The reason it is so difficult to define these termiS
stems from cultural, professional or political biases which can strongly affect the
definition formulated. Alex Schmid suggest, "The question of definition of a term like
terrorism cannot be detached from the question of who is the defining agency.""'^ J.
Bo'w.yer Bell supports this contention in his statement that, "The very word [terrorism]
becomes a litmus test for dearly held behefs, so that a brief conversation on terrorist
matters with almost anyone reveals a special world view, an interpretation of the
nature of man, and a glimpse into a desired future. "-^'^ It often boils down to a
normative question of whether one perceives terrorism to be a positive (good) force or
a negative (bad) force. For the political scientist, however, this is not the issue. The
~'^Alex P. Schmid, op. cit., p. 6.
J. Bov^^'yer Bell, A Time of Terror. How Democratic Societies Respond to
Revolutionary Violence. (New York: Basic Books, 1978) p. X. As quoted in Schmid,
op. cit., p. 6.
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political scientist seel<.s to understand tiie phenomenon, not justify it.-^^ Still, there is
an extremely wide range of "scientific" definitions of terror and terrorism.
Nearly ever\'one will accept a dictionary definition of the word terror. But terror
is a subjective phenomenon. As Grant Wardlaw notes, "We all have different
thresholds of fear and our personal and cultural backgrounds make certain images,
experiences, or fears more terrifying to each of us than others."" This subjectiveness
makes it extremely difficult to scientifically operationalize the concept of terror. And,
since terror is an integral part of terrorism it stands to reason that terrorism is equally
difficult to operationalize. Consequently, any definition of terror and terrorism, is, of
necessity, an arbitrary one -- the primary purpose of which is to establish a point of
reference or departure for further discussion. It is with this caveat in mind that the
following definitions are offered.
' Terror' is an intense paralyzing fear^ or the dread of it. ' Terrorism' is a deliberate
attempt to create terror through a symbolic act involving the use or threat of
abnormal lethalforce for the purpose of influencing a target group or individual.
The term 'lethal force' is used in lieu of 'lethal violence' due to the pejorative
nature of the latter term. In conventional parlance 'violence' connotes the illegitimate
use of force; as in 'criminal violence' . But even when coupled with a more "neutral"
term such as 'political violence' it still conjures images of force used against a legitimate,
established authority. As observed by Hanna Arendt, "Violence can be justifiable, but
it never will be legitimate." Consequently, this paper employs the more neutral term
'force' to avoid to the greatest possible degree any normative concepts. Terrorism, as
this paper seeks to establish, is an instrument of war. Like any instrument of war,
terrorism may be used in a manner considered by those adhering to the ideological
school as being "good" or "evil". Certainly the same Western democratic nations that
today decry the use of terrorism as being evil, barbarous, or criminal would have
warmly applauded the terrorist attack on Adolf Hitler and his NAZI regime in July
1944. And, to use a more contemporary case; were Gadhafi to meet the same fate as
Anwar Sadat, few in the Western democratic world would be likely to condemn such
an act. Clearly, then arguments of the legitimacy of the use of force in a terroristic
^^^Grant Wardlaw, op. cit., p. 5.
2^^Ibid., p. 8.
-^ £ '^
'"Hanna Arendt, On Violence (New York: Harcourt. Brace, Jovanovich. 1970)
p. 46. As quoted in Schmid, op. cit., p. 13.
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manner are superfluous to understanding the utility of that force. Such arguments will
therefore not be addressed in this paper.
This is not to say, however, that this paper analyzes only the objective and
rejects the subjective aspects of terrorism. Not only is such objectivity impossible to
achieve, it would be counter-productive. As mentioned in Chapter Two, men adhere to
certain feelings or beliefs and this in turn affects how, when, and where they apply
lethal force. The normative values of mankind inhibit, restrict or channel the
employment of lethal force. These normative values, thereby become part of the power
equation. As Andrew Schmookler observes.
Value may be defined as the basis for choice. In the absence of values, any
alternative is as good as any other. Indifference reigns. To be or not to be can
be no question, for there is no basis for answering. Values are implicit in any
choice, and choice is required for any action. "^^
Terrorism is called 'terrorism because it violates the normative values of the
target entity regarding the employment of lethal force. The more horrifying the act the
greater the psychological impact upon the target. According to Alex Schmid this
extranormalness is what sets terrorism apart from all other forms of force employment.
He writes,
The adherence to social norms in human interactions makes behavior predictable
and thereby contributes to a sense of security.... Even m wartime some minimal
rules of conduct are observed most of the time by the belligerents. Deliberate
attacks on civilians are not considered justified in war either as an end or a
means to an end. Certain basic rights are granted to the enemy in war, such as
humane treatment of prisoners and special consideration for women, children and
old people.... All this is absent when we speak of terrorism.... No rule of combat
is respected if the rule violation serves the terrorist's purpose."^'*
It is this factor of abnormality that separates terrorist force from other types of
force employment. This of course invites the question of what is to be considered
abnormal. Clearly, abnormality is at best a transitive phenomenon. As Schmid notes,
when tanks and poison gas were first used in combat they were considered abnormal
and caused panic and terror among those v/ho initially faced them.'^^^ Today most
^^^Schmookler, op. cit., p. 138. (Italics in original).
-^•^Schmid, op. cit., p. 109.
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people would probably agree that tanks are normal, legitimate instruments of war,
while poison gas is not.
Perhaps the most widely accepted criterion used to define abnormal force in war
is the killing of noncombatants -- particularly civilians. Even this was not always
considered abnormal, however. Indeed, killing civilians was considered common place
until it went too far during the Thirty Years War. The sack of Magdeburg in May
1631 was so complete and bloody that historian H.W. Koch calls it the Hiroshima of
the Thirty Years War.-^^^ Nearly all of Christendom was repelled at the horror of the
wanton pillaging, slaughter and destruction. The reaction to this and the terrible cost
of the war in general resulted in the Peace of Westphalia which, among other things,
placed limitations on warfare and protected noncombatants from its scourges. As
Gwynne Dyer notes, 'Tt was a century and a half before there was another war in
Europe that caused deaths on anything like the same scale, and fully three centuries ...
before civilian losses again outnumbered military casualties." But by World War I
and certainly by World War II killing civiHans once again became less and less an
abnormal element of warfare.
Clearly, then, abnormality is a transitory factor subject to the interpretations of
those involved in the incident at the time. Rather than try to identify abnormality in
terms of weapons or methods, this paper will simply accept as abnormal anything
identified as such by the most widely accepted cultural mores of the group receiving the
lethal force. For instance, for a soldier who enters combat for the first time, being shot
at is an extremely unusual and probably unprecedented event, but it is hardly abnormal
-- providing the soldier is being shot at by an enemy soldier. Soldiers are trained and
expected to shoot and be shot at. The same can be said for bombing cities. During
World War II nearly every belligerent that could bomb enemy cities did so with the
general concurrence of the civilian populations of the nations doing the bombing --
particularly those populations which had already suffered under enemy bombing.
Certainly by the time America entered the war. bombing cities and killing civilians was
considered simply another factor of modern warfare and definitely not an abnormal use
of lethal force.
^^^Ibid., p. 107.
^^^H.W. Koch, op. cit., p. 32.
^^^Gwynne Dyer, op. cit., p. 60.
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Abnormal force, by itself, is not sufficient to establish that an event is an act of
terror, however. The perpetrator of the act must intend to terrorize the target for
abnormal lethal force to be considered terrorism. For instance the Soviet downing of a
Korean civilian airliner in September 1983 was certainly an example of abnormal force,
but in all probability it was not an act of terror. Indeed, there is considerable evidence
to substantiate the Soviet claim that they -- or at least anyone who had the authority
to countermand Soviet Air Defense Command (PVO) standing operating orders
requiring all unidentified intruders be shot down -- did not know the target was a
civilian airliner.-^^^ While it was the intention of the Soviet Union to defend its
airspace, Moscow apparently had no intention of terrorizing anyone through the
employment of lethal force. Consequently, though it is inexcusable that Soviet
command and control procedures were so rigid and cumbersome that 269 civilians
were needlessly killed, the shooting down of the airliner was not an act of terror.
Lethal force is terrorism only when the force employed is considered abnormal by
those receiving that force and when it is the intention of the perpetrator of the force to
terrorize the target. Remove either factor and no matter how terrifying the deaths of
the victims, what occurs is not terrorism.
It is also important to understand at the outset that terrorism does not equate to
any particular ideology. It does not fall solely within the purview of communism,
fascism or (jointly) totalitarianism.'^^^ Nor is it strictly an instrument of anarchism.
Terrorism was used by both loyalists and rebels in the southern colonies during the
American Revolutionary War. During the American Civil War, Mosby's Rangers
often conducted operations in which terrorism, as defined above, was employed.
Moreover, both NAZI Germany and democratic Britain attempted to terrorize each
other's populations during World War II by employing airpower against civilian
targets. So terrorism is an instrument having utility in achieving the objectives of any
group, regardless of ideology - although some are clearly more Ukely to employ a
certain form of terrorism than another.
^^^Alexander Dallin, Black Box: KAL 007 and the Superpowers (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1985) pp. 61-65.
^^^Schmid, op. cit., pp. 52-55.
112
C. HOW TERRORISM FUNCTIONS
Follow'ing nearly every terrorist attack, statesmen and journalists condemn the
attack as being "barbaric", "criminal", "mindless" and so on. Depending upon one's
definition of the terms, such attacks may indeed be "barbaric" or "criminal". One thing
is certain, however — such attacks are seldom, if ever, "mindless". As Michael Stohl
contends, the idea that political terrorism is the province of madmen is a myth; one "...
that finds a particularly warm reception in the American media and in government
statements concerning terrorism...".^ '^^ As suggested by the definition of terrorism
presented in the previous section terrorism is not mindless violence, but the
employment of lethal force to create certain conditions that, in turn, improve the
probability of achieving a given end.
At the most basic level the purpose of all terrorism is to influence the behavior of
some target entity. This normally, but not always, entails the creation of a state of
fear or terror in a target collectivity that is so intense that is renders that target helpless
" unable or unwilling to resist. Precisely how this condition is achieved will var\' from
target to target and will depend to a great extent upon w^ho is the terrorist and who is
the terrorized. Obviously the means employed would vary greatly between a
government employing state terrorism on an unarmed populace and a small
revolutionary band employing agitational or revolutionary terrorism. Ultimately, the
end sought is essentially the same — to undermine and destroy the cohesion of the
target entity, reducing it to its smallest constituent part; the isolated, individual human
being. As Grant Wardlaw contends. "The ultimate [expression] of the terrorization
process occurs when the individual is so isolated as to be unable to draw strength from
usual social supports and is cast entirely upon his or her own resources. "-^"^^ In such
cases the very cohesion of society is in jeopardy and resistance to the terrorist becomes
increasingly difficult. The terrorized target becomes malleable or indifferent and. hence,
no longer a factor in the power equation.
Eugene Walter, writing of the institutionalized terror of the 19th centur>' Zulu
king Shaka, noted that terror was an effective tool for controlling the body politic.
Terror effectively rendered resistance psychologically and behaviorally impossible for
his subjects.
^
''^Michael Stohl, "Myths and Realities of Political Terrorism," The Politics of
Terrorism, edited by Michael Stohl, (New York: Marcel Dekker, Inc., 1979) p. 5.
^"^HVardlaw, op. cit., p. 34.
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The aim was to deny the people any resistance potential, that is, to deny their
ability to participate in the power process, by withdrawing their empowering
responses that would collapse the established order.... It is also interesting that
over a period of time there was overt behavioral evidence that participation in
maintaining terror arose to the point of offering no protest, or even of gladly
v/elcoming one's own destruction; and this occured at all levels in the body
politic.-^^
Such examples are not restricted to institutionalized "terror form above". As the
NAZIs clearly estabUshed in the late 1920s and early 1930s in Weimar Germany,
terrorism also had utility in combating the regime. Hitler employed terrorism to
undermine and disrupt key elements of the German social base. Force was used by
NAZI SA (Sturmabteilung) stormtroopers to alter certain conventions within German
society in order to make a democratic form of government inappropriate to it."'^ As
Martin Oppenheimer observes in his book. The Urban Guerrilla,
By the use of street brawling, beatings, and assassinations, the NAZI party
discredited 'arsument and compromise as political means' and transferred
political decision-making from the parliamentary environment to the streets."
Under such conditions the average German citizen became politically malleable
or withdrew from politics altogether. Hitler continued to employ terrorism once he
gained power. As William S. Allen has noted, this terrorization clearly affected the
cohesion of the targeted entity resulting in the breaking down of social mores which
could be measured through a concomitant rise in the crime rate.^''^ He goes on to write
that,
The evidence suggest some kind of social disorganization, resulting possibly from
the effect of living the life of insincerity required by the NAZI regime. [There
resulted] ... a general breakdown of trust and ... the destruction or perversion of
^'"Harold D. Lasswell, "Terrorism and the Political Process", Terrorism: An
International Journal Vol. 1, Numbers 3/4, (1978) pp. 260-261. (Quoting Eugene
Walter.)
"^"Russell Rhyme, "Patterns of Subversion by Violence, Annals, Vol. 341. (May
1962), 65-73. As quoted m Martin Oppenheimer, The Urban Guerrilla (Chicago:
Quadrangle Books, 1969) p. 75.
^
'"^Martin Oppenheimer, The Urban Guerrilla (Chicago: Quadrangle Books,
1969) p. 75.
"^^William S. Allen, "The German People and National Socialism: The
Experience of One Town," Adolf Hitler and the Third Reich, 1 93 3- J 945, edited by
Robert E. Herzstein (Boston: Houghton Mifllin Co., 1971) pp. 20-21.
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hitherto imirying social organizations. The response of the individual was
generally withdrawal, sometimes aggression.'^
Moreover, as recent events in Kentucky have shown, terrorism can be employed
even in an open democracy and can result in precisely the same psycho-social results.
For instance, Jules Loh has noted the effects of a small number of allegedly corrupt
officials in a small, isolated Kentucky county.^
'"^
Sixteen persons, including the county
judge and sheriff were arrested for crimes including extortion, drug-running, and
larceny. Quoting the local newspaper editor, Loh writes,
We've had murders go unsolved, burnings go unsolved, shooting go unsolved.
The people feel betrayed and feel they can't trust the police and the courts....
When that happens, the whole structure of how people hold together their lives
begins to wobble. When they ask themselves 'Whom can I trust?' and the
answer is 'nobody', they tend to build a shell around themselves. There soes our
sense or community.'
The end result in each of the above-cited cases was the destruction or at least
disruption of the psychological ties that bind human beings to larger psycho-social
organisms such as the local or state community. In short, its cohesion is shattered.
According to Alexander Dallin and George Breslauer,
Terrorism affects the social structure as well as the individual; it upsets the
framework of the precepts and images which members of society depend on and
trust. Since one no longer knows what sort of behavior to expect from other
members of society, the system is disoriented. The formerly coherent community
dissolves into a mass of anomic individuals, each concerned only with personal
survival.'^ '^
Once the conventions of a given society are disrupted to such a degree, they may
be relatively easily replaced by conventions provided by the terrorists. Grant Wardlaw
suggests that the disoriented victim of terrorism often does not know what he fears, or
the source of his fear lies outside his field of experience.
2^^Ibid., p. 21.
^"^Jules Loh, "Big-Time Crime Hits Kentucky Hill Country," (Associated Press)
San Jose Mercury News (July 20, 19S6) P. 1 1 A.
^^^Ibid.
Alexander Dallin and George Breslauer, Political Terror in Communist Systems
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970) p. 2. As quoted in Schmid, op. cit., pp.
172-173.
115
[And] if the victim cannot obtain an understanding of the source of danger within
a framework which he or she is able to construct from his or lier own resources,
it is Hkely he or she will turn to a leader who gives the appearance of wisdom
[and has] ... the strength to interpret and control events. "^^
Gerald Holten would agree. He notes that, "... precipitous changes in the human
condition stretch personal and historic memory' beyond [ordinan.'] limits ... leaving the
psyche different, distorted, and ready to crystalize ... in new ways."^^^ The disoriented
individual is in a mental state approaching neurosis and to relieve his anxiety the
individual is ready to accept almost any structure promising to bring order out of the
existing chaos. It is at this point the terrorists have achieved their first goal. They
have created conditions amenable to achieving specific ends. The terrorized, target
entity is likely to accept any alternate social conventions preferred by the terrorists so
long as it promises restored order. The terrorists, in turn, may ic-baild society in their
own image and in a manner so as to achieve their own ends. Clearly the use of
terrorism in such a manner cannot be described as "mindless".
What is important to understand is that terrorism can result in a multitude of
reactions. There are varving decrees of "being terrorized". Thomas Thornton has
identified four broad categories of responses to terrorism which are shown in Table 6
below. Depending upon the terrorist's goals, they will seek to create a level of
response most likely to bring that end to pass.
Different forms of terrorism, then, may require different levels of responses in
order to achieve their ends. For example, revolutionary terrorist seeking to mobilize
the population against the regime would wish to create anxiety (level III) wherein the
population becomes "disoriented and seeks guidance". These same terrorists would
assiduously avoid creating despair (level IV), however, since a totally withdrawn and
atomized populace would be both unwilling and unable to mobilize against the regime.
Despair would, on the other hand, suit certain types of state terrorists if their goal was
to create a totally apolitical society or destroy the cohesion of an enemy's society.
Terrorist must therefore tailor their force-employment in order to achieve their desired
end. Yet, at the most basic level, the process is essentially the same. The terrorists
employ force to destroy the cohesion of the target entity thereby destroying its ability
and 'or willinaness to resist.
^^'^Wardlaw, op. cit., p. 35.
"Gerald Holton. "Reflections on Modern Terrorism," Terrorism: An
International Journal, Vol. 1. Numbers 3,4. (1978), P. 271.
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TABLE 6
THORNTON'S FOUR LEVELS OF RESPONSE TO TERROR
/. Enthusiasm — The one positive response to be achieved is enthusiasm among the
terrorists (and those thev wish to garner as supporters.) This is represents strictly a
morale building function.'
//. Fright -- This is the lowest negative reaction in which the frightened person
experiences a specific danger that is not quantitatively different front other dangers
with which he is personallv or vicariously familiar. Since the perceived danger fits mto^
the pattern of his previous experience, 'his response will be meaningful m terms of
familiar norms of action; it will be both subjectively and objectively logical and
reasonably predictable.
///. Anxiety -- This is the middle level response which is called forth by fear of the
unknown and the unknowable. Traditional norms of behavior show no' relevance to
the new situation, and the victim becomes disoriented, casting about for guidance. The
exact nature of response is unpredictable, but it is likely to lead to activity that is
logical in terms of the new situation as perceived by the target.
IV. Despair — This is the most extreme level of response, which is basically an
intensified form of anxiety. The victim perceives the threat to be so sreat and
unavoidable that there is no course of action open to him that is likely to bfing relief
As a result the victim withdraws from the situation to the maximum po'ssible extent.
(Source: Thomas P. Thornton, "Terror as a Weapon of Political Agitation." Internal
War. Problems and Approaches, edited by Harrv Eckstein (New York: The Free Press
of Glencoe, 1964) pp. 5O-8I. As presented in Schmud, op. cit., p. 71.)
To this point the terms terrorist victim and terrorist target have been used
interchangeably. But in many cases they are not equivalent. According to Brian
Jenkins,
Terrorism is violence for effect; not only, and sometimes not at all, for the effect
on the actual victims of the terrorists. In fact the victims may be totally
unrelated to the terrorists cause. Terrorism is violence aimed at the people
watching. Fear is the intended effect, not the by-product of [the force
employment. ]~^^
In a classical terrorist scenario, the terrorists attack a specific "victim" in order to
convey a message to a given target group or individual who, in turn, experiences
chronic fear or terror of the terrorists. As shown in Table 7, there are three discrete
elements in classical terrorist acts: 1) the terrorist, 2) the victim and 3) the target.
From Table 7 one may conclude that terrorism is a process having, as Eugene
Walter suggests, "... three elements: the act or threat of violence, the emotional
reaction to extreme fear on the part of the ... potential (future) victims, and the social
effects that follow the violence (or its threat) and the consequent fear."^^^ The true
Brian Jenkins, International Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict. (Los Angles:
Cresent Publications, 1975) p. 1.





(2) VICTIM(S) (3) TARGET
(1) Employment of lethal force or threat thereof
(2) Results in communication of ?;^1 to the taraet group.
(3) Results m the target's fear or terror of thelerrorists.
[Source: Alex P. Schmid and J. de Graaf. Violence as Communication, (London: Sase
Publications, Ltd., 1982) p. 176. As quoted in Schmid, op. cit., p. 91.]
product of the terroristic process, then, is not the physical attack on the victim, but the
psychological impact upon the target. As a consequence, the terrorist's victims must be
carefully selected in order to assure the maximum possible psychological impact upon
the target. This is achieved by selecting victims having some sort of symbolic
significance to the target entity. To again cite Thorton, "... the optimum targets are
clearly those that show the highest symbolic value and are dominated by symbols that
are most vulnerable to attack."*^'* Moreover, "Terrorism," writes Schmid, "is symbolic
in the sense of 'you too might become a victim' ... because of some common quality,
e.g., membership in the same class, party, creed, [or] race."^^^
This process is clearly seen in descriptions of the first terrorist induced revolution
in history; the revolt of the Jews against Roman rule in 132-135 A.D. As the Roman-
Jewish chronicler Josephus clearly discloses in his history of this revolt, the terrorists,
or Sicarii as they were then called, succeeded in creating conditions ripe for revolt
against Rome through the employment of terroristic force against Jewish leaders who
opposed the revolution. Josephus wrote of the Sicarii that,
Their favorite trick was to mingle with the festival crowds, concealing under their
garments small daggers with which they stabbed their opponents. When their
victims fell, the assassins melted into the indignant crowd.... [And] more terrible
than the crimes themselves was the fear thev aroused, everv man hourlv
expecting death as in war.'^^^
Case Studies of Some Primitive African Communities. (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1969) p. 5. As quoted in Wardlaw, op. cit., p. 12.
^^"^Thornton, op. cit., p. 86.
^^'Schmid, op. cit., p. 86.
^^^Josephus, The Jewish War, translated by G.A. Williamson (New York: Dorset
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Bv targeting these svmbolic victims the Sicarii manaced to silence most of those
who openly sought to avoid war with the Romans. In this way, the terrorists assured
that only their views took hold among the populace and, equally important, insured
that the Romans perceived all Jews as a threat since the only voices being heard were
those calling for revolt.
To this point only simple triadic terrorism has been addressed. That is, when the
terrorist, target and victim are separate entities and where the target's behavior is
influenced by the lethal force employed or threatened upon the victim. This is classical
or direct terrorism. It is important to understand, however, that terrorism can also
function in an indirect manner.
In direct terrorism the target if influence and the target of terror are one in the
same. In indirect terrorism, however, the entity targeted to receive the terror and the
entity targeted to be influenced are separate. ^^ Perhaps the classic example of this
form of terrorism, is revolutionary terrorism wherein the target of terror is the members
of the state's ruling apparatus while the target of influence is the population. As the
governm^ent becomes increasingly paralyzed as its members are terrorized, the
population is mobilized as they begin to perceive the growing weakness of the state.




(2)VICTIM (4) TARGET OF
INFLUENCE
( 3 ) TARGET OF
TERROR
(1) Terrorists commit an act of terror upon ...
(2) a carefully selected victim causing terror in ...
{j) the target of terror. As this target begins to weaken and lose its
cohesion this is perceived by T.,
(4) the target of influence, which In turn begins to act favorablv toward
the terrorists and their intentions.
Whether the terrorism is triadic or quadratic, however, it still relies upon the
employment of lethal force to influence the behavior of a given target entity or entities.
But is it war?
Press, 1985) p. 147.
^^^Ibid.. p. 92.
119
Although Tables 7 and 8 were created to depict how all types of terrorism
function, upon closer scrutiny it becomes apparent that they also provide an excellent
model for how warfare operates. By substituting the word soldier or combaiant for the
word terrorist in these two tables one can see how classical warfare truly functions at
the most abstract level. In direct terrorism the combatant employs lethal force against
a victim with the aim of causing those who most closely identify with the victim --
usually his comrades-in-arms -- to become terrorized and much more interested in
sparing themselves the same fate as the victim rather than to continue fighting.
Indirect terrorism is seen in war when the combatant employs lethal force against a
victim not only to terrorize the surviving members of the victim's group, but to
influence the behavior of a non-terrorized entity, such as the victim's commander or
national government. And, while they may not personally suffer the effects of
terrorism, the commander of terrorized troops, or the government of a terrorized
populace clearly suffers indirect psychological pressure from the results of the
terrorization process. This only further reinforces Liddell Hart's comments, first
presented in Chapter Three, that the strategist should always think in terms of
paralyzing not of killing.
Even on a lower plane of warfare, a man killed is merely one less, whereas a man
unnerved is a highly infectious carrier of fear, capable of spreading an epidemic
of panic. On a higher plane of warfare, the impression made on the mind of the
opposing commander can nullify the whole fighting power that his troops
possess. And still on a higher plane, psychological pressure on the government
o{ a country' may suffice to cancel all the resources at its command — so that the
sword falls from a paralyzed hand.-^^
From this, one may conclude that, at the most basic level, both terrorism and the
more classical forms of warfare function in the same manner. Both employ lethal force
against a victim in order to affect the morale of the much larger target or targets.
Force is employed not so much for its physical but its psychological capabilities -- that
is, its ability to affect the target's morale and thereby influence its decisions and actions
directly, or those of it's superior's indirectly. Thus the only significant difference
between terrorism and the more classical forms of warfare is the afore-mentioned
selection of abnormal means by the terrorists. This difference will be explored in
greater detail when this paper examines terror as a weapon of war in Chapter Nine.
I
^^^Liddell Hart, op. cit., p. 255.
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It is the ability to afTect the enemy's moral force that makes terrorism such an
efTicient weapon of war. It takes a minimum amount of physical force and converts it
into the maximum amount of power - thus becoming the ultimate expression of
Luttwak's input-output model described in Chapter Three. By applying a small
amount of lethal force against a properly selected symbolic target, a single terrorist
may affect the lives of thousands or even millions of people in a target entity. So long
as the members of the target entity perceive that the terrorists may strike again with
impunity, the political and military power of even the most powerful nation-state can
be virtually neutralized. This was clearly established in the October 1983 bombing of
the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut. One man in a bomb-laden truck killed 241
American Marines and resulted in relatively major alterations in U.S. foreign policy in
Lebanon, including the withdrawal of the U.S. forces there. According to Robert
Kupperman, "In the minds of many people, the U.S. — a massive power with
thousands of nuclear weapons, ships [and] tanks - was forced to leave Lebanon by a
comparatively tiny proxy force. "^^^
This disparate payback in political power for a minimal expenditure of lethal
force makes terrorism the natural weapon for the ver>' weak. It is quite interesting to
note, for instance, that the British instigated "terror" bombing of German cities at the
moment of England's greatest relative weakness to the NAZIs during World War II.
As Paskins and Dockrill point out, "There were times during World War II when
Britain was powerless to do anything more in her fight against Germany [but
bombing]. ..".-^^^ The terror-bombing was bom of a desperate need to show both the
British people and the rest of the world that Britain was still in the war and could still
hurt the enemy. -^^^
Clearly, terrorism is also an effective tool for a weak, fledgling revolutionary
organization that simply does not have the resources to engage the regime's armed
forces head on. By employing terrorist tactics a revolutionary organization can
maximize its extremely limited coercive capabilities by employing lethal force against
the regime's morale rather than against its physical forces As Bard O'Neill contends:
Robert M. Kupperman, "Terrorism and National Security", Terrorism: An
International Journal. Vol. 8, Number 3, p. 255.
^^^Paskins and Dockrill, op. cii., p. 43.
2^^Ibid., pp. 42-43.
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The long-term goal of [revolutionar>'] terrorism has not been so much the desire
to deplete the government's physical resources as it has been to erode its
psychological support by spreading fear among officials and their domestic and
international supporters."^"
Even when powerful states employ terrorism to maintain internal control they
often resort to this form of coercion due to its efficiency. A few acts of terror may
often be enough to obviate the need of increasing the size of or diverting military and
security forces from other endeavors. Adolf Hitler strongly believed in the utility of
terrorism for maintaining internal control. In an interview Hitler reportly remarked:
"These so-called atrocities save me hundreds of thousands of individual actions against
the protesters and malcontents. Each one of them will think twice to oppose us when
he learns what is awaiting him in the [concentration] camps. "^^^
Employing force on the psychological plane is, then, the most efficient use of that
force. And terrorism is the purist expression of this mode of force employment.
Of course it should be stressed that while terrorism is the most efficient use of
lethal force it generally is not the most effective. Clearly a fully equipped army from
nearly any modern nation-state enjoys far more raw power than any terrorist
organization - as do most metropolitan police forces for that matter. Consequently, it
is far more effective to employ conventional military forces to resolve inter-state and
intra-state conflicts due to the decisiveness and relative quickness of the outcome.
Despite Adolf Hitler's obvious belief in the efficiency of terrorism when it came time to
resolve political differences with France, Hitler chose tanks over terrorists.
Finally, while terrorism represents the most efficient use of force, it does not
necessarily mean it is the most efficient means of controlling the population. This done
not by force, but by the other elements of the power continuumi, including persuasion
and influence which induce voluntary cooperation with the regime. Terrorism, on the
other hand, is probably the least efficient means of governing a nation since resources
must be diverted to control the population, which in turn becomes an adversary' rather
than an asset of the regime. Force, as Edmund Burke noted, "... may subdue for a
"^^Bard E. O'Neill, William R. Heaton, and Donald J. Alberts, Insurgency in the
Modern World (Boulder: Westview Press, 1980) pp. 4-5. As quoted in L.C. Green,
"Terrorism & Its Responses," Terrorism: An International Journal. Vol. 8., Number 1
(1985).
^^•^Herman Rauschning, Gesprache mit Hitler (Vienna: 1940) p. 82. As quoted
in Schmid, op. cit., p. 90.
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moment; but it does not remove the necessity for subduing again; and a nation is not
governed which is perpetually to be conquered."
D. SUMMATION
Terrorism is a force employment process in which abnormal lethal force is used
against a symbolic victim in order to impact the will of a target entity. It is not
mindless violence but the rational selection of lethal force to effect a specific end -- the
submission of the target entity to the terrorist's will. Moreover, it is a dynamic process
wherein the level of force and selection of a victim must be carefully orchestrated with
the level of terror desired in the target entity. Once the target entity experiences the
desired level of terror it becomes politically malleable afTording the terrorists the
opportunity to create the political situation suitable to their needs. At one end of the
spectrum of responses to terrorism is enthusiasm within the terrorist's own ranks
providing and reinforcing group cohesion. At the other end of the spectrum is despair
within the target entity resulting in the total atomization of society into its smallest
constituent parts — individual persons. Despair represents an almost total shattering of
group cohesion where each person relies almost exclusively upon himself for all of his
owTi needs.
Due to its tremendous efficiency, terrorism is the natural tool for the ver\' weak.
It affords the absolute maximum amount of power for the minimum expenditure of
physical force. Consequently, entities that are too weak to physically compel an enemy
outright often chose to employ terrorist tactics in order to undermine and influence
enemy morale and will to resist. By systematically and with seeming impunity
attacking a given class of targets, the terrorists send a clear message to anyone who is
a member of that target class — whether through race, creed, color or political
persuasion - that they are helpless and vulnerable. This results in the withdrawal, to
the maximum degree possible, of the constituent members of that target class, resulting
in its eventual destruction through loss of cohesion. Equally important, even elements
that are not terrorized can be influenced to behave in a certain manner simply from the
realization that the terrorized entity is rapidly being weakened and removed from any
power equation.
" Gehard Lenski, Power and Privilege: A Theory of Social Stratification (New
York: McGraw-Hill, 1966) p. 51. (Quoting Edmund Burke.)
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At the most abstract level, then, terrorism meets the same basic criteria as
warfare. It represems consciously selected force applied for a specific end. Moreover,
it involves the employment of kinetic, physical force to influence the enemy
psychologically through the erosion of his will to continue to resist. As in war, this is
easily measured by the degree to which the cohesion of the targeted entity is eflected.
In this way, terrorism represents a clash of wills between two contending parties. If
both parties employ force to resolve this clash of wills, and if both parties seek, a
political end through this conflict, then a state of war exists and the terrorism used by
either belligerent constitutes a form of war.
As will be seen in subsequent chapters, there are many types of terrorism. Each
of these will be examined to ascertain which are forms of warfare. Some types of
terrorism will be rejected because they employ force for non-political purposes. Others
will be rejected for violating principles of war despite having an ultimate political
objective. In the end, however, there will be identified types of terrorism that are
indeed forms of warfare because they employ force not only for the same ends, but in




As the name suggests, apolitical terrorism is the employment of lethal force in a
terroristic manner, but for non-political ends. Based upon this work's defmition of
war, this lack of political purpose alone would seem sufficient to disqualify apolitical
terrorism as a form of war. As will be seen, however, there are those who argue that
psychotic and criminal terrorists are infact unwitting political terrorists subconsciously
reacting to their political and social environment. Given this, it is necessary to subject
ihe apolitical forms of terrorism to a more rigorous examination before determining
whether or not they are a form of war.
There are three main types of apolitical terrorism: psychotic, criminal and
mystical. Most psychotic and criminal acts, and many mystical acts, involving
abnormal lethal force are clearly not terrorism due to the simple fact that no one is
"terrorized" or influenced except the victim. But many such acts are infact committed
precisely for the express purpose of terrorizing and influencing other entities through
the employment of abnormal lethal force upon a symbolic victim. In such cases, that
force is employed in a terroristic manner — and whether the perpetrator is psychotic,
criminal, a member of a mystical sect, or all three together, he is also a terrorist.
From the outset it should be stressed that these three categories are by no means
mutually exclusive, and indeed, quite often overlap. Moreover, all three types of
apolitical terrorism are similar in that they are based upon achieving goals having no
consistent, overt political purpose.
B. PSYCHOTIC TERRORISM
Psychotic terrorism devolves from "abnormal behavior", a psychological term
that rests predominantly upon normative values and is therefore as diJTicult to
scientifically define as the term "terrorism". Those who engage in psychotic terrorism,
however, are defined by J. Bowyer Bell as "... those who attempt bizarre, ostensibly
political actions with uncertain or irrational outward motives ... for what are internal
personal reasons."" Such terrorists are often confused and have no clear idea of their
political aims. They frequently select their victims on a random basis and are given to
J. Bo\^7er Bell, Transnational Terror (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise
Institute for Public Research, 1975) p. 10.
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spontaneous rather than the systematic use of lethal force. Indeed, inconsistent




A good example of this is Charles Manson and his "Helter Skelter" group.
Espousing vague political goals including a desire to cause a black-white race war.
Manson and his "family" brutally murdered actress Sharon Tate and her unborn baby,
and in another episode murdered the La Bianca couple. -^^^ The total absurdity of the
means by which they sought to initiate a race war, and the haphazard manner in which
the murders were committed simply belies the political motivation of the Manson
group. ^^^ Still, it was terrorism. Manson and his followers, like most psychotic
terrorists, employed lethal force in an extremely abnormal manner to bring attention to
themselves by terrorizing the general public. Psychotic terrorists crave attention, and
the terroristic method provides precisely the correct tool. As Dr. Lawrence Freedman
observes, by employing terrorism "the terrorist is recognized, and is negotiated with,
and is able to prove his power to bring the most powerful and admired figure ... to his
knees. "-^^ Moreover, many psychotic terrorists are provided with other important
feedback from the terrorist act and that is an intense feeling of thrill and pleasure in
committing the act itself. -^"^^
While Manson's terrorism was based upon dubious overt political rationale, there
are some who would argue that it was, at least subconsciously, a product of sincere
political motivations. For example, Emma Goldman, one of the leading twentieth
century anarchists, suggested that ideological [psychotic] terrorists are supersensitive to
the wrong and injustices of society causing them to "... pay the toll of our social
crimes. "^^^ She argues, for instance, that the assassin of President McKinley in 1901 "...
-^^Alan F. Sewell, "Political Crime: A Psychologist's Perspective." International
Terrorism and Political Crime, edited by M. Bassiouni (Springfield, Illinois: Charles C.
Thomas, 1975) pp. 20-21. As quoted in Alex P. Schmid, op. cit., p. 29.
Albert Parry, Terrorism: ^-^cm Robespierre to Arafat. (New York: Vanguard
Press, Inc., 1976) p. 33.
^^^Ibid. Manson and his group sought to cause a race war by killing whites and
blaming it on the blacks. Once both sides were destroyed by the ensuing holocaust,
Manson and his followers supposedly would then control whatever remained.
^^^Ibid., p. 28.
^'-"^James C. Coleman and William E. Broen, Jr., Abnormal Psychology and
Modern Life. (Glenview, Illinois: Scott, Foresman & Co., 1972) p. 397.
^^^ Bernard K. JohnpoU, "Perspectives on Political Terrorism in the United
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was not a depraved creature of low instincts [but] in reality 'supersensitive' [and]
unable to bear up under the too great social stress. "^^~
The stress of which Goldman is speaking manifests itself in the postindustrial
world by three primary factors: 1) the dehumanization of man in his dealings with
those who control his life, 2) his alienation from society, which is caused by his
inability to reconcile his differences and conform to that society, and 3) the realization
that nothing short of force can change the current socio-political environment. Karl
Marx wrote extensively on the dehumanization of man in his work. Das Kapital. He
was particularly critical of the modern industrial process which converts man into "... a
mere appurtenance of the machine. .."."'^•^ In such a society man is judged less upon his
value as a human being than as an element of production. Moreover, man becomes a
fragmented being. As Ralph Waldo Emerson observed,
Man is not a farmer, or a professor, or an engineer, but he is all. Man is priest
and scholar, and statesman, and producer, and soldier. In the divided or social
state these functions are parceled out to individuals, each of whom aims to do his
stint of the joint work, whilst each other performs his.... Unfortunately, this
original unit, this fountain of power, has been so distributed to the multitudes,
has been so minutely subdivided and peddled out, that it is spilled into drops, and
cannot be gathered. The state of society is one in which the members have
suffered amputation from the trunk, and strut about as so many walking
monsters — a good finger, a neck, a stomach, but never a man.
Such estranged and fragmented individuals eventually sufTer from what Robert
Taylor and Byong-Suh Kim identify as reification. This is a social process through
which individuals begin to view themselves and others as impersonal objects or things,
and thus lose their personal self-identity. ^^^
States," International Terrorism: National, Regional, and Global Perspectives (New
York: Praeger Publishers, 1976) p. 35.
^O^Ibid.
^^^Karl Marx, Das Kapital, translated by Eden and Cedar Paul (London: J.M.
Dent & Sons, 1933) p. 713. As quoted in Robert C. Tucker, The Marxian
Revolutionary Idea. (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1969) pp. 23-24
^^"^Ralph Waldo Emerson, "Nature" and "The American Scholar," The Heart of
Emerson's Essays, edited by Perry Bliss, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin & Co., 1933) pp.
56-57. As quoted in Schmookler, op. cit., pp. 91-92.
^'"^Robert W. Taylor and Byong-Suh Kim, "Violence and change in
Postindustrial Societies: Student protest in America and Japan in the 1960s,"
International Terrorism in the Contemporary World, edited by Marius H. Livingston
(London: Greenwood Press, 197S) p. 210.
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These reified individuals are immediately confronted with the question of whether
they and their fellow man are doomed to be controlled by a soulless teclinocratic
bureaucracy which requires absolute conformity, or can the system be changed?
Moreover, these same individuals generally experience an identity crisis. If they are not
what the system says they are, then what are they? A particularly poignant example of
this identity crisis was written by a Japanese student a few days before he was killed in
a university riot. He wrote,
I came into existence 18 years and 10 days ago. What have I done to live during
this period? I can feel no sense of responsibility, either for the present or for the
future. I constantly find myself doubtful, if not indifferent, and I borrow other's
words to defend myself What on earth am I?'^^^
During the 1960's, thousands of alienated people experiencing similar identity
crises took to the streets in protest. By employing force these individuals sought two
simultaneous objectives, to change the system and equally important, to achieve some
sort of self-identity by engaging in an action that was clearly independent of the system
they sought to change. This can represent a political action. For instance, one is
reminded here of Franz Fanon's statement that, "The colonial subject, by killing a
white man, can regain a sense of manhood, a sense of power, a new image of
himself"^^^
Clearly, the stresses of postindustrial societies create many people alienated by
the dehumanization processes inherent in such societies and who resort to the use of
force both as a means to redress grievances and to provide a form of self-identity apart
from that given to them by the system. For the majority of those who are "sane," the
type of force selected tends to be non-lethal, such as protest marches and sit-ins.
These people are generally quickly reco-opted into society. For the psychotics,
however, there is quite often no reconciliation with society. Not only have the
psychotic terrorists rejected society, they are unable to comprehend fully the moral
principles espoused by that society. ^'^^ As a result, they all too often select lethal forms
^°^Ibid., p. 215.
^^"^Paul Wilkinson, Political Terrorism (London: Macmillan & Co.. 1974) pp.
101-102. As quoted in Alex Schmid, op. cit., p. 93.
Austin T. Turk, Political Criminality: The Defiance and Defense of Authority.
(London: Sage Publications, Inc., 1982) pp. 72-73.
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of force as a means of protest and self-identity. Consequently, they, as Enima
Goldman noted, pay the ultimate price of being unable to conform to the socio-
political environment in which they find themselves.
To the degree that the psychotic terrorist is motivated by his socio-political
environment to take up arms, it may be concluded that his use of force is a poUtical
act. It is not, however, an act of war. As suggested in Chapter Two, war exists when
lethal force is employed to compel an enemy to conform to a given political end.
Psychotic terrorists are generally incapable of such rationalization. Psychotic terrorists
such as Charles Manson offer the target group, which is usually ill-defined, no
consistent idea of how to avoid future terror. Under such conditions it is impossible to
comply v^dth the terrorist's will, even if such were deemed desirable.
In the final analysis, then, psychotic terrorists employ lethal force primarily to
meet some inner, personal need or to satiate an emotional or psychological desire. As
Walter Laquer has observed,
The less clear the political purpose in terrorism, the greater its appeal to
unbalanced persons. The motives of men fighting tyranny are quite different
from those of rebels against a democratically elected government. Idealism, a
social conscience or hatred of foreign oppression are powerful impulses, but so
are free-fioating aggression, boredom and mental confusion. Activeism can give
meaning to otherwise empty lives. ^'^^
For the psychotic terrorist, then, the act of terrorism is not so much a means to
an end, but an end in itself. The compulsion of others to submit to the psychotic
terrorist's will is sim.ply an incidental factor of the terrorist act. While possibly caused
by given socio-political conditions, psychotic terrorism at best only superficially
attempts to affect the socio-political milieu. Equally important, the psychotic terrorist
generally employs abnormal lethal force to satiate only his own personal psychological
needs. Given that war is a sociological as well as a political phenomenon, this
personalization of the use of lethal force clearly places psychotic terrorism outside the
pale of warfare.
C. CRIMINAL TERRORISM
Criminal Terrorism is defined as "... the systematic use of terror for ends of
material gain."^'° It is not difficult to envisage this form of terrorism. The primary
^ Walter Laquer, Terrorism: A Study of National and International Political
Violence (Boston: Little, Brown and Co.. Inc., 1977) p. 12.
^^^Grant Wardlaw, op. cit., p. 12.
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manifestations of force in tliis form of terrorism include kidnapping, extortion,
gangland assassinations and murders. While such activity may actually result in
political and/or social change, such change is usually incidental, and a by-product of
the use of force.
Not all crime involving lethal force is, of course, terrorism since it generally
involves only the criminal and the victim. On the other hand, certain criminal acts are
by their very nature terrorism. One obvious example is kidnapping. In this form of
terrorism the kidnappers threaten to kill the victim in order to terrorize the family into
paying a ransom, and to influence the authorities not to interfere.
As with psychotic terrorism, criminal terrorism is essentially the employment of
lethal force for personal motives. Additionally the criminal terrorist may elect a life of
crime for the same r^. icns as the psychotic terrorist, including alienation from society
and a need to establish a self-identity. But here is where the parallel stops. While the
actions and results of psychotic and criminal are objectively the same, according to
Frederick J. Hacker, the psychotic and criminal terrorists have fundamentally different
attributes. In Hacker's opinion the psychotic, or the use his term "crazy" terrorist is
"... predominantly inward-directed, ...suicidal, unstable and immature. [An] inept
individual with a weak ego and overt behavior disturbances ... [and who is] ...
unpredictable...".- The criminal terrorist, on the other hand, is outward-directed and
homicidal, having a seemingly intact ego and no overt behavioral disturbances. Most
important the criminal terrorist is predictable, [logical], determined, and ruthless. '^'^
Probably the only operational differences between the two is that it may be possible to
reason with the criminal terrorist but generally not the psychotic terrorist. Moreover,
being outward-directed, the criminal terrorist is far more likely to work with a group of
other criminals whereas the psychotic tends to be a loner.
As with psychotic terrorists, some have argued that criminal terrorists are
unwitting political actors. For instance Martin Oppenheimer suggests that certain
criminals may be defined as "social bandits" who employ force without pohtical goals
or mass support, but who, by resorting to force, impact the social milieu." ^^ A social
Frederick J. Hacker, Crusaders, Criminals, Crazies: Terror and Terrorism in
Our Time. (New York: Bantam Books, 1978) pp. 13-19. As quoted in Turk, op. cit.,
p. 74.
^l^Ibid.
Martin Oppenheimer, op. cit., p. 33.
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bandit is described by E.J. Hobsbawm as "A man [who] ... does something which is not
regarded as criminal by his local conventions, but is so regarded by the state or local
rulers. ""^^"^ Classical examples of these social bandits are Robin Hood or Jesse James.
These social bandits, as Oppenheimer points out, are capable of setting limits to
state oppression by targeting and terrorizing the upper strata of society and agents of
the government. ^^^ But due to a lack of political ideology, social bandits are only local
phenomenon and can only mitigate the oppression by the state, not solve its basic
causes. Indeed the targets for the force used in criminal terrorism are selected based
primarily upon considerations of personal material gain and fall outside the political
arena. If a member of the governing apparatus is targeted at all, it is either for direct
personal gain or to reduce interference by governmental authorities in their efforts to
interdict criminal activity. Any impact upon the social or political milieu is purely
incidental to the criminal terrorists main objective — personal gain. Indeed, the social
impact of criminal terrorists may be purely ascriptive in nature, a search by the
population for a deliverer from perceived oppression. Robin Hood, for example, is the
arch-typical social bandit, but he is merely a legend. And Jesse James is no more than
a young man brutalized by war who continued to do what he did best when the war
ended. There is no evidence that Jesse James perceived himself to be other than what
he was after the war — a simple outlaw.
In the fmal analysis, then, criminal terrorism is not a form of warfare for
precisely the same reasons as psychotic terrorism. Not only is it the employment of
lethal force for non-political goals, but that force is also used primarily to satiate the
personal desires of the terrorist. Any impact upon the socio-political milieu is for the
most part purely incidental. It is not a form of war.
D. MYSTICAL TERRORISM
Mystical terrorism involves the use of lethal force against a symbolic victim in
order to influence or invoke supernatural powers. At the most basic level of analysis it
is quadratic terrorism where the people are the target of terror and the supernatural
power the target of influence. Collectivities practicing this form of terrorism have
political aspirations only in-so-far as they are interested in creating and m.aintaining a
socio-political environment sufficient to assure their continued existence.
^^*E.J. Hobsbawm, Primitive Rebels (New York: Norton & Co., 1965) p. 15. As
quoted in Oppenheimer, op. cit., pp. 33-34)
Oppenheimer, op. cit., p. 34.
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Although there have been very few purely mystical terrorist groups throughout
history, mysticism has played a major role in many terrorist organizations. As Walter
Laquer has noted, French and American anarchists, Rumanian Fascists, nineteenth
century Russian terrorists, and contemporarv^ Irish and Arab terrorists have embraced
mysticism as a means of legitimizing both their cause and the sacrifices they ask of
their membership/ ^^ He writes,
The parents, the brothers and sisters of Fascist terrorists were as convinced as
the families of Russian revolutionaries that their dear ones had died for a 'holy
cause.' ... [Indeed] the last words of some of those about to be executed ... reveal
that these men and women were deeply convinced that upon them, as on Christ,
rested the burden of deliverance.^^'
In explaining why terrorism t'^rrorizes. Dr. Lawerence Freedman points to man's
primal fear of becoming isolated and alone, a factor modern terrorists play upon as a
means of manipulating the target of terror. -^^^ This is, according to Freedman, a
continuation of the traditional mystical prophets and messiahs. Freedman points out
that,
The prophet predicted and threatened: he predicted social justice and god's grace
with conformity to god's rules, but he threatened terrors unless sin ended and
propitiation of the gods was successful ... Only behavior and feelings suitable to
the injunctions of the god or the god's designated messiahs and prophets could
bring respite.^ ^^
Mysticism, therefore, plays a part in both the instigation of terrorism and
enhances its effect. Although mysticism is generally an adjunct to political terrorist
movements, it can and has existed in pure form. Perhaps the best example of purely
mystical terrorism is the Hindu Thugee movement of eighteenth and nineteenth century
India. The Thugees murdered thousands of Indians from all castes of society as
sacrifices to the goddess Kali.^^° Though these terrorists generally selected their victims
at random, they were also quick to move against any Indian who jeopardized the
\ 1 f
Laquer, op. cit., pp. 126-127.
^' Tbid., p. 127.
J 1 o
Lawrence Z. Freedman, "Why Does Terrorism Terrorize?" Terrorism: An
International Journal, Vol. 6., Number 3. (Crane, Russak & Co., Inc. 1983) p. 391.
^^"^Ibid., p. 400.
Will Durant, The Story of Civilization, vol. 1. Our Oriental Heritage (New
York: Simon & Schuster, 1954) p. 499.
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Thugee movement. The Thugees were so efiective and so terrorized the general Indian
population that the best efTorts of the British Empire found it extremely difficult to
prevail in destroying the miovement. The British historian V.A. Smith describes the
Thugees in terms that could easily apply to a modern criminal terrorist gang. He
wrote,
The gangs had little to fear, and enjoyed complete immunity.... The moral feeling
of the people had sunk so low that there were no signs of [resistance to] ... the
cold-blooded crimes committed by the [hugs. They were accepted as part of the
established order of things, and until the secrets of the organization were given
away... it was usually impossible to obtain evidence against even the most
notorious Thugs. ^"^
The tremendous success of the Thugees can be attributed both to their effective
use of lethal force to deter informants as well as the population's acceptance of the
movement as a legitimate part of the social order. It is this latter factor that explains
the attraction to mysticism by many modern terrorists.
As to the question of whether mystical terrorism, by itself, is a form of war, again
the answer must be no. To be sure, mystical terrorism does involve the use of lethal
force for the purpose of sustaining a given socio-political environment, and to that
limited extent qualifies as a use of force for a political end. Upon closer scrutiny,
however, it is quite clear that mystical terrorists are much less interested in political
power than in social structures. xVIoreover, while the lethal force does facilitate
achieving and maintaining a given socio-political environment, and to that extent
qualifies as the use of force as a means to an end, lethal force in mystical terrorism is
also an end in itself In classical warfare, the employment of force ceases when the
enemy complies with the victors will. In mystical terrorism, the employment of force
continues ad infinitum - the people simply cannot alter their behavior in order to avoid
future terror. Force employed as an end in itself is simply not a form of warfare.
One fmal element is absent in mystical terrorism as a means of warfare, and that
is, it fails to meet the preeminent principle of war - the principle of engagement. As
emphasized in Chapter Four, it is not enough for an entity to employ force for a
political objective for that use of force to be considered a form of war, it must also
involve a clash of arms; the employment of force by both sides. In mystical terrorism
only the terrorists employ force. Force employed in this manner is not warfare.
^-^V.A. Smith, Oxford History of India (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1923)
pp. 666-667. As quoted m Durant, Ibid., pp. 499-500.
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E. SUMMATION
None of the three forms of apolitical terrorism qualify as a form of warfare.
Although Goldman, Oppenheimer and Freedman suggest a certain politicalness for
psychotic, criminal and mystical terrorism respectively, for the most part any political
impact of these types of terrorism is incidental and ancillarv'. Both criminal and
psychotic terrorism involve the use of lethal force that is often justified on political
grounds but clearly employed to achieve or satiate personalized goals and desires.
Moreover, psychotic terrorism employs force in a highly idiosyncratic fashion making it
impossible for the target of terror — if it is identified at all -- to modify its behavior to
avoid future terror. This represents the use of lethal force as an end in itself, rather
than a means to an end and clearly places psychotic, as well as mystical terrorism --
which employs force in the same manner -- outside the pale of warfare.
Criminal terrorism generally employs lorce in a more utilitarian fashion than the
other two forms of apolitical terrorism by making it quite clear to the target of the
terror how it must behave to avoid future terror. But again, it is for personalized goals
having at best ancillary political ramifications. Because the criminal terrorists has no
mass support, no political ideology and limited aims, he is generally only a local or
regional figure having at best a cursory- impact upon the socio-political environment.
Consequently, while the criminal terrorist, like the psychotic terrorist, may be a
product of the socio-political milieu their aims are not so much to change that milieu
as to personally capitalize upon its weaknesses - an apolitical goal. In this regard




Certainly the most sensationalized form of political terrorism in the world today
is revolutionary terrorism. Often called agitational terrorism or terror from below, its
primary purpose is to destabilize and topple the incumbent regime, replacing it with a
political apparatus more acceptable to the revolutionaries. As shall be quickly
established, however, terrorism alone cannot achieve the ends sought by the
revolutionaries. Terrorism is but a small part of an overall process.
Understanding the role of terrorism in the revclutionar}' process is the subject of
the first section of this chapter. This will entail examining terrorism's immediate
objectives and the means it employs to achieve them. Particular emphasis will be
placed upon the conditions the terrorists seek to create in the regime on the one hand,
and the population on the other. While conducting this investigation it will become
possible to determine whether revolutionary terrorism is a form of war.
B. THE ROLE OF TERRORISM IN THE REVOLUTIONARY PROCESS
As mentioned above, the purpose of revolutionary terrorism is to destabilize and
overthrow the incumbent regime. In order to emerge victorious, these terrorists must
generate sufficient power to compel the incumbent governmental leaders to relinquish
the reins of power. Given that revolutionary terrorists normally have only a small
fraction of the total armed force available to the regime, the question immediately
arises, how can the terrorists succeed in the face of their extreme military weakness?
The answer, of course, lies in the unique characteristics of revolutionary warfare.
As the American Revolutionary and Vietnam wars have clearly shown, victory in
revolutionary war is not entirely dependent upon military power. Indeed, according to
William Friedland,
Revolutionar>' warfare is preeminently a question of political and social
relationships and not merely a matter of technology and skill. In contrast to
other forms of warfare, revolutionary warfare is always directed not only at
defeating the enemy by military means, but at the mass movement of the people
as a crucial part of the process. ^~~
"William Friedland, Revolutionary Theory (Totowa, New Jersey: Allanheld,
Osmun & Co., Inc., 1982) p. 169.
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It is the mobilization of the populace against the regime, then, that is the critical
factor in revolutionary wars. Without the support of the majority of the populace the
revolutionaries would simply remain too weak to successfully defeat the regime and its
instruments of coercion. It is therefore not in open combat with the regime's armed
forces that terrorism plays its major role, but rather as an instrument of mobilization
within the revolutionary process. Before delving into how revolutionary terrorism
actually mobilizes the populace, however, it is helpful to have a better understanding of
the revolutionary process per se.
The great revolutionary leader Mao Tse-Tung saw revolutions occurring in three
major phases. ^^^ Phase I is devoted to organizing, estabhshing and preserving the
revolution. Phase II is one of progressive expansion, and Phase III is the decisive
phase in which the regime is destroyed by the revolution. Careful analysis of these
political objectives reveals that different levels of force having different military
objectives are necessary in each phase.
In the initial phase of the revolution the revolutionaries are extremely weak vis-a-
vis the regime. If they are going to organize the revolution, communicate its goals to
the populace, and preserve the existance of the revolutionary organization in the face
of the overwhehning military force possessed by the regime, the revolutionaries require
armed forces capable of operating in extreme secrecy, able to attack symbohc targets,
and at the same time evade the regime's main forces. Consequently, terrorism is the
obvious choice of armed resistance during this phase.
In the progressive expansion of Phase II the primary military objective is to
secure liberated zones in which bases for recruitment and training can be built. In
addition to its earher purpose of communication, the armed forces of the revolution
must now begin to weaken the regime by direct attacks on the regime's armed forces,
yet at the same time avoid excessive losses. Consequently, during Phase II the hit and
run tactics of terrorism must be retained, but the revolutionaries must also be be
capable of doing substantial physical damage to the regime's coercive forces. Clearly,
guerrilla warfare has the greatest utility in such situations.
Phase III of the revolution, according to iMao is the strategic offensive phase.
The primarv' militarv' objective here is total victory, which in Clausewitzian terms
means: the destruction of the regime's armed forces, the occupation of its territory and
Mao Tse-Tung, On Guerrilla Warfare, translated and edited by Samuel B.
Griffith (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1961) pp. 20-22.
^^^Ibid.
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most importantly, the destruction of its will to resist. To accomplish these objectives
the revolutionaries require conventional militar\- forces capable of seizing and holding
terrain as well as defeat the regime's main combat forces.
All of this is not to say, of course, that terrorism is not used in the latter stages of
the revolutionary process. Guerrillas and even conventional militar}' forces frequently
employ terrorism not only in revolutionary but interstate wars as well. The main point
here is that terrorism enjoys its greatest relative utility in the initial phase of the
revolutionary mobilization process. This is perhaps most clearly depicted by Thomas
Thornton in his famous five stages of insurrection. As is shown in Table 9, each phase
of the revolutionary process is characterized by a different level of force.
TABLE 9
THORNTON'S FIVE STAGES OF REVOLUTION
Phase Characteristic
I Preparatory Previolent
II Initial Violence Terrorism
III Expansion Guerrilla Warfare
IV Victorious Conventional Warfare
V Consolidation Post Violent
[Source: Thomas P. Thornton, "Terror as a Weapon of Political Agitation," Internal
War. Problems and Approaches, edited by Harry Eckstein (New YorR: The Free Press
of Glencoe. 1964) p. 92. As quoted in Alex STchmid, Political Terrorism: A Research
Guide to Concepts, Theories, Data Bases and Literature (New Brunswick: Transaction
Books, 1985) p. 4L]
One thing that Thornton has overlooked in his depiction of the stages of the
revolutionary process is that during the consolidation phase there is often -- as
occurred in France, Russia, China, Cuba, Vietnam, Kampuchea and Nicaragua -- a
return to terrorism in order to consolidate the revolutionary's hold on the reins of
power. The postviolent phase often does not begin until after this reign of terror.
Moreover, each phase also has a specific political objective; the identification of which
will make it easier to determine the military' objective(s) germane to a specific phase of
the revolutionary' process. This expanded version of Thornton's Revolutionary Phases
is presented in Table 10. The Objective column represents the political objective of the
revolutionaries against the incumbent regime in a given phase.
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TABLE 10
STAGES OF REVOLUTIONARY MOBILIZATION
Phase Characteristic Objective
1) Preparatory Previolent Establish Cause
2) Initial Violence Terrorism Morally Isolate
3) Expansion Guerrilla War Physically Isolate
4) Victorious Conventional Physically Destroy
5) Consolidation Terrorism Reprogram Populace
5) Administrative Post Violent Maintain Regime
As will be seen below the political objective during the initial violence phase of
the revolutionary mobilization process will be to initiate the moral isolation of the
regime. Once this is suITiciently under way and increasingly more people join the
revolution the objective can be expanded to include liberation of territory in order to
physically isolate the regime. Once sufficient territory has been liberated giving the
revolutionaries control over larger and larger numbers of people and other necessar}'
resources, they can then launch a conventional war during which the military' objective
is the final destruction of the regime's forces of coercion. The process proceeds in this
manner until the final phase in which the revolutionaries establish control of the
government and maintain their revolutionary goals through peaceful, administrative
processes.
It should be noted here that the characteristic drives the phase. That is to say the
revolutionary' mobilization process will never move into the next phase until the
revolutionaries adopt the level of force germane to that phase. Thus if the
revolutionaries continue to rely exclusively upon terrorism and are unable or unwilling
to adopt guerrilla warfare the revolution will never move into the expansion phase.
Indeed, according to Thomas Greene, "An exclusive reliance on terror as a
revolutionary technique ... is a certain sign of the movement's weakness. "^^^ He goes
on to say that,
Marx, Lenin and Regis Debray are amoung those proponents of revolution who
have admitted that terror alone can never bring about revolutionary change, that
having to rely primarily on terror reflects the impossibility of achieving
revolutionar\- goals under prevailing circumstances."'^^
^Thomas H. Greene, Comparative Revolutionary Movements: Search for Theory
and Justice (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1984) p. 131.
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The ultimate danger under these circumstances is that the revolutionaries lose
sight of their goals and get increasingly wrapped up in the tactics of terrorism. As Paul
Wilkinson points out, these terrorists are no longer capable of"... viewing terrorism in
instrumental-rational terms, involving a realistic calculation of its political effectiveness
and the possibilities of success, [and consequently] acts of violence become ends in
themselves.
"^^'^
Still, it quite evident from the above that terrorism plays a significant role in the
revolutionary mobilization process, particularly in its earliest phases. The question
now becomes one of how does terrorism mobilize the populace to support the
revolution?
According to William Friedland, revolutionary mobilization consists of four
elements: 1) raising consciousness, 2) increasing participation, 3) undermining the
system, 4) building the revolutionary organization. ^^^ As will be seen, terrorism has
considerable utility in achieving all four elements of mobilization, but is probably best
suited to raising the consciousness of the population.
Raising the consciousness of the population is clearly a necessary and critical
step in the mobilization process. As Ted Gurr established in his great work Why Men
Rebel, men will not rebel unless: 1) they are deprived of some expected value, and 2)
they are aware of this deprivation.^^^ If nothing else, terrorism is certainly a very
effective means of communicating and highlighting existing grievances. Indeed, some
analysts, as Alex Schmid points out, consider communication to be the most important
aspect of political terrorism. For instance, Martha Crenshaw contends that, "The
most basic reason for terrorism is to gain recognition or attention. ..".^^^
^^^Ibid.
Paul Wilkinson, "Terrorist Movements," Terrorism: Theory and Practice, edited
by Yonah Alexander, David Carlton, and Paul Wilkinson (Boulder, Colorado;
Westview Press. 1979) p. 107.
^^^ Friedland, op. cit., p. 155.
Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel 4th ed. (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1974) p. 24.
^^°Alex Schmid, op. cit., p. 219.
Martha Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism," Comparative Politics (July,
1981) p. 386. As quoted in Ibid.
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It is possible for the terrorists to raise the consciousness of the population
because, as was pointed out in Chapter Six, terrorism can function in a quadratic as
well as a triadic fashion. In quadratic terrorism there are two targets: the target of
terror and the target of influence. Those that the terrorists seek to mobilize are the
target of influence.
The terrorist has an impact upon the target of influence in two important ways.
First, it emphasizes to the people representing the target of influence that they are not
isolated individuals experiencing some form of deprivation due to personal
inadequacies, but rather they are part of a larger collectivity of like-minded individuals
suffering from, and wishing to be rid of, the same oppression. In this way, the
individual begins to realize he is part of a larger group having similar experiences and
common desires. Secondly, by choosing the correct symbolic target, the terrorists can
also educate the target of influence as to the source of their deprivation. This is
extremely important since as Ted Gurr points out, "... an angered person is not likely
to strike out at any object in his environment, but only at targets he thinks are
responsible."^^"
In this way, terrorism initiates and reinforces a psychological polarization of
society through the process of raising the consciousness of the target of influence. Of
course nothing limits the target of influence to only one social class. Theda Skocpol
notes, for instance, that successful social revolutions involve not only an alienation and
mobilization of the lowest classes, but also of the landed upper classes which have
sufficient political autonomy to hinder the state's ability to put down the revolt. "^^
Those that are influenced clearly begin to thmk in terms of 'we' and 'they' with the
latter ascribed to the incumbent regime and its instruments of coercion. But as Ted
Gurr suggests, simply being aware that one is deprived due to actions and policies of
the regime does not necessarily mean men will rebel. They must also believe that
resorting to violence has some utility; that there is some chance of success.
Establishins the feasibilitv and utility of resistance to the regime is central to the
second element of revolutionary m.obilization: increasing participation. Here it is
necessary to expose the regime's weaknesses and emphasize the revolutionary's
strengths. This, of course, is best achieved by launching attacks against symbolic
'""Gurr, op. cit., p. 34.
^^^Skocpol, op. cit., p. 110.
^-"^Ibid., p. 157.
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targets, such as government or police oITicials, and is most efTective when carried out
on a frequent basis and with seeming impunity. Each attack drives home the pouit
that the regime is not omnipotent and can be successfully resisted.
Of equal importance, of course, is the reaction of the incumbent regime. If the
terrorists can induce the government to overreact and employ ever increasing doses of
repression upon the populace in an attempt to compel the people to stop supporting
the revolutionaries, then the regime can begin to lose legitimacy in the eyes of the
repressed populace. If larger and larger segments of the population become aUenated
from the regime the number of people who may be induced to join the revolution also
grows. This, of course, is a classical terrorist stratagem popularized by the terrorist
revolutionary, Carlos Marighella. He wrote in his Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla,
It is necessary to turn political crisis into armed conflict by performing violent
actions that will force those in power to transform the political situation of the
country into a military situation. That will alienate the masses, who, from then
on, will revolt against the army and police and blame them for the state of
things. ^^^
Such a reaction by the government also reinforces the trend towards polarizing
the society in question. This is particularly true in regards to the members of the
regime's elements of coercion. As the police and soldiers begin to perceive the
population as being, if not the enemy outright, then at least sympathetic to the
revolutionaries, it justifies in the minds of many in the regime's armed forces the use o^
increasingly heavy-handed tactics against the population itself. By creating such
conditions the terrorists hope to establish their moral credentials while at the same time
undermine those of the regime. In this way the terrorists, according to Marighella, are
provided with their most important advantage: namely, moral superiority over the
regime. In his opinion this moral superiority devolves from the fact that the terrorist is
"... defending a just cause, the cause of the people -- whereas [the regime's forces] are
on the side of an enemy the people hate."^^^ Thus, the terrorists increase participation
'Carlos Marighella, Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla (Havana: Tricontinental
Congress, no date) As quoted in Robert Moss, Urban Guerrillas (London: Temple
Smith. 1972) p. 198.
Christopher Dobson and Ronald Payne, The Terrorists: Their Weapons,
Leaders and Tactics (New York: Facts on File, Inc., 1982) p. 13. (Quoting Marighella
from his Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla.)
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of the target of influence in the revolutionan.' process by, as political analyst Eqbal
Ahmad describes it, "... activating and perpetuating the moral isolation of the regime
until such isolation has become total and irreversible."-^'
In order to morally isolate the government and increase participation in the
revolution, the revolutionaries must avoid at all costs the use of arbitrary",
indiscriminant terrorism. Indeed, as Ahmad observes, it "... is a myth that terror is the
basis of civilian support for the [revolutionaries]. "^^^ He continues by stressing that
revolutionary' ...
warfare requires highly committed but covert civilian support which cannot be
obtained at gunpoint.... [Moreover, resorting] to indiscriminant terrorism
indicates lack, of broad support, without which the m.ovement soon collapses. ^-^^
This is essentially an echo of Che Guevara's admonition in the early 1960s that
indiscriminant terrorism "... is generally ineffective ... in its results, since it often makes
victims of innocent people and destroys ... lives that would be valuable to the
revolution." Consequently, the revolutionary' terrorists create a situation wherein
they employ dlscriminani terrorism against very' specific targets and hope they can
induce the government to overreact with indiscriminant terror against the population
writ large. It is here that the Vietnam war provides a clear example. Because the
governmental authorities by necessity operated overtly, they were easy to be located,
observed, and at the proper moment be assassinated by Viet Cong (VC) terrorists. In
this manner, the VC was able to apply very discriminant — one might even say surgical
-- force against specific "enemies of the people."^'^^ But, because the VC operated
clandestinely and easily hid among the populace, the governmental security forces had
great difficulty locating their enemy. As a consequence, these security forces often
directed lethal force in an indiscriminant manner against large segments of the
^^' Eqbal Ahmad, "Revolutionary Warfare and Counterinsurgency," Guerrilla
Strategies: An Historical Anthology from the Long March to Afghanistan, edited by
Gerard Chaliand, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982) p. 245.
^^^Ibid., p. 249.
339lbid.
^^^Che Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1961) p.
26.
James Pinckney Harrison, The Endless War: Vietnam's Struggle for
Independence (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1982; McGraw-Hill Paperback
Edition, 1983) p. 190.
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population suspected of supporting the VC. Thus, while a person knew how to act in
order to avoid VC terror, it was often impossible to avoid that of the regime's.
Moreover, the shear lethality of conventional warfare using modern technology made it
far less discriminant to use than the more carefully applied and easily controlled force
germane to guerrilla and terrorist warfare used by the VC and the North Vietnamese.
As Robert Asprey notes, "During [one] twelve-day battle... [American] gunners fired
over 18,000 artillery rounds, tactical aircraft dropped 1,375 tons of bombs, and B-52
aircraft dropped [another] 1,750 tons...".^'^^ Since the battle just described occurred in
and around the inhabited town of Dak To, the employment of such heavy ordnance in
such massive quantities invariably resulted in large numbers of civilian casualties. Even
when the regime tried to limit civilian casualties by searching out the VC cadre and
destroying them, it often, indeed usually, backfired. For instance, describing U.S.
Marine operations in Vietnam Asprey writes,
As elsewhere in Vietnam, search and destroy tactics continued to antagonize
people who had to be won over. Marines were operating in a vast sea of fear
that could easily turn into hatred, and frequent fire-fights, no matter how
carefully conducted, could not but exacerbate the situation -- moving bullets are
promiscuous. Marine bands could play, and Marines could distribute food and
clothing, and doctors could help villagers, but these advantages paled when one,
two or more villagers were killed in a fire fight or by bombs, rockets, naval shells
or napalm.... Marines could hold 'county fairs' until doomsday, but, unless
carried to fruition, they were not only meaningless but dangerous [since they
exposed] ... friendly or potentially friendly villagers ... to VC wrath. ^"^^
In order to be effective, then, terrorism must use only discriminant force against
the regime and its supporters. But every possible precaution should be taken not to
employ force — particularly indiscriminant force -- against the population writ large.
In short, the terrorism must not alienate the population it seeks to mobilize for the
revolution. Rather, it should endeavor to shatter the political cohesion of society by
driving a wedge between the regime and the populace. The terrorism should also
attempt to destroy the cohesion of the regime's governmental apparatus and its armed
forces, but the social cohesion of the population should remain relatively intact and
disrupted only to the degree necessary to effect the other two objectives just
mentioned. It should be noted here that the revolutionarv terrorists do not seek the
Robert Asprey, War In The Shadows: The Guerrilla in History 2 vols. (Garden
City, New York: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1975) p. 1194.
^'*^Ibid.,p. 1197.
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total destruction of the social cohesion of the populace because the populace is not the
enemy. The enemy is the incumbent regime and its instruments o'l control.
Consequently, the terrorists can and should employ all force possible to totally destroy
the regime.
Still as Theda Skocpol has clearly established, raising the consciousness of the
governed masses and inducing them to want to overthrow the regime is in itself
insufficient. As she so clearly puts it in her book States and Social Revolutions, "This
image suggests that the ultimate and sufficient condition for the revolution is the
withdrawal of ... consensual support [by the ruled] and, conversely, that no regime
could survive if the masses were consciously disgruntled."^'*'^ A few pages later she
further reinforces her point by stating, "Even after great loss of legitimacy has
occurred, a state can rem.am quite stable — and certainly invulnerable to internal mass-
based revolts - especially if its coercive organizations remain coherent and
effective. "'^^ It can be concluded from this that the regime's center of gravity is its
forces of coercion.
There are Uterally hundreds of historical examples to support Skocpol's
contention. Two instances Skocpol uses to underscore her thesis are the Japanese
Meiji Restoration of 1868-73 and the Prussian Reform Movement following that
kingdom's defeat by Napoleonic France in 1806. In both examples, the state's ability
to wield superior force was a major factor in the regime not succumbing to social
revolution.-'*^ Perhaps the most poignant 20th century example of the critical role
played by the regime's forces of coercion in averting a social revolution can be found in
comparing the Russian revolutions of 1905 and 1917. In both cases, Russia was
engaged in a losing war, but it was only after the much longer and more costly First
World War had bled Russia's armies white that a social revolution succeeded in
toppling the regime. As W. Bruce Lincoln observed when comparing the 1905 and 1917
Russian revolutions,
^'*'*Theda Skocpol, op. cit., p. 16.
^"^^Ibid., p. 32.
^^^Ibid., pp. 100-111. The ability to wield superior force, of course, is dependent
upon many important factors beyond the existence of coercive forces responsive to the
will of the incumbent regime. As Skocpol notes, the existence of a politically
autonomous elite and,' or the existence of a military crises diverting coercive forces to
face an external threat play a major role in determining whether the regime has
sufficient coercive force to stave ofTa social revolution.
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Only the cruel fact that Russia's peasant army remained willing to shoot their
brethren in town and country enabled Nicholas II to survive the turbulence of
1905. Of all the lessons that Russia's ill-fated emperor failed to learn from his
nation's revolutionarv experiences that year, the extent to which his power
'
. 347depended upon the army's loyalty proved the most dangerous to ignore.
It is therefore apparent that success in a massed-based revolution requires more
than the mere willingness of the population to revolt. It is also dependent upon the
revolutionar>''s ability to neutralize the regime's coercive organizations. It is here that
Friedland's third element of revolutionary mobilization — undermining the system —
comes into play. While terrorism is less effective in achieving this elem.ent of
mobilization than it is in raising the consciousness or increasing participation, never-
the-less terrorism can positively influence this revolutionary goal.
One of the primary means of undermining the system has already been
mentioned: namely, moral isolation; the psychological separation of the regime from
the mass of the populace, and/or large portions of the elite. Without the support of
the majority of the people, or substantial numbers of the elite classes, the government
will find it increasingly difiicult to raise taxes or find willing replacements for its armed
forces. As more and more reluctant members of the population are coerced into
joining the police and/or military, the loyalty of these instruments of coercion to the
regime becomes questionable. As Jack Goldstone notes.
When army officers come primarily from a landed elite, they may sympathize
with their own class in a conflict with the central government and elites. Where
troops are recently recruited and fraternize with the populace, their sympathy for
their civilian fellows may override their allegiance to their officers. In either ...
[case], the unreliability of the army increases the vulnerability of the state to the
revolution. -"^^
The regime begins to find it more and more difficult to find commanders and
soldiers who are willing to apply the "whiff of grapeshot" necessary to disperse and
neutralize the rebellious populace. In this way, the state begins to lose control of
coherent and effective instruments of coercion that Skocpol has so rightly pointed out
are necessary for the regime to maintain power.
W. Bruce Lincoln, Passage Through Armageddon: The Russians in War and
Revolution (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986) p. 21.
Jack Goldstone, ed.. Revolutions: Theoretical, Comparative, and Historical
Studies, {New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, Publishers, 1986) p. 8.
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The terrorists can, in a manner described by Josephus. neutralize popular support
for the incumbent regime by terrorizing those elements of the population opposed to
revolution. For this to occur quickly and effectively, however, the terrorists must be
sufiiciently strong to create a psychological environment in which the cohesion of the
regime's supporters is disrupted. Moreover, as Martha Crenshaw points out, the
populace must be in general favorable to the terrorists and their stated objectives for
the revolution to have a chance of success. ^"^^ If the population is indifferent to the
terrorists, inciting a revolution is extremely difficult, and if the majority of the populace
is hostile to the terrorists, inciting a revolution is probably impossible. Still, in a
society in which the general populace is already hostile to the regime ~ as in a colonial
situation - the terrorists can make considerable progress in increasing the polarization
of that society by assassinating those elements of the population favoring compliance
with the regime and/or its policies.
Another major method the terrorists may use, and one that compliments the
above objective, is to attack the cohesion of the regime directly. Fortunately for the
terrorists, modern industrial societies are sufficiently complex that they provide an
extremely target-rich environment. More importantly, these societies are highly
dependent upon relatively fragile elements of cohesion that are easily disrupted. For
instance, as David Carlton notes.
The fact is that advanced democracies - and maybe advanced totalitarian states
as well -- are much more vulnerable than states ... even half a century ago.
Large-scale industrialization has steadily grown and sophisticated processes are
commonplace. Any breakdown in communications or in the flow of components
or the supply of electricity or in the working of computers can instantly render
idle thousands of workers. ...^^"^
Consequently, the modern industrial powers are extremely vulnerable due to their
intrinsic complexity. The fragileness of the industrial system can clearly be seen in the
following description of the 1965 New York City power blackout.
In the gathering darkness of a cold winter evening on 9 November 1965 ... a
small metal cup inside a black ... box began to slowly turn. As it turned, a
spindle set in its center and carrying a tiny arm also rotated, gradually moving
the metal arm ... to a metal contact. Only a handful of people knew the exact
Martha Crenshaw, Terrorism, Legitimacy and Power. The Consequences of
Political Violence (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1984) p. 27.
^ David Carlton, "The Future of Political Substate Violence," Terrorism: Theory
and Practice, op. cit., p. 207.
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location of the cup, and none knew it had been triggered. At precisely eleven
seconds past the niinute the two tiny objects made contact, and ... set in motion
a sequence of events that would lead in twelve minutes, to chaos. During that
time life in 80,000 square miles of one of the richest, most highly industrialized,
most densely populated areas in the Western world would come to a virtual
standstill. Over thirty million people would be effected ... [and] as a result some
of them would die. For all of them, life would never be quite the same again.
The impact of this manmade, yet freak accident is easy to see. The damage was
undone within thirteen hours because the infrastructure of the power grid was
undamaged and power was easily restored. One can only imagine the chaos created if
the damage had been irreparable for several days or weeks. As Richard Rubenstein
notes,
Even the richest most powerful city can only survive as long as the umbilical
chord to the countr\'side is not cut. One of the frightful images of the death of
civilization envisages a time when the city, deprived of the countryside's surplus
population, feeds upon its own ever-diminishing self and finally collapses.^
Clearly political cohesion would be virtually impossible under such a situation.
Luckily for the regime, even the most dedicated and highly skilled terrorists would
probably be too weak to bring about such a level of chaos by themselves. Yet
disruption to the degree described by Rubenstein may not be really necessarv-. The
mere threat of such chaos and loss of control can undermine the regime and weaken its
forces of coercion.
In order to retain absolute political control, the regime must counter every
terrorists attack and/ or must undo all damage done. Given the complexity and
vulnerability of the system, protecting everything would be cost prohibitive. As
Thomas Greene notes, "Not knowing where the terrorists will strike next can
immobilize thousands of government troops, constrained to take up a defensive posture
by guarding officials, residences, offices, and utilities and communication facilities. ^^^
Thus the government experiences an expenditure of effort far outweighing that of the
revolutionaries. The revolutionaries conserve their strength while the regime grows
continuously weaker. As the 19th Century Russian terrorist Stepniak-Kravchinsky
wrote, "In the struggle against an invisible, impalpable, omnipresent enemy, the strong
^^^James Burke, op. cit., p. 1.
"Richard Rubenstein, The Cunning of History; The Holocaust and the American
Future (Nev/ York: Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 1978) p. 95.
^^^Greene, op. cit., p. 132.
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is vanquished, not by the arms of his adversary', but by the continuous tension of his
own strength, which exhausts him, at last, more than he would be exhausted by
defeats. "^'"^ This, of course, is a return to Sun Tzu's simple admonition that the enemy
should always be kept under strain and gradually worn down."^-
The objective here is to create conditions wherein the regime's armed forces
become an occupying army in their own country. Here again, the Vietnam War
provides a classic example of this situation. The Viet Cong, by launching a series of
terrorist attacks, caused the governmental forces to begin to perceive that they were in
a state of war. By 1961, according to Stanley Karnow, the South Vietnamese Army
(SVA) had been converted from a national army representing the people into an army
of occupation which represented a far-off regime increasingly under the influence of a
^ireign power. Karnow, writing of the South Vietnamese Army, states,
Not only did they neglect the economic and social needs of the local population,
they operated as if they were in enemy territory -- living in fortified garrisons
protected by blockhouses and barbed wire, venturing into the countr>'-side only
under heavy guard, often accompanied by American advisors whose presence lent
substance to the Viet Cong denunciations of ... the 'neocolonial' collaboration
between America and [South Vietnamese President] Diem.... One of Diem's aides
confessed at the time: 'Except for the color of our skin, we are no difTerent from
the French'.""^
Although morally isolating the regime and gradually wearing do\^'n and
exhausting its armed forces are crucial parts to successful revolution, they are by no
means sufficient in and by themselves. There must be more than a moral and physical
break by the people from the regime. There must be a psychological break as well.
Friedland, for instance, points out that, "Seizing the state is not a simple physical
activity; post offices, radio stations, governmental buildings, work places, and
corporate offices may be occupied, but the ideological assumptions and habitual
behavior that underlie the manner in which these institutions operate are more diffiicult
to uproot." Thus, the habitual behavior of the people must be transformed for the
^•^^Serge Stepniak-Kravchinsky, "Underground Russia," (London: 1883), in
Walter Laquer, ed. The Terrorism Reader: A Historical Anthology (New York: New
American Library', 1978; Meridian Books, 1978) p. 87.
'Sun Tzu, op. cit., p. 68.
^^^Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History {^c\v York: Viking Press, 1983) p. 238.
^^"^ Friedland, op. cit., p. 128.
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revolution to be successful. Old loyalties and behavior patterns must be replaced by
those supplied by the revolutionaries. Here again, terrorism can play a significant role.
As was noted in Chapter Six terrorism can disrupt the cohesion of society to the
point of total despair - a level in which society is reduced to a conglomeration of
anomic individuals. This would clearly be counter-productive for the revolutionary
terrorist who was trying to mobilize that population. But if the terrorists are able to
create a level of anxiety in the population sufficient to disrupt previous patterns of
social intercourse but not to the degree of total isolation and despair, then as Thomas
Thornton suggests, the people will begin to cast about for new guidance. That
guidance, of course, is provided by the revolutionaries themselves.
The terrorists create this anxiety by disrupting previous social patterns through
the neutralization of the regime's normal socialization and service mechanisms. In this
way they physically isolate the regime. This proved extremely effective in South
Vietnam. By targeting local officials at the village and hamlet level, the terrorists were
able to disrupt much of Saigon's presence and influence among the populace. Nor was
this assassination campaign limited to government officials and agents. School
teachers, doctors, missionaries and anyone else advocating compliance with the regime
was targeted as well. According to James Harrison, the Viet Cong, by using terrorist
tactics, had virtual control of An Loc province by 1960, "... since the Communist
assassinations were sufficient to cripple the government apparatus at the hamlet and
village level. ..".-^^^ Only the massive influx of U.S. military power in 1965 was able to
turn the tide against the VC. Without U.S. aid Saigon's ability to retain political
control and ultimately defeat the revolution is extremely questionable.
By physically isolating the people from the government's influence, the
revolutionaries could then embark, upon a re-education program. The population was
introduced to new ways of thinking and living. Those who would not or could not
conform were eliminated. But this required the establishment of liberated zones where
a microcosm of the revolutionary state could be set up and operated. Hence, this level
can only be achieved when the revolution has reached the Expansion Phase and the
revolutionar>''s primary' means of force employment is guerrilla warfare. Since this is
beyond the scope of this paper, it is sufficient to note that terrorism has utility in the
physical isolation of the people from the regime and that this, in turn, can be converted
into psychological isolation.
^^^James Pinckney Harrison, op. cit., p. 190.
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Undermining the system is only useful, of course, if the revolutionaries can offer
a suitable alternative; a goal which the population prefers over ?.nything the regime can
credibly ofier. This is where Friedland's fourth, and in many ways most important
element of revolutionary' mobilization comes into play -- building the revolutionary
organizaiion.
It would be difficult to overemphasize the importance of the revolutionary
organization. It is the common denominator for the other three elements of
revolutionary mobilization. The revolutionary organization guides the revolution
through the mobilization process, selecting the best means of raising the consciousness
and increasing the participation of the revolutionary's reference group. The
revolutionary organization also develops and insures the correct implementation of an
action strategy which ultimately results in the undermining of the incumbent regime.
Finally, the revolutionary organization establishes new institutions to take the place of
those of the crumbling regime, insuring the post-revolutionarv' society is created in the
image of the revolution.
The revolutionary organization, then, sets the goals or objectives of the
revolution and creates and implements a strategy in which to bring these goals about.
But the revolutionary organization performs another very critical function in the
revolutionary' process, namely, maintaining the political and military cohesion of the
revolution. It is here that terrorism can also play an important role.
The importance of maintaining the cohesion of the revolution is self-evident.
Without a cohesive political and militar>' infrastructure there can be no revolution. It
is helpful, therefore, to briefly examine how revolutionary organizations effect and
maintain political and military cohesion within their ranks in the face of the
overwhelming armed force usually enjoyed by the incumbent regime.
To begin with, it is interesting to note that revolutionary organizations must
perform precisely the same basic functions as the nation-state in wartime to create and
maintain political and military cohesion. Both ernties must create a situation in which
the individual, autonomous human being, totally subordinates his will to that of the
established hierarchy, even to the point of willingly sacrificing his/her life if necessary.
As suggested in Chapter Three nation-states create such a condition by employing
four, overlapping and mutually supporting elements. These are: 1) leadership, 2)
organizational compulsion, 3) group pressure, and the 4) survival instinct. As shall be
seen shortly, these four factors are also operational in the creation and maintenance of
cohesion within revolutions as well.
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That the revolutionary organization provides a leadership component is readily
apparent and needs little elaboration here. As stated above, this organization
establishes the goals and strategies of the revolution and, germane to this function,
must mobilize resources, coordinate actions, establish acceptable patterns of behavior
and punish errant members.
Group or peer pressure is an effective tool for establishing and sustaining
acceptable patterns of behavior. Recalling the citations from Ardant Du Picq, Morris
Janowitz and S.L.A. Marshall presented in Chapter Three above, men who are not
totally accepted as part of a primary group are much less likely to subordinate their
will and personal well-being to that group than are men who are integral members of
the group. Moreover, what the group perceives to be acceptable behavior governs how
each member of the group behaves, providing they have been fully socialized within
that group. The importance of this has not been lost upon revolutionary organizations
which endeavor to create small, closely-knit cells of individuals who are all socialized in
the same manner.
This socialization is critical to the success of the revolution because as Paul
Wilkinson points out, early in the revolutionan/' mobilization process the only
advantage the terrorists can hope to generate is superior morale and political will.^^^
This must be sufficient to compensate for their extreme weakness in mihtar>' and
political resources. It should come as no surprise, therefore, that the revolutionar}'
organization places so much emphasis in properly indoctrinating new recruits to the
movement. This indoctrination, according to Peter Watson rests upon two
psychological principles: 1) conformity comes from absolute control, and 2) behavior
shapes attitudes. "^^^
Behind the principle that conformity comes from absolute control is the idea of
totally resocializing the individual. This entails at least the partial disruption of former
patterns of behavior and social bonds. It is a concept with which military training
systems throughout the world are familiar. Writing of military bootcamp Gwynne
Dyer states that,
Basic training is not really about teaching people skills; its about changing them,
so that they can do things they would not dreamt of otherwise. It works by
applying enormous physical and mental pressure to men who have been isolated
^^^Wilkinson, op. cit., p. 110.
Peter Watson, War on the Mind: The Military Uses and Abuses of Psychology
(New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1978) pp. 344-345.
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from their normal civilian environment and placed in one where the only right
way to think and behave is the way the [militar>] wants them to."^^
At the most basic level this is precisely how terrorist organizations train their
combatants as well. Of course, revolutionary terrorists endeavor to change their
recruits to a much larger degree than do most military organizations, consequently
their methods are much more extensive, harsh and unyielding. And terroristic force is
an extremely effective tool in this reorientation process. Again as Dyer notes, "The
first stage in any conversion process is the destruction of an individual's former beliefs
and confidence, and his reduction to a position of helplessness and need."^^' In the
individual's extrem^e anxiety he becomes more malleable and often readily accepts any
positive feedback from^ his new environment, even if it means behaving in a manner he
would have considerpH unacceptable a short time before. This behavior can range from
driving a bayonet into a human being to placing a bomb in a crowded airport. The
difference is merely one of degree. Of course, the stronger one's prior beliefs and the
more radical the action the controlling agency expects to be performed, the less chance
the resocialization will be completely successful. But revolutionary terrorist
socialization processes are often quite effective. This process involves the complete
isolation of the new recruit from his normal life and through a long series of
indoctrination sessions, which include heavy doses of self-criticism and high levels of
anxiety, the individual becomes psychologically changed. Watson notes that new
revolutionary terrorist recruits are often required to criticize themselves in public or in
mass meetings where they admit to some deviation from the ideology of the revolution.
Moreover, the recruits are also exposed to long discussions on ambiguous topics, since
their attitudes on these have yet to be fully formed and they are likely to be more
malleable and easily persuaded than in discussions in areas with which the recruits
already have formed strong opinions. These discussions then go on for many hours,
ensuring the recruit becomes exhausted and, thereby, more susceptible to change.
Finally, the recruit is often isolated from outside sources of information and support
which further reduces the ability to resist indoctrination. ^'^^ A practical example of this
technique is provided by William Henderson in his study of Viet Cong cohesion. He
notes that,
^^'Dyer, op. at., pp. 109-110.
^^-Ibid., p. 111.
^^^(See Watson, op. cii., pp. 344-345.)
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Those individuals identified as 'lazy,' 'lacking in commitment,' or guilty of
'rightest thouglits,' or 'a lack of an objective point of view,' and so on , were
subjected to criticism sessions of varving severity, depending upon the gravity of
their deviation. Criticism was a psychological technique designed to bring
anxiety to the [VC] soldier, who was culturally dependent for security upon his
relationship with the group. The relief from anxiety produced by the individual's
reaffirmation of his intent to comply with group expectations was a strong force
for cohesion. ^^'^
Although most terrorist recruits are predisposed to such a life-style, even initially
hostile persons can be susceptible to resocialization. Perhaps the most famous case is
Patricia Hearst who, within eight weeks of being kidnapped participated in a bank
robbery for the Symbionese Liberation Army.^^^
The commission of a crime also enhances the recruit's dependence upon the
group by fuilher isolating him from the rest of society. This is the second element of
the resocialization process — behavior shapes attitude. As Watson points out.
When vou do something vou have to rationalize whv vou have done it. so vou
change your attitudes [so that they are] in line with your behavior.... Not only
do these [criininal acts] provide the opportunity for blackmail ... they also help
persuade the recruit that he is a member of something that matters, that is worth
breaking the law for.'^^^
Once an individual is socialized into the group, group pressure tends to keep that
individual in the group. The group becomes that individual's main source of self-
esteem " particularly when the revolutionary terrorist becomes a wanted man and
cannot return to his old way of life. Indeed, according to Paul Wilkinson, "It is partly
for this reason that the classic exponents of revolutionary terrorism, such as Sergi
Nechayev and Johann Most, have insisted on the need for the individual terrorist to
utterly sever his ties of affection with his family and friends. "^'^^ As Sergei Nechayev
admonished in his Catechism of the Revolutionist, "The revolutionarv' considers his
friend and holds dear only a person who has shown himself in practice to be as much a
revolutionary as he himself "-^^^
^^^William D. Henderson, IVhy the Viet Cong Fought: A Study of Motivation and
Control in a Modern Army in Combat (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, Inc.,
1979) p. 89.
^^^Dobson and Payne, op. cit., pp. 62 and 100.
^^SVatson, op. cit., p. 344.
^^^Paul Wilkinson, op. cit., p. 113.
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It is here that group pressure gives over to the survival instinct. Not only do
soldiers perceive their primary group to be their main source of self-esteem, it also
becomes their primary source of security as well. If the integrity of the group is
threatened, then so are the individual members. Consequently, it is critical for each
member of the group to be trusted by and to trust in return all of the other members
of his/her group. The means the revolutionary terrorists employ to insure this trust is
quite simple. It is to simply make each new recruit an accomplice of terror -- a wanted
man. Franz Fanon has pointed out that this is critical in ensuring the cohesion of the
terrorist group. He wrote that,
The group requires that each individual perform an irrevocable action. In
Algeria, for example, where almost all the men who called on the people to join
the national struggle were condemned to death or [were] searched for by French
police, confidence was proportional to the hopelessness of each case. You could
be sure of a new recruit [only] when he could no longer go back into the colonial
system. -^^
Military" and revolutionary' organizations alike understand the importance to
group cohesion of creating conditions wherein the incumbent members of the group
associate security with that group. In such conditions, threatening situations only
serve to increase rather than decrease the cohesion of the group.
This goes far in explaining how individual's socialized to society's norms can
violate them to such a degree once they join a terrorist group. Jerrold Post in a study
on the psychodynamic theory of terrorist behavior suggested the answer might be
found in studying the Unification Church. In this study he notes that American young
people willingly accepted a totally new system of norms when joining the church, even
to the point of having their spouses chosen for them by the Reverend Moon.^'''^ It was
suggested in another study by M. Galanter, that those who found the greatest degree
of security from the Unification Church were most likely to accept its mores and least
likely to tolerate dissidence within the group.^^^ As Post writes,
Sergei Nechayev, "Catechism of the Revolutionist," The Terrorism Reader: A
Historical Anthology, edited by Walter Laquer, op. cit., p. 69.
^^^ Franz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (London: Hamandsworth, 1967)
p. 67. As quoted in Wilkinson, op. cit., p. 113.
^"^^Jerrold VI. Post, "Notes on Psychodynamic Theory of Terrorist Behavior,"
Terrorism, Volume 7, No. 3, 1984, pp. 252-253.
^^^M. Galanter, "Engaged Members of the Unification Church: Impact of a
Charismatic Large Group on Adaptation and Behavior." Archives of General Psychiatry
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In efTect, to question the ethos of the group was to threaten the basis for their
security.... [This] relationship between loneliness and psychological distress and
staying in the group and the unquestioning acceptance of the group's standards
probably apply to Terrorist groups as well.... For the Moonies, maintaining the
boundary' of the group is critical, for if it is breached, the [cohesion] of the group
is threatened, [and] members might be influenced to return to the society from
which they came. With the Terrorist group, the threat is even more extreme
[since] transgressing the boundary may lead to death or imprisonment.
^"^^
Survival instinct, then, is operative in the maintenance of the cohesion of the
terrorist group. Still, there are no doubt many who, once they get in wish to return to
society. Because this is such a grave risk to the revolution, few if any are ever allowed
to return. It is here that the last of the four elements of cohesion come into play --
organizational compulsion.
Like any military organization, revolutionary terrorists must instill order and
discipline in its combatants. This is achieved through the development of special
elements whose primary purpose is the enforcement of internal discipline. As John
Wolf has noted,
A terrorist organization of the FLN or Tupamaro variety establish... specialized
enforcement units and attached them to their command councils for the purpose
of executing sentences pronounced by a 'revolutionary judiciary' upon those who
attempt to leave the organization or others who were found guilty of some other
serious breach of discipline. ^^^
Moreover, Paul Wilkinson has observed, "Some of the most savage acts of
repressive terror are imposed on the members of the organization to impose an iron
discipline of fear on the whole organization.""^''''* One particularly stark example is
provided to us by Walter Laquer,
In February 1972, a United Red Army hideout was discovered in Karuizawa, a
mountain spa some eighty miles from Tokyo. There fourteen mangled and
tortured bodies were found; one half of the group had liquidated the others for
antirevolutionar\' failings, a few had been buried alive. "^"^^
(In press). As quoted in Post, op. cit., p. 253.
^'^Post, op. cit., pp. 252-253.
John B. Wolf, "Organization and Management Practices of Urban Terrorist
Groups," Terrorism: An International Journal, Volume 1, Number 2, 1978, p. 177.
^'^'^Wilkinson, op. cit., p. 114.
Laquer, Terrorism, op. cit., p. 125.
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Certainly there are many other equally graphic examples. The important point
here is that the revolutionary organization must be willing and able to apply coercion
and, if necessary, lethal force against its own members in order to maintain strict
internal discipline. As the previously cited example of the U.S. Army in Vietnam
clearly showed, without discipline the cohesion of the military organization begins to
wane when facing combat conditions. This is particularly critical for the
revolutionaries, especially in the early phases of the revolutionaiy mobilization process,
since it is only in moral force that they are likely to generate any superiority over the
incumbent regime. In so doing, the revolutionaries are likely to rely heavily upon
organizational compulsion to maintain absolute control to maintain absolute control
over those who may begin to waiver in the face of the regime's overwhelming political
and military' superiority. Moreover, this org-^ni^ational compulsion may often include
the use of terroristic force. As with the British NCOs at Waterloo or the Somme, it is
often necessary to employ lethal force against a symbolic few in order to keep the
remainder in line.
In the mobilization of the revolution the revolutionarv organization not onlv
estabhshes the goals and strategies for the revolution but, most importantly, insures the
revolution remains a cohesive entity. In so doing, it employs the same group dynamics
as military organizations the world over, both to socialize and maintain control of its
constituent members. So long as the revolutionary organization is able to sustain its
cohesion in the face of the superior armed forces of the regime, the revolution has a
chance for success.
Revolutionary terrorism, then, not only plays a significant role in the
mobilization of the revolution, but in the preservation of the revolution as well.
Terrorism is instrumental in raising the consciousness of the target populace, inducing
many to join the revolution, contributing to the undermining of the regime and has
great utiUty in maintaining the cohesion of the revolutionary organization. These are
clearly integral elements of the revolutionary mobilization process. The question no./
becomes, are these activities by the revolutionary terrorists and act of war? It is this
question that will be addressed in the next section.
C. REVOLUTIONARY TERRORISM -- A FORM OF WAR?
For revolutionary' terrorism to qualify as a form of war it must meet the three
basic criteria outlined in the first four chapters of this study. It must involve the
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employment of lethal force for: 1) a political objective and 2) in a manner that seeks to
destroy the enemy's will to resist. Moreover, to be a form of war, revolutionary
terrorism must 3) also involve armed engagements between contending political entities
each seeking to physically compel the other.
The first two criteria have been adequately dealt with in the preceding section
and require little further discussion here. From the above, it is apparent that
revolutionary terrorism has utility in mobilizing the revolution: clearly a political
objective. Additionally, the primary method employed by revolutionary terrorists is the
moral isolation of the incumbent regime from the general populace. This increasing
isolation ultimately shatters the political cohesion of the state and undermines the
williningness of the regime's armed forces to continue to support the crumbling and
isolated regime. The question remains, however, does revolutionary terrorism meet the
last criteria: does this form of lethal force involve armed engagements with the regime?
As will be recalled from Chapter Four, the Principle of Engagement requires that
both political entities employ lethal force in order to compel the other to do its will.
Upon initial rellection it would appear that not only does revolutionary terrorism not
involve such armed engagements, the terrorists do everything in their power to avoid
such clashes. Indeed, the targets most often attacked by revolutionary terrorists are
rarely armed, and in a majority of the cases where such targets do have a means to
resist, the force is usually employed unilaterally by the terrorists. From this, it is easy
to conclude that revolutionary terrorism violates this, von Clausewitz's preeminent
principle of war, and therefore cannot be considered a form of warfare.
Upon closer inspection, however, it becomes apparent that this is an overly
narrow interpretation of the Principle of Engagement. To be sure this principle
normally manifests itself in the form of a battle -- i.e., the simultaneous and reciprocal
employment of lethal force on both sides — but nothing limits this principle to only this
manifestation of force. Often, even in conventional warfare, lethal force is employed
unilaterally. This is particularly true at the tactical level. For instance, to name just a
few examples, submarines torpedoed unarmed merchant ships during World Wars I
and II; fighter planes strafed unarmed trains and barges; and bombers and artillery
bombarded cities, ports and factories which had no means with which to reply.
Von Clausewitz's Principle of Engagement is therefore not restricting warfare only
to those instances, as in a duel, where both sides are equally capable of inflicting lethal
force on each other. Otherwise, such time-honored military tactics as the surprise
157
attack and the ambush would fall outside the pale of war. As von Clausewitz
observed. "[When] the preservation of one's own fighting forces [is] the dominant
consideration ... the attacker will attempt destructive action only under favorable
circumstances..."."' '^ Clearly, von Clausewitz understood that when one side is
considerable weaker than the other, it will avoid open confrontations with the enemy's
armed forces to the greatest degree possible, and military operations will be restricted
to hit and run or other such tactics where damage can be done to the enemy without
further weakening the attacker. Sun Tzu put it another way, "Now an army may be
likened to water, for just as flowing water avoids heights and hastens to the lowlands,
as an army avoids strength and strikes weakness. "'^'^ These ideas were "rediscovered"
and implemented by T.E. LawTence as he strove to turn the fledgling Arab national
rebellion into a viable military threat to the Ottoman Empire during World War I.
According to Lawrence,
Battles in Arabia were a mistake, since we profited in them only by the
ammunition the enemy fired off... [Marshal Maurice de] Saxe told us that
irrational battles were the refuges of fools: rather they seemed to me impositions
on the side which believed itself weaker, hazards made unavoidable either by lack
of land room or by the need to defend material property dearer than the lives of
soldiers. We had nothing material to lose, so our best line was to defend
nothing.. ..^"^^
Given the above, it is clear that revolutionary terrorism is the ultimate expression
of this idea. When the Chinese People's Army or Viet Cong went into a village and
assassinated the village chief or informant, it was a blow to the central government's
power structure. Although no battle occurred, the terrorists did conduct a "destructive
action" for a political end. Likewise, when the government forces entered that same
village and "executed" suspected revolutionaries or their sympathizers, so too did they
conduct a destructive act for a political end.
^"^^Von Clausewitz, op. cit., p. 529. While von Clausewitz acknowledged that
engagements could occur without battles he cautions that, "These means are generally
overrated; they seldom achieve so much as a battle, and involve the risk of drawbacks
that may have been overlooked. They are tempting because they cost so little. [But]
they should always be looked upon as minor investments that can yield only minor
dividends, appropriate to limited circumstances and weaker motives. But they are
obviously preferable to pointless battles -- victories that cannot be fully exploited."
^"^'Sun Tzu, op. cit., p. 101.
^^^T.E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom (New York: Doubleday and Co., Inc.,
1935; Penguin Books, 19S5) p. 201.
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Engagements, therefore, do not have to involve open battles. It is sufficient that
both sides employ lethal force to weaken their opponent morally and materially. The
means each side employs, however, will rest upon the pohtical-military situation and
the objectives sought. For instance, the regime is generally waging a total war of
position and annihilation against the revolution. Thus the regime seeks open conflicts
with the revolutionaries where the former's superior combat power can be brought to
bear. The revolutionary' terrorists, however, are most often waging a total war of
evasion and attrition. ^"^^ Their political objective is the absolute destruction of the
regime, which in Clausewitzian terms means the destruction of the enemy's armed
forces, occupation of his territory and destruction of his will to resist. Because of their
extreme weakness, revolutionary terrorists cannot achieve this by direct means, and
must therefore employ operational objectives commensurate with their limitfd strength.
This requires them, particularly in the earliest phases of the revolutionary mobilization
process, to adopt strategy and tactics permitting the terrorists to attack the enemy and
begin wearing him down through attrition, without getting hit in return. Clearly this
calls for a special form of engagement on the part of the revolutionary terrorists.
Like all military organizations, terrorists have two basic weapon-types available
to them; shock and fire. As pointed out in Chapter Three, shock weapons are
generally more effective -- that is, they are more decisive since they result in the
capture of territory and/or prisoners -- but are also the most expensive to the users in
terms of potential friendly casualties. This is due to the fact that the employment of
shock weaponry requires the user to expose himself to the enemy.
Revolutionary terrorists employ shock to seize banks, hijack aircraft or attack
airports. But as the 1972 Japanese Red Army attack at Lod airport and the 1985
Palestinian attack at Rome International airport clearly underscores, shock attacks are
often very costly for the attackers. The terrorists must therefore adopt special tactics in
order to mitigate the enemy's superior combat power. This is normally done by seizing
hostages, the safety of which normally prevents the regime from bringing its
overwhelming combat power to bear. Even so, such operations are extremely risky for
Revolutionaries can also find themselves waging a limited war. that is, a war
in which the political objective is not necessarily to effect the total destruction of the
governing entity, but merely exhaust its willingness to continue the conflict. This is the
classical colonial situation wherein the insurgents do not wish or seek the total
destruction of the colonial regime, but simply that they tire of the conflict, cut their
losses and withdraw. As in the case of the Vict Cong, the insurgents were fighting two
wars simultaneously: a total war against Saigon and a limited war against Washington.
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the terrorists and should a fire-fight break out, as in Vlunich in 1972, the terrorist
casualties -- killed, wounded, and captured -- are invariably 100 per cent.
Fire weapons afTord a much less risky, if less efTective means of hitting the
enemy. The standard fire weapon of the terrorists is, of course, the time bomb and,
like all fire weapons, this permits the attacker to strike the enemy with minimum
exposure and risk. The primary' drawback is that, in most cases, it lacks the
decisiveness and effectiveness of a shock attack. Whereas a shock attack can result in
the seizure of hostages who can afford the terrorists hundreds of days of press
coverage, a bomb attack is often quickly forgotten. Yet the time-bomb does permit
even the weakest terrorist organization to strike the enemy without unduly risking any
casualties.
The question still remains, however, do these operations truly constitute a
militarv' engagement? This is where the seven principles of combat come into play.
Since all militarv' engagements are governed by these principles, it is reasonable to
assume that if these seven principles are present in a terrorist attack, it is a military
engagement. A few examples should be sufficient to establish this.
One of the most dramatic and successful examples of a terrorist organization's
overcoming superior combat power through the proper application of the principles of
combat is the 19S3 bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut, Lebanon. By effectively
using mass, economy of force, unity of command, security, surprise and simplicity, a
single terrorist " ... overcame the theoretical militar>' advantage of a Marine
amphibious unit supported by aircraft carriers, a battleship and the nation's combined
intelligence capability to gain a major political victory."^^^ The mass of a 12,000-pound
bomb was sufTicient to destroy the designated target. One driver in one truck insured
economy offorce since both the truck and the driver were already deemed expendable
to the terrorists. Maneuver allowed the terrorists to place the weapon where it would
be most decisive. Unity of Command and simplicity were apparent in that the few
elements involved required verv' limited command and control, and achieved the
planned results. It is also evident that all intelligence, logistics, planning and
operational execution were well coordinated resulting in the application of force in the
precise place and manner to achieve the desired political objective. Finally, and
perhaps most importantly, the terrorists achieved surprise and maintained their security
^^^Jefferey W. Wright, "Terrorism: A Mode of Warfare," Military Review (Ft.
Levanworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College) October, 1984.
p. 38.
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up until the moment of the attack. The attack occurred at a time, place, and manner
for which the Marine commander was unprepared. Above all other factors, it was
security and surprise that enabled the terrorists to achieve the force mulitiplication
necessary so that one man in a truck could kill 241 enemy troops and force the US to
modify its political objectives in the region. It also ensured, at least for the near term,
greater Islamic participation in the Lebanese government.
When revolutionary' terrorist organizations have ignored these principles of
combat they are invariably defeated, often with catastrophic results. Indeed, according
to Abraham Guillen, it was the loss of mobility — i.e. the ability to maneuver - and
security that ultimately caused the collapse of the Tupamaros. He writes.
By tying themselves to fixed terrain ... the Tupamaros ... lost both mobility and
security.,.. In order to avoid encirclement and annihilation through house-to-
house searches, the guerrillas can best survive not by establishing fixed urban
bases, but by living apart and fighting together.... Because the Tupamaros
immobilized many of their commandos in fixed quarters, they were exposed in
1972 to mass detentions, they lost a large part of their armaments and related
equipment and were compelled to transfer military' suppUes to the countr>'side for
hiding.'^^
The Tupamaros lack of security meant that the regime's forces could find their
bases of operations and mass sufficient forces against them to insure they were
destroyed. Moreover, by losing the ability to maneuver, the Tupamaros could not
avoid the coming blow and were thereby doomed to defeat. Their last ditch effort to
move to the countryside proved illusory when the leadership brought along the same
encumberances that tied them down in the cities and at the same time robbed them of
any remaining security they could have derived by hiding among the populace in a
large city.
In another example, the Marxist revolutionary terrorist group that operated in
Argentina during the 1970s known as the ERP, suffered a devastating setback in
December 1975 when it failed to achieve surprise or sufficient mass in an attack on a
military stronghold at Monte Chingolo, a few miles south of Buenos Aries. According
to Christopher Dobson and Ronald Payne,
The garrison seems to have been forewarned and was ready for the attacking
party. The fighting went on all night and in the end six civilians, nine soldiers
and 85 guerrillas lay dead. It was a devastating blow and followed a series of
Abraham Guillen, "Urban Guerrilla Strategy," Guerrilla Strategies, op. cit.,
edited by Gerard Chaliand, pp. 317-319.
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defeats in the guerrilla's attempts to occupy a 'liberated area' in the rugged
mountains and junsle of Tucman. Thev lost an estimated 600 men in this
campaign....
Poor security caused the Symbionese Liberation Army to give up the principles
of mass, surprise, maneuver, and economy of force when their hideout was discovered
and overwhelmed by 150 Los Angeles policemen and 100 FBI agents."^-' Lack of
maneuver and poor security also resulted in the annihilation of the pro-Palestinain
terrorists at Entebbe airport in July 1976. Moreover, lack of unity of command has
drastically reduced the combat power of the FLO which, according to Abu lyad, has
reduced that organization's cohesion and effectiveness.''^'^ Clearly, then, the principles
of combat are critical to victory by revolutionary' terrorists at both the tactical and
strategic levels. From this, it may also be concluded that revolutionary terrorist
operations are military operations from the most basic level of analysis. What is O''
greater importance to this study is that the presence and necessity of adherence to the
seven principles of combat provides sufficient evidence to conclude that revolutionary'
terrorist operations constitute the element of armed engagement necessary to establish
that this form of terrorism is indeed a form of war.
D. SUMMATION
Revolutionary terrorism is clearly a form of warfare. The employment of lethal
force for a political objective is readily seen in terrorism's integral function within the
revolutionary mobilization process. Its employment of lethal force on the moral plane
is also apparent, both to shatter the cohesion of the enemy and to sustain its own.
Finally, revolutionary terrorism qualifies as the employment of force against force since
revolutionary' terrorist operations meet the basic definition of armed engagements.
The political objective of the revolutionarv' terrorists is to overthrow the
incumbent regime. Because of their extreme weakness, this can only be brought about
by indirect means. In this case, these indirect means involve the mobilization of the
revolution, taking the revolutionary mobilization process from the preparatory phase to
the expansion phase. In this process the terrorists must carefully apply force in order
to raise the consciousness of the target of iniluence, increase their participation,
undermine the regime and assist in the building and maintenance of the revolutionary
^^"Dobson and Payne, op. cii., p. 203.
^*^^Bernard K. Johnpoll, op. dr., p. 41.
Aby lyad, "Al Fatah's Autocriticism," Guerrilla Strategies, op. cit., p. 326.
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organization. All four of these are clearly political objectives that are within the
capabilities of the terrorists.
Due to their extreme weakness, the revolutionary terrorists rely very heavily upon
the employment of force on the moral plane. In this way, the very miniscule physical
force available to the terrorists is converted to considerable power as it influences an
ever increasing number of people, both in terms of terrorizing members of the regime
and positively influencing the general populace. Equally important, revolutionary
terrorism is instrumental in sustaining the cohesion of the revolutionary organization in
the face of overwhelming odds. By providing leadership and creating conditions where
group pressure, organizational compulsion and survival instinct become operative, the
revolutionary terrorists — in precisely the same manner as military organizations the
world over — insure the maximum cohesion possible even under extremely adverse
circumstances.
Finally, revolutionary terrorism involves the use of force on the physical plane.
This is manifested in armed engagements which rest solidly upon the principles of
combat espoused by Carl von Clausewitz. By focusing that force on the moral
isolation of the regime, the government finds it increasingly difficult to maintain its
forces of coercion. These forces of coercion are the center of gravity for the regime
and as Skocpol and others have clearly established, the loss of these forces is
catastrophic for the incumbents. Although it is apparent that both the regime and the
revolutionary terrorists are applying physical force to compel each other at the
strategic level, it is less so at the tactical. Yet, as the Beirut bombing, Tupamaros,
Symbionese Liberation Army and Entebbe examples clearly show, the seven principles
of combat are critical to success and are operative even when only one side is
employing lethal force at a specific moment.
Revolutionary terrorism, then, involves the three grand elements of warfare: 1)
the use of force for a political objective, 2) the use of force on the moral plane, and 3)
the use of force against force on the physical plane. It is safe to conclude, therefore,




State terrorism involves the employment of lethal force by state governments
upon civilian populations for the express purpose of weakening or destroying their will
to resist. This form of terrorism can be divided into two general categories: internal or
external.^^^ Internal state terrorism is the use of lethal force by a state government
against its own civilian population and can have two purposes: 1) to repress the
people, making them apolitical or politically malleable, and/ or 2) to weaken the
population's willingness to support revolutionary or other anti-government movements.
This type of terrorism will hereafter be referred to as repression terrorism. External
state terrorism involves the use of lethal force by a state goverimient against a foreign
civilian population ostensibly to weaken or destroy that population's morale and
willingness to support its own government. This can be of two types depending upon
the method employed: 1) military terrorism and 2) state sponsored terrorism. As the
name suggests, mihtary terrorism involves the employment of terroristic force by
elements of a given state's military forces against a symbolic target within the targeted
entity. In state sponsored terrorism the terroristic force is employed by surrogate
terrorist forces usually having only clandestine ties to the supporting state.
This chapter will examine each of these forms of state terrorism to determine
which qualify as a form of war. The first to be examined is repression terrorism. In
this section we will analyze the rulers relationship to the ruled as well as the methods
by which the rulers employ terrorism against the populace. In the next section we will
analyze military terrorism, examining how this form of terrorism functions, and the
purposes for which it has been used by sovereign political entities. Thirdly, we will
^-xamine state sponsored terrorism, analyzing how this form of terrorism functions and
to what ends it may be employed. In each section we will ascertain whether the type
of terrorism being examined qualifies as a form of warfare.
^^^Gerald Holton, op. cit., pp. 265-266.
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B. REPRESSION TERRORISM
All modern nation-states are heavily dependent upon power and coercion in
order to effectively command and control their resources -- particularly their
populations. As Andrew Schmookler points out in his book The Parable of the Tribes,
the evolution of civilization is, quite simply, the story of ever increasing social
inequalities culminating in modem societies in which a highly centralized state
bureaucracy has a virtual monopoly on power and most forms of coercion.
Schmookler WTites,
A system has effective central control to the extent that there exists within it a
part that can direct and coordinate all parts of the system. The evolution of
civilization has manifested a broad trend toward the creation of such control.
This has entailed first a differentiation of power among the members of society
and second an elaboration of the organizational means by which the powerful
parts can control society as a whole. ^^^
This command and control by the powerful parts is, of course, highly dependent
upon coercion to varying levels of degree. Examples are legion, ranging from traffic
tickets, to IRS audits, to capital punishment. Certainly, many would consider capital
punishment to be terrorism. In-as-much-as the state seeks to employ lethal force to
"terrorize" or "deter" others from committing similar crimes, and to the degree that
many, if not most death-row inmates consider such punishment abnormal,^^ capital
punishment is "terroristic" as defmed by this paper. Still, it would be incorrect to label
such states as terroristic based upon the use of capital punishment alone. For instance
one could easily argue that the target population is not death-row inmates, but the
general populace, the majority of which (particularly in democratic societies that elect
the officials that make the laws) clearly see capital punishment as not being an
abnormal use of force. And, since the majority of those subject to that force do not
perceive it to be abnormal, it cannot be terrorism.
^^^Andrew B. Schmookler, op. cit., p.92.
•^^^Perhaps the most poignant example of death-row inmate's perception of
capital punishment being an abnormal use of lethal force is the remarkable Februar}'
1960 letter by death-row inmate Carv'l Chessman to then California Governor Edmund
Brown. See Caryl Chessman, "A Letter to the Governor," Criminal Life: Views from
the Inside, edited by David M. Petersen and Marcello Truzzi (Englewood Cliffs, New
Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1972) pp. 204-212.
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A terrorist regime is one that engages in repression terrorism against elements of
its own population in order to create conditions sufiicient for that regime to remain in
political control. In other words, repression terrorism is the systematic use of lethal
force by a state apparatus for the purpose of suppressing, quelling or restraining
political opponents within the population.^^^ To the extent that maintaining political
control over the population is a political objective, repression terrorism can be
considered the employment of lethal force for a political end. As shall be seen,
however, this alone does not qualify repression terrorism as a form of war.
As Alex Schmid observes, repression terrorism has clearly had a longer history
than other forms of political terrorism. '^^ Regimes throughout history have employed
lethal force against symbolic victims as a means of terrorizing and neutralizing
potential resistance within their respective populations. The moment mankind moved
away from the egalitarian hunter-gathering society towards more complex social
systems involving a hierarchy of command and control mechanisms the rulers began to
employ force in order to maintain control of the rulcd.^ That such a technique has
survived down through the ages is a testament to its utility. According to Ted Gurr,
"So long as men anticipate severe and certain retribution for proscribed actions they
are likely to restrain their anger [against the regime]. "-^^^ Theda Skocpol would agree.
She writes, "Even after great loss of legitimacy has occurred, a state can remain quite
stable ... [provided] its coercive organizations remain coherent and effective. "^^^ But
there is a price.
As was mentioned in Chapter Six, coercive measures may be an effective and
eflicient means of controlling a population, but it is not an efficient means to govern.
Clearly the most efficient way to govern a population is by the consent of the people.
In this way resources are not wasted on maintaining internal controls. As Schmookler
has noted, "The ruler who relies on brute force needs more power to conquer and hold
the same territory'. Therefore the value of consent must be part of the calculus of
"393power. -^^
^^^This definition of repression terrorism is a modification of one presented by
Paul Wilkinson in his book, Political Terrorism, (London: .Vlacmillan & Co.. 1974) p.
40.
^^^Alex P. Schmid, op. cit., p. 171.
'^'^Schmookler, op. cit., p. 93.
^^^Ted Robert Gurr, op. cit., p. 238.
^^^Theda Skocpol, op. cit., p. 32.
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From this, it may be inferred that leaders who employ repressive terrorism
normally do so not out of preference, but because they are compelled to do so.
Indeed, according to Alexander Dallin and George Breslauer, repression terrorism is
generally employed by those states that do not enjoy widespread legitimacy among the
pcpuiace.^^*^ While this situation is possible in long-standing regimes, lack of legitimacy
is norally a factor of fledgling regimes that have recently acquired power through coup
d'etat or revolution. Classic examples, of course, are the Red Terror following the
French and Russian Revolutions.
To be sure, the Red Terror of the French Revolution was to become the
archetypal expression of this form of terrorism. Although later "terrors" would claim
far more victims, they would still not surpass the utter horror nor result in any more
effective political control than the French Red Terror. Owen Connelly writes,
The guillotine still appears to represent in the Western mind the ultimate in
political repression, bloodletting, and misuse of power. Its some 2600 victims in
Paris seem an insignificant number when compared to the millions executed by
the NAZIs during World War II or the five to ten milhon who died during
Stalin's collectivization of farms in the Soviet Union. Yet the guillotine retains
its horrible image. ...Nothing before had created such horror abroad or so
effectively intimidated a domestic population as did the Terror."^^^
The Soviets followed suit immediately after coming to power in Russia. One of
the ver\' first organizations Lenin created upon coming to power was his secret state
police, or CHEKA. The CHEKA's primary function was to neutralize enemies of the
revolution and to permit the fledgling Soviet government to consolidate its power.^^*^ It
was an organization of coercion born of necessity, and terrorism was its primary
instrument. As Felix Dzerzhinsky, the first Chief of the CHEKA, reportedly
commented, "We don't need justice now. We must fight to the utmost. We need a
revolutionary sword to destroy all counter-revolutionaries."^^''' And as William H.
^"^^Schmookler, op. cit., p. 55.
Alexander Dallin and George Breslauer, Political Terror in Communist
Systems, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970) p. 2. As quoted in Schmid, op.
cit., pp. 172-173.
^^^Owen Connelly, French Revolution/Napoleonic Era, (New York: Holt,
Rinehart and Winston, 1979) p. 142.
^^^Skocpol, op. cit., p. 215.
U.S., Congress. Senate, Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, The
Historical Antecedents of Soviet Terrorism, Hearings before a subcommittee of the Senate
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Chamberlin points out:
No government could have survived in Russia in those years without the use of
terrorism.... The national morale was completely shattered by the World War.
No one. except under extreme compulsion, was willing to perform any state
obligation. The older order had simply crumbled away; a new order, with new
habits and standards of conduct, had not yet formed; very often the only way in
which a governmental representative, whether he was a Bolshevik or a White
olTicer, could get his orders obeyed was by flourishing a revolver.^^^
Of course, repression terrorism is not limited only to post-revolutionary
situations. Peter the Great and Stalin employed repression terrorism in situations
wherein their governments were relatively secure from any overthrow attempt. These
leaders simply selected repression terrorism as the most efficient means not of
governing but of effecting social change. The question remains, however, regardless of
the conditions in which it is employed, is repression terrorism a fonn of war?
Based upon the first two of the three elements of war identified previously, it
appears repression terrorism could be a form of war. It involves the use of lethal force
for: 1) a political objective and 2) for the purpose of destroying the target entity's will
to resist. But as shall be quickly established, that target entity cannot be considered to
be the enemy and moreover, repression terrorism clearly violates von Clausewitz's most
important principle of war - the engagement — since there is no armed clash between
contending poUtical parties. This being the case, repression terrorism clearly cannot be
considered a form of war.
As was stated in Chapter Three, war entails the employment of lethal force for
the purpose of destroying the enemy's will to resist. Given that repression terrorism is
lethal force employed by a state government against its own population, the amount of
force employed must be carefully regulated or the state will wind up destroying itself by
destroying the cohesion of its own population. Clearly a state whose population is
"reduced to a mass of anomic individuals" cannot, by definition, be a state at all. This
careful orchestration in the amount of force used and the level of damage done is
presented by Eugene Walter in his landmark work which analyzed repression terrorism
employed by Zulu kings in the nineteenth centur\'. He notes that there are ...
Committee on the Judiciary J-97-40. 97th Cong., 1st sess., June 11 and 12, 1981.
(Statement of Stefan T. Possony) p. 57.
^^'^Wilham Henry Chamberlin, The Russian Revolution 1917-1921, (New York:
Grosset & Dunlap, 1965) Vol. 2, p. 81. As quoted in Skocpol, op. cit., pp. 215-216.
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five conditions necessary for the maintenance of a terroristic regime, which may
also be understood as functional prerequisites: 1) A shared ideology that justifies
violence.... Legitimacy suppresses outrage. 2) The victims in the process of terror
must be expendable.... If the violence liquidates persons who are needed for
essential tasks, or if replacements cannot be found for thier roles, the system of
cooperation breaks down. 3) Dissociation of the agents of violence and of the
victims from ordinary social life.... 4) Terror must be balanced by working
incentives that induce cooperation.... 5) Cooperative relationships must survive
the effect of the terror.^^^
From these characteristics, particularly characteristics number four and five, it is
easy to see that the regime does not intend to destroy or defeat an enemy, but simply
control a friendly population from which may be expected a certain level of consent to
be governed in such a manner. Moreover, as Martha Crenshaw points out terrorism of
any kind can only be successfully employed so long as it is perceived to be morally
justifiable in the eyes of the target of infiuence.^^^ And as Lyford P. Edwards suggests,
The terror is not so bloody as is often assumed.... [Indeed], the terror is the least
bloody of all phases of the revolution ... it is not a horrible series of atrocities
perpetrated by a savage mob upon innocent and helpless victims.... [Rather] a
reign of terror is just what the name implies. It is a reign, not an anarchy. It is
an organized, governmental regime set up with a calculated purpose of social
control.'*^^
Admittedly Edwards wrote the above words in 1927, before Stalin's reign of
terror in the USSR during the 1930s. Clearly the death of 8 to 10 million Russian
peasants during this terror was far greater than anything that occurred during the
revolution proper. Still, despite the fact that Stalin's main purpose in employing state-
terror against the peasants was to neutralize them as an autonomous political
collectivity, it would have been not only counterproductive but dangerous for the
Soviet Union if he had destroyed them completely. He needed their support for his
regime and he needed their labor. Thus, he only created a condition of anxiety among
the targeted group -- not despair. As Skocpol notes, "... general fear of arrest and
^Eugene V. Walter, Terror and Resistance: A Study of Political Violence with
Case Studies of some Primitive African Communities, (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1969) pp. 341-342. As quoted in Grant Wardlaw, op. cit., p. 12.
Martha Crenshaw, (ed.), Terrorism, Legitimacy and Power: the Consequences
of Political Violence, (Middletown, Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press, 19S4) p.
28.
Lyford P. Edwards, The Natural History of Revolution (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1973) pp. 175-176. (Emphasis added).
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imprisonment among the Soviet population only served to reinforce labor discipline
among those who remained out of prison.'"^^^ While it is true that Stalin went much
farther than necessary if his goal was simply to neutralize the peasants -- the well-
publicized execution of a few hundred, or at most, a few thousand resisters would
probably have been sufficient -- it is also true that the vast majority of those who died
were not victims of the terror per se. Many, if not most, simply died of starvation due
to the famine caused by the collectivization of the peasant farms. Indeed, Adam Ulam
estimates that the Soviet standard of living fell by as much as 25 per cent during this
period of collectivization.'^'^^
Consequently, the regime employing repression terrorism must be very careful in
the level of terror it creates. It must be strong enough to destroy or neutralize the
populations will to resist, but not be so great as to destroy that population's cohesion
and thereby undermine the regime's own power structure. This introduces a factor of
moderation into the equation which von Clausewitz categorically rejects in the first
chapter of his great work. As he succinctly put it, "To introduce the principle of
moderation into the theor\' of war ... would always lead to logical absurdity. ""^^"^ Thus,
with its built-in structure of moderation, repression terrorism cannot be a form, of war.
The final, and perhaps most important reason repression terrorism is not a form
of war pertains to von Clausewitz's primary principle of war, the principle of
engagement. In repression terrorism there is no clash of arms between contending
political entities each tr>'ing to compel the other to abandon its political goals. The
population has no armed forces, no political structure and no territory. Under such
conditions, the only resistance open to the populace is passive resistance.
Perhaps the ultimate example of this is the afore-mentioned Nazi extermination
of the Jews. Clearly this event represented the employment of lethal force to achieve a
political goal. But it is equally clear that this event entailed almost exclusively the
unilateral employment of lethal force by the regime and any resistance encountered was
generally spontaneous and most often limited to one or two isolated individuals acting
on their own. Indeed, as Richard Rubenstein has noted, the ultimate irony of the Nazi
genocide campaign is that it would not have been so effective or efficient had the
Nazi's not been able to incorporate existing Jewish bureaucracies into their own.
"^'^'^Skocpol, op. ciL, p. 231.
Adam Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence: Soviet Foreign Policy 1917-1973 (New
York: Praeger Publishers, 1974) p. 183.
'^^'^Carl von Clausewitz, op. cit., p. 76.
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According to Rubenstein,
The process of taking over the Jewish communal bureaucracies and transforming
them into components of the extermination process was one of the
organizational triumphs of the Nazis.... In addition to the cultural conditioning
that affected even the most assimilated Jews, the organized Jewish community
was a factor in preventing effective resistance. Wherever the extermination
process was put into effect, the Germans utilized the existing leadership and
organizations of the Jewish community to assist them.... [Indeed] in the Warsaw
Ghetto and in Lodz, Poland, the Jewish council or Judenrat, did not resist
German directives even the Germans demanded the 'selection' of 10,000 Jews a
day for deportation. Jewish bureaucrats made the selection; Jewish police
rounded up the victims."^^^
Clearly, this is not warfare. There was no counterforce involved on the part of
the Jewish community -- although there were isolated uprisings such as that in
Warsaw. Moreover, as Eugene Walter has suggested, this form of terrorism was only
possible as long as the victims were superfluous to the maintenance of the power of the
state, and as long as the cohesion of the civil population was not threatened. Since the
holocaust directed lethal force against a portion of the populace that was deemed
superfluous both by the regime and the majority of the German people, their
destruction threatened neither the cohesion of the German populace nor the power
structure of the Nazi regime; it could continue unabated until it achieved its end or the
process was interrupted by outside forces. In short, the Jews were in, but not of ihQ
German population.
Of course, it is possible that members of a regime's population might coalesce
into armed bands and employ lethal force to resist the regime. This is a revolutionary
situation in which totally new and different criteria apply. As described in the previous
chapter, the regime can view the revolutionaries as enemies and can wage war against
them. Moreover, the regime may engage in repressive terrorism and revolutionary'
'^'^^Rubenstein, op. cit., pp. 72 and 75. (Italics in original). Rubenstein, however,
admonishes us to take care in judging those Jewish community leaders too harshly for
cooperating with the Nazi extermination campaign. These leaders were simply acting
as their forefathers had for nearly 2,000 years. Following the disasterous defeats in
their revolution against the Roman Empire, the Jews were transformed from a warrior
people into a "submissive people of the book." "This event shaped Jewish character and
conditioned Jewish responses in the diaspora for 2,000 years.... No matter how grave
the provocation, the Jewish community instinctively avoided violent response." Thus
Jewish community leaders, even when they knew what was in store for the
"resettlement victims," complied. (See pp. 68-77.)
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warfare simultaneously, but this does not make repression terrorism a form of war.
Those members of the populace who do not join the revolutionaries are no: enemies of
the regime and the regime must treat them accordingly. The regime may still subject
them to terror to a degree necessan.' to control them, but not to the degree that their
social cohesion collapses and they are effectively destroyed. For this, and other
reasons iterated above, repression terrorism is not a form of warfare.
C. MILITARY TERRORISM
No study on terrorism as a form of war would be complete without examining
the employment of terror by the military. Military terrorism is an ancient art which
has become increasingly effective with the advances in technology and increased
complexity of the socio-political infrastructures found in modern societies. Simply put,
military te o. sm is the employment of terrorism by a nation's military instrument
against the civilian population of an enemy nation for the purpose of 1) undermining
that population's w/// to support its own government, or 2) shattering the cohesion of
the population making it unable to support its government. Thus, where repression
terrorism sought to control the population, military terrorism seeks to make that target
population unmanageable.
Terrorism, as defined in this paper, is the employment of abnormal lethal force
against a symbolic victim for the purpose of causing chronic fear or terror in a target
collectively identifying with that symbolic victim. As was previously mentioned, at the
most abstract level, war functions in much the same way as terrorism. Whenever one
combatant shoots another he not only hopes to remove the man he shot from the
power equation, but also desires that the victim's comrades will lose heart and cease
fighting. In short, he wants to terrorize them. Still, despite the similarities, this is not
terrorism. It is not terrorism because the force employed is not considered abnormal;
either by the perpetrator or the recipient. Because this concept is so crucial to this
paper it needs to be examined further.
First, of course, it is necessary to operationalize "abnormal" force. As was
mentioned in Chapter Six what qualifies as being abnormal is dependent upon the
defining agency. It is, at best, a highly subjective concept which varies over time and
place. Still, it is a factor in force employment, and therefore must be clearly identified.
In Chapter Six it was suggested that what is abnormal is what the target entity
perceives to be abnormal. This can be operationalized by two criteria: 1) the target
entity clearly identifies the force being employed against it as being abnormal, and 2)
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the target entity either refrains from using the same methods in its own force
employment, or, if it uses such force, admits that it, too, is employing abnormal force.
It must be stressed, of course, that what is being addressed here is the general
methods of force employment, not the means. It would be ludicrous, for example, to
accept an argument by the Palestine Liberation Organization that aerial bombardment
by fighter-bombers is terrorism and therefore they will refrain from using such means
in their struggle against Israel. What is at issue is not what weapon system or piece of
hardware is used, but how it is used and against whom.
The central issue around abnormal force, at least since the Peace of Westphalia in
1648, has been the application of lethal force against non-combatants. Indeed, perhaps
the most universally accepted element in an discussion of terrorism is its targeting non-
combatants. As Alex Schmid notes, "A terrorist act lacks the symmetry of a duel or
the preparedness of both parties for the fight of a battle. '"^^^ He continues,
In regular warfare the deliberate killing of non-combatants is not permitted and
is considered a 'war crime.' Soldiers taken prisoner during hostilities are treated
humanely according to conventions which protect their rights. By becoming
nonbelligerent through capitulation, surrender or capture soldiers can be
reasonably certain that their lives will be saved. The prisoners of ... terrorists,
however, either as kidnapped [or disappeared] individuals or as a group of
trapped hostages, cannot affect their own fate by handing in their weapons and
[or] promising non-resistance.'^'^''
The primary difference between a terrorist and a soldier, then, is that the latter is
willing and able to recognize the non-combatant status of persons in the enemy camp.
Civilians, particularly women and children, are normally granted non-combatant status.
Moreover, the enemy soldier can become a non-combatant if he so chooses simply by
laying aside his weapon and surrendering. The terrorist, on the other hand, does not
and in most cases cannot recognize non-combatant status. He takes not prisoners, but
hostages. He does not merely inflict casualties in order to weaken enemy combat
power, but kills the helpless and infirmed, even when it is within his power not to do
so. The soldier and the terrorist are therefore not equivalent. It is a fact that cannot be
stressed too strondv.
'^^^Schmid, op. dr.. p. 81.
^o^ibid.
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Still, soldiers do frequently kill non-combatants in wartime. This, of course, gives
rise to the question that when this occurs are these soldiers terrorists?**^^ To answer
this question it is necessary to go back to the definition of terrorism presented in
Chapter Six. It is terrorism if the soldiers deliberately use lethal force against non-
combatants for the express purpose of terrorizing them and if those non-combatants
perceive such force to be abnormal. Classic examples are provided by the Bataan
Death March in 1942 and the Tulle and Oradour massacres by the 2nd S5 Panzer
Division in June 1944."^^^
Most non-combatant deaths cannot be so easily categorized as acts of terrorism,
however. To begin with, the nature of modem warfare with its weapons of mass
destruction have made it virtually impossible not to cause non-combatant casualties.
This is particularly true when militar\' targets are located near m.ajor metropolitan
areas having large populations. While the employment of lethal force in such areas is
generally not meant to kill non-combatants, hundreds or even thousands are maimed
or killed. Such unintentional casualties are euphemistically referred to by militan'
planners as "collateral damage. '"^^^ But, regardless of how they are labeled, the killing
of non-combatants in such situations is not terrorism. Indeed, according to William
O'Brien,
It should be noted that the law-of-war principle of discrimination or
noncombatant immunity from direct attack prohibits targeting of noncombatants
and nonmihtar\' targets as such. However, collateral damage proportionate to
the military damage done is permitted by the principle of discrimination.'^^ ^
Another major factor in modern warfare is the increasing fuzziness between
combatant and non-combatant. Beginning with the American Revolutionary and
Napoleonic Wars the concept of total war began to take shape. '^^^ Within One
'^'^^The term 'soldier' is used here to represent inilitar^' servicemen from all
services - airmen, sailors, etc.
'^^^Samuel W. Mitcham, Jr., Hitler's Legions: The German Order of Battle, World
War II, (New York: Stein and Day Publishers, 1985) p. 442. The 2nd 5S Panzer
Division hanged ninety-five Frenchmen at Tulle and gunned-down over 400 men,
women and children at Oradour in retaliation for the murder of a German ofilcer.
'^^'^Roland Powell, "Weinburger Discusses Anti-Terrorist Attacks," Monterey-
Peninsula Herald, (January 7. 1986) p. 2.
* William V. O'Brien, "Counterterrorism: Lessions from Israel," Strategic Review
Fall 19S5, p. 36.
"^^^Theodore Ropp, op. cit., pp. 108-111. Ropp writes that "France had the first
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Hundred Years no modern amiy could sustain itself in the field without a well
organized and motivated "home front." Thus, the civilian munitions-worker, scientist,
or farmer became an increasingly important factor in a nation's overall power
equation. If that civilian were to become unwilling or unable to provide the necessarv-
support to the armed forces, then that nation's military power would be reduced.
Clearly, then, the civilian is a major element in a belligerent nation's war making
capacity and consequently any claim he might have to non-combatant status is severely
compromised.
Even before the advent of industrialized societies, however, military terrorism was
employed with good effect against enemy civilian populations. This, form of force
employment was chosen, then, as now, because of its extreme efficiency. There are
many historical examples of this, but perhaps the best-known pre-industrial use of
military terrorism in the modern epoch is that of Oliver Cromwell against the Irish
rebellion in 1650. That Cromwell's campaign of terror was both successful in
neutralizing the Irish population's will to resist, as well as represented the most
efficient use of lethal force, can be readily seen in Lyford Edw^ard's description of this
campaign. He writes that.
The massacres and reign of terror instituted in Ireland by Oliver Cromwell during
the Puritan Revolution stand out clearly even in the bloodstained history of that
country.... The statistical evidencs shows beyond doubt that Cromwell's conquest
of Ireland was the least bloody of any in its long history. His whole procedure,
as his letter to Parliament show, was a scheme to terrify the Irish people so that
they would not dare to resist him.... At the very beginning of the war he ordered
two massacres, which he carried out in the most spectacular manner possible.
He accompanied these massacres with the most dreadful threats against all who
should dare oppose him.... [Moreover] it was necessary for him also to save his
troops as much as possible for the war in Scotland, which had already begun,
and which was more dangerous to his power.... The dehberate massacre of 4200
men ... was his solution of the problem. By that action he subdued the island in
less than nine months ... lost only a few hundred of his own troops, [while] ...
three large Irish armies, then in the field, dissolved from mere terror as soon as
the Puritan army approached.. ..^^^
'national' army in modern European histor}'," and goes onto some detail on the
economic mobilization of France which "extended to the entire nation...".
'^^^Lyford P. Edwards, op.cit., pp. 177-178.
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The first war in the early industrial era in which the morale of the civilian
population was specifically targeted is the American Civil War; and certainly the most
famous episode of this type of warfare is Sherman's march to the Sea in 1S64.
According to this Union General, the Confederacy had begun the conflict and was
therefore responsible for all subsequent bloodshed. Prior to the burning of Atlanta
General Sherman told its Mayor,
War is cruelty and you cannot refine it; and those who brought war into our
country deserve all the curses and maledictions a people can pour out. [One
might as well] appeal against the thunderstorm as against these terrible hardships
of war. They are inevitable, and the only way the people of Atlanta can hope
once more to live in peace and quiet at home, is to stop the war.'^^'^
By later standards Sherman's "harshness" would seem to be merely child's-play.
Despite its reputation, the burning of Atlanta was not as complete as many would later
contend. Only approximately 37 percent of the city was destroyed, mostly in the
industrial and business districts while most of the homes and nearly all of the churches
were spared the torch. "^^^ Still, the target, and the lesson was clear, so long as the
southern civilian population supported the Confederate war effort, it would be
subjected to such harshnesses. Although lethal force was rarely used against non-
combatants, Sherman cut a 50-mile-wide swath of scorched earth as he marched to the
sea. His objective, writes Dupuy and Dupuy, "...was [to] deliberately make 'Georgia
howl' as he devastated crops and the war-supporting economy of central Georgia. ""^^^
Russell Weigley openly calls Sherman's strategy a strategy of terror. He writes,
Sherman came to believe that if the terror and destruction of war could be
carried straight to the enemy people, then they would lose their zest for war, and
lacking the people's support, the enemy armies would collapse of their own
weight. So he made his marches campaigns of terror and destruction....'*^'
Sherman's logic was impeccable. No modern army could stay in the field without
massive support from the civilian population. If that population's will could be
directly targeted and broken, then the armies that population was supporting would be
forced to capitulate. Still, it had taken four grueling years of hard fighting before
'^'^David Nevin, Sherman's March: Atlanta to the Sea, (Alexandria, Virginia:
Time-Life Books, Inc.. 1986) p. 15.
'^^^Ibid., p. 46.
'^^^Dupuy and Dupuy, op. cit., p. 900.
'^^
'Russell F. Weigley, op. cit., p. 149.
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Federal armies were in a position to take the war directly to the enemy population. By
the First World War technology had provided the necessary means to directly attack
the population without first having to destroy the enemy's armies. This resulted in a
profound change in how war was to be waged. According to G\^7nne Dyer,
Bombing civilians in cities - not by accident while trying to hit military targets,
but with the deliberate purpose of killing civilians and breaking their morale -
was the fnal step in the brutal logic of war. If the civihan producing the
weapons of war were now the real foundation of a nation's armed strength, then
they were actually the most important target of all. [Certainly]... by 1915,
everybody was a legitimate target."*^
^
Although the weapons were still too primitive to do any significant damage,
much less cause the population to demand an end to the war, the intent was still there.
For instance, heavy-bomber crews were instructed oy General Ludendorff that their
primary objective was the morale of the British population and that the disruption of
the war industry, of communications between London and the coast and of
transportation across the Channel were secondary objectives. '^^^ Moreover, the British
reaction clearly indicates that they perceived such force to be abnormal. As one
Minister of Parliament -- Lord Montagu — quickly learned, the British populace was in
no mood to hear that centers for the production of war materials such as London were
perfectly legitimate military targets. Indeed, according to Neville Jones, reaction to
Lord Montagu's comments by British civilians bordered on hysterical. '^^ Despite the
fact these air raids clearly affected British civilian morale, they certainly never came
close to the stated objective of causing the British government to topple or sue for
421peace. '^
When World War II began in September 1939, the British and Germans initially
refrained from bombing each other's cities. But by the second summer of the war,
both sides had again removed the kid-gloves, and civilians once again became prime
military targets. This, despite the fact that both the British and the Germans openly
claimed that "indiscriminate" bombing of civilian targets was an abnormal use of lethal
^^^Gv^ynne Dyer, op. cit., pp. 84-85.
* Douglas Robinson, "Strategic Bombing." IVarplanes and Air Battles of World
War I, edited by Bernard Fitzsimons, {London: BPC Publishing, Ltd., 1973) p. 72.
Neville Jones, The Origins of Strategic Bombing: A Study of the Development of
British Air Strategic Thought and Practice up to 1918 (London: William Kimber & Co.,
Ltd., 1973) p. 133.
Robinson, op. cit., p. 72.
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force. The Germans resurrected the term Schrecklichkeit or terror-war (which had been
originally used in conjunction with German submarine operations during World War
!).''"" to describe their new aerial strategy. The British initially disguised their purpose
with euphemisms, but eventually they, too, began to openly admit that their primary
target was German civilian morale. By 1941 the Chief of British Bomber Command.
Sir Arthur "Bomber" Harris, was openly and vigorously caUing for a policy of directly
attacking German workers in their homes. '^^^
By the end of the Second World War, technology had provided the ultimate
terror weapon, the atomic bomb. That the American government considered this to be
abnormal force, there can be little doubt. Moreover, its means of employment belied
its terroristic nature. Indeed, according to Thomas Schelling the purpose of employing
atomic weaponr>' upon Hiroshima and Nagasaki was to make "... noncapitulation
terrible beyond endurance."'*^* He continues by stating that,
These were weapons of terror and [psychological] shock. They hurt and
promised more hurt, and that was their purpose.... The bomb that hit Hiroshima
was a [symbolic] threat aimed at all of Japan. The political target of the bomb
was not the dead of Hiroshima or the factories they worked in, but the survivors
ofTokyo.^--^
Bernard Brodie further reinforces this contention when he concluded that the
final surrender of Japan resulted not from the atom bombs dropped on Hiroshima and
Nagasaki, but from the implicit threat of more such attacks if the Japanese did not
surrender right then.^^^ Clearly, this represented the employment of terroristic force.
^'^Jere C. King, The First World War, (New York: Walker Publishing Company,
1972) p. 267.
^^^Hanson Baldwin, The Crucial Years, 1939-1941: The World at War - From
the Beginning through Pearl Harbor, (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, Inc.,
1970) pp. 192-193.
'^^'^Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1966) p. 15. As quoted in Schmid, op. cit., p. 68.
^^^Ibid., pp. 15-17. As quoted in Schmid, Ibid.
"^'^Bernard Brodie, "Changing Capabilities and War Objectives," Lecture; Air
War College, APR 17, 1952, Maxwell a\FB, p. 2S. As quoted in Kaplan, op. cit., p. 47.
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As early as 1943 there was already considerable, and growing doubt as to
whether terror bombing was having any effect on civilian morale at all. In retrospect,
it is clear that neither the German LuftwafTe commanders nor those of the RAF truly
understood what it would take to cause a civilian uprising against its government or to
shatter the cohesion of that population.
Those who sought to cause the populace to rise up against its own government
simply did not understand what such an enterprise required. As Skocpol has clearly
pointed out, it is not enough for the population to want to overthrow the regime. So
long as that regime is able to maintain control of coherent and effective coercive
organizations the regime can remain quite stable despite chronic, wide-spread
discontent among the populace. "^^^ This was clearly a forlorn hope, particularly in the
case of NAZI Germany whose forces of coercion remained intact until the ver\' last
days of the Third Reich.
As for those who hoped to totally shatter the target population's morale,
destroying its cohesion, and making it entirely unmanageable by strategic aerial
bombardment, they too did not fully understand the magnitude of what they sought to
achieve. To begin with, it is a far more complex undertaking than those who
advocated terror-bombing were aware. It is simply a fallacy that bombing produces
long-term, chronic terror among the populace. While it is true that air raid studies
determined "... that it was often not the countries responsible for the bombing that
were blamed by the victims ... rather the victims blamed their own government for
failing to protect them,'"^"^ these studies also estabUshed that "... people found a
succession of raids less disturbing than those which occurred at irregular intervals,
[indicating] sustained, intense, relentless terrorism is more likely to numb the
target...". Consequently, the more intense the bombing, the less overall effect it had.
Moreover, those who sought to destroy enemy morale by terror bombing generally had
an overly simplistic concept of what they were targeting. As Fred like noted in his
study, The Social Impact of Bomb Destruction,
Before the end of World War II it was thought that bombing destruction would
lower civilian morale and that low morale would lead to lessened war production
or even to a revolt against the government, forcing it to surrender. The fallacy of
this premise lies in the fact that two quite different types of 'morale' are involved....
Skocpol, op. cit., p. 32.
Grant Wardlaw, op. cit., p. 36.
^29lbid.
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The German language has a difTerent word for each kind of 'morale'.
Consequently the German intelligence reports in World War II concerning the
civilian home front always distinguished between the two. These reports
correctly showed that bombing lowered Siimmung, the 'passive morale' or the
way people felt. But the low Stimmung did not destroy Haltung, the 'active
morale' or the way people actually behaved under stress. Habits, discipline, the
fear of punishment, and the lack of alternative courses of action left the behavior
(Haltung) of the civilian population unaffected by the low feelings and depressed
mood (Stimmung).'^^^
Not even the Japanese, who suffered far worse than the British or German
populations from strategic bombing, lost their national cohesion or attempt to
overthrow the government and sue for peace even after suffering the atomic attacks.
The ultimate, tragic lesson is, then, that terror bombing simply does not work.
Bombing alone could not crush an enemy's will to resist. It '^'^'ild, however, render
him unable to resist.
Those, like Russell Weigley, who label American conventional bombing of Japan
as terror-bombing are simply using different criteria than this paper. Certainly the fire-
raids on Japan's cities were terrifying and devastating to Japan's civil population, but
the decision by the American bomber commander Curtis LeMay to begin these raids
was a technical one in which considerations of Japanese civilian morale were secondary
at best. To be sure, the aim of the Air Force and Naval Air commanders was to defeat
Japan without having to resort to a costly amphibious campaign against the Japanese
home islands. But the means sought to bring this about was not something ephemeral,
such as the loss of civilian morale, but the destruction of Japan's ability to wage war.
This required the destruction of Japan's industrial capacity - particularly its
manufacturing facilities. Unfortunately, unlike most European industrial targets the
ones in Japan were spread throughout highly populated centers. Moreover, within
these populated areas were hundreds of "shadow" factories which fed finished products
to the main industrial plants. Consequently, as Edward Jablonski correctly points out,
"Defining the boundary between purely industrial and residential Japanese target was
all but impossible. "'^•'^ Consequently, it was found that, with the technical means then
available, the most effective way to insure the destruction of Japan's industrial capacity
was to employ fire-bombing to destroy whole districts of Japanese cities. That this
'^'^Fred like. The Social Impact of Bomb Destruction, (Norman. Oklahoma: 1958),
p. 15. As quoted in Paskins and Dockrill, op. cit., p. 45.
"^^^ Edward Jablonski, Air War, vol. 4. IVings of Fire (Garden City, New York:
Doubleday & Co., Inc.. 1972), p. 169.
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method caused tens of thousands of civilian casualties was seen as an unfortunate by-
product of the attacks, but these casualties certainly did not constitute the main
objective.
When Japan finally did surrender, it was not because the morale of its civilian
population had collapsed, nor even that of its still intact three miUion strong armed
forces, but because Japan could no longer wage warfare on modern terms. With its
imports virtually cut off by submarine and surface naval forces and its production
facilities demolished Japan simply could not sustain the war effort any longer. As
General MacArthur was to remark after the war, "At least 3,000,000 of as fine ground
troops as I have ever known ... laid down their arms because they didn't have the
materials to fight with ... and the potential to gather them ... where we would
attack... ".'*-~
That Japanese civilian and military' will to fight remained intact, even after
suffering atomic attacks, is clearly indicated by the unprecedented intercession of the
Emperor in political decisionmaking. Had the Emperor not personally called for peace
there is little doubt but that the war would have continued for many more weeks or
even months. That virtually all, including most of the most ardent members of the
faction calling for the continuation of the war, obeyed the Emperors command to cease
hostilities is further indication that Japanese national cohesion remained intact until
the final moment. '^^^ It was Emperor Kirohito that removed the will of Japan's civilian
population to continue fighting, not the American bombers. Japan was defeated, then,
by technological and economic collapse, not psychological.
The ultimate question is, of course, whether military terrorism is warfare? Based
upon the definition of warfare used by this paper the answer has to be yes. To begin
with, military terrorism is simply a weapon or means of warfare. And, to the extent
that all warfare is waged for political purposes, military terrorism qualifies as the
employment of lethal force for a political end.
Hearings on the Relief of General MacArthur, (Washington: 1951) Part I,
57-58. As quoted in Ropp, op. cit., p. 381.
"^ Those military men who simply could not stand to witness the shame of the
first military defeat Japan had suffered in over two and a half thousand years still did
not dare to oppose the Emperor's will. Indeed, astonished British Naval Aviators
witnessed Japanese Kamikaze planes deliberately crash their aircraft into the empty sea
on the day after the Emperor's order to cease hostilities. See John Costello, The
Pacific War, (New York: Rawson, Wade Publishers, Inc., 1981) pp. 596-597.
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Military' terrorism is also clearly tailored to destroy the enemy's will to resist.
Indeed, one might say that this is the ultimate expression of this element of warfare.
The fact that this form of warfare has often proven to be unsuccessful in either
destroying the enemy's will to resist or shattering the social cohesion of the enemy
populace -- particularly when relying primarily or solely upon fire weapons -- is an
interesting and instructional point, but it does not change the fact that it is still force
employed for the purpose of undermining and destroying the enemy's will.
Finally, military' terrorism is force applied against force, meeting the principle of
engagement central to Clausewitzian principles of war. While non-combatants were
clearly targeted in the employment of military terrorism, these non-combatants were
clearly not defenseless - as anyone who flew missions in the night skies over Germany
will clearly attest. Indeed, the most costly, single mission of the entire war was the
night terror-bombing raid on Nuremburg in March 1944. '^^"^ While the individual, non-
combatant civilian may not personally have anything with which to fight back, he, she
is still protected by the armed forces of the government he/she supports. How well
those forces protect the civilian, non-combatant is another issue.
One final comment needs to be made before leaving this subject. The militan.'
terrorist can be either a soldier or a pure terrorist as defined above. That is to say, the
soldier performing acts of military terrorism is still subject to certain rules of war and,
whenever possible, respect the non-combatant status of a given individual. Even men
who flew terror bombing missions respected the territory' of neutral countries and did
not bomb open cities once they were abandoned by the enemy's armed forces and
declared to be open. There are, however, pure terrorists, even in uniform, who do not
respect non-combatant status, even when it is within their power to do so. The
exploits of the 2nd SS Panzer Division in France, previously mentioned, is a case in
point as are the infamous actions of American Lt. Galley during the Vietnam War.
Thus, there is a distinction, and it bears remembering. Either way, however, military
terrorism is still a form of war.
D. STATE SPONSORED TERRORISM
State sponsored terrorism involves the employment of lethal forces across
international borders for the purpose of destroying or weakening the political cohesion
of a targeted political entity. In this way, it is much like military terrorism. The
'^^'^Ninety-four four-engined RAF heav7 bombers were shot down and a further
71 were heavily damaged. See James GampbcU, The Bombing of Nuremburg, (Garden
City, New York: Doublcday & Company, Inc., 1974) p. 147.
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primary' difierence, however, is that the state employing state sponsored terrorism does
not use its own military instrument to deliver the lethal force, but harnesses social
elements witliin the targeted entity to do so. In short, it is a subcategory of social
warfare and functions in the same way and for the same end as this form of war.
In the last chapter it was concluded that revolutionary terrorism is a form of war.
Certainly this condition would not change simply because the revolutionaries are being
supported by an external sovereign power. As will be seen, however, state sponsored
terrorism can involve a wide array of revolutionary terrorist groups, including national
revolutionary, international revolutionary' and minute political groups adhering to a
revolutionary agenda. While the goals and methods of each of these forms of
revolutionary' terrorism will be briefly discussed, the question this section seeks to
answer is not whether these revolutionaries are conducting a form of war, but whether
the states sponsoring those revolutionaries are doing so.
1. Types of State Sponsored Terrorism
There are three basic types of terrorism employed by social forces that lend
themselves to outside sponsorship. These are: 1) national revolutionary terrorism, 2)
international revolutionary terrorism, and 3) minute political terrorist gangs. The first
type was discussed in Chapter Eight and a further description need not detain us here.
It is sufficient to note that national revolutionary terrorism can be supported by
sovereign states wishing to weaken or topple the incumbent regime of a targeted state.
This type of terrorism involves what Ariel Merari calls "Homofighters", that is,
terrorists operating against their fellow country-men and include such organizations as
the Italian Red Brigade, the German Red Army Faction, the Tupamaros and the
Contras, to name just a few. Merari points out that these are ...
terrorists [who] usually refrain from activities that may alienate a major portion
of the population. Indiscriminate murder of civilians, which is customary of
groups that fight foreigners, is therefore unlikely to be adopted as an item in the
domestic terrorists' arsenal, although selective killings or kidnappings of
government ofiicials, military' and police personnel, or members of rival
organizations are frequent. "^^"^
International revolutionary terrorists are those who employ terrorism against
targets controlled and operated by persons other than the terrorists' fellow country-
men. These Merari calls "Xenofighters" and include colonial terrorist organizations
J. A ^
Ariel Merari, "A Classification of Terrorist Groups," Terrorism: An
International Journal, Volume 1, Number 3/4, 1978, p. 337.
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fighting against their colonial "masters", as well as irrecientia contingents, such as the
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), fighting those who currently control their
homelands and those who are allied with them."^^^ Other examples of Xenofighters
would include ideologically motivated terrorists having wide-spread popular support,
such as the Islamic Jihad or other radical Islamic terrorist groups. Interestingly
enough, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) can fit in both groups. It is a Homofighting
group when it directs its lethal force against fellow Irishmen and a Xenofighting group
when directing such a force against the British.
States supporting international revolutionary terrorists are usually those
having the same ideology as the terrorists or those wishing to destabilize and weaken
the targeted entity politically. For instance as Martin Arostegui notes,
Radical Islamic groups operating under different names, Jihad, Martyrs of
Baalbek, Islamic Liberation Front, Soldiers of Allah and others are nothing less
than Tehran's fifth column in its current war effort against Saddham Hussein's
regime in Iraq, its conservative Arab supporters, and Western powers with strong
interests in the area.*^^^
Another ver\^ important difference between Momo fighters and Xenofighters is
that the latter tend to adopt more indiscriminate tactics. Again according to VIerari,
"Since Xenofighters do not rely on the target population for support, as the
Homofighting type must do, they are relieved of the need to avoid harming the
innocent.""*^ This goes far in explaining the indiscriminant nature of the force used by
international terrorists as opposed to national revolutionary' terrorists. Just as in
military terrorism, the international terrorist often seeks the complete destruction of the
target entity's social cohesion; reducing the target population to a level of despair so as
to make it unresponsive to its own government. Additionally, international terrorists
are much more likely to need and to receive support from an outside source which, in
turn, gives them greater technical ability to operate on a higher level of violence than
their domestic counterparts. As Brian Jenkins notes, "State sponsorship puts more
resources at the disposal of the terrorists: intelligence, money, sophisticated munitions,
and technical expertise... reduc[ingj the constraints on the terrorists. ""^^^
^^^Ibid.. p. 333.
'^•'^ Martin C. Arostegui, "Special Reports of Risks International," Terrorism: An
International Journal, Volume 7, Number 4, 1985, pp. 417-418.
"^^^Merari, op. cit., p. 340.
^^^Brian M. Jenkins, "Will Terrorists Go Nuclear?" Orbis, Volume 29, Number
184
The third type of terrorism likely to receive state sponsorship are what this
study calls the Micro-Political Terrorist Gangs. These groups include such
organizations as the Baader-Meinhof gang, and the Japanese Red Army. They seldom
have membership over a dozen or so, and despite grandiose claims, have no popular
support. As Paul Wilkinson points out,
Ideological sects of this kind originate exclusively within the industrialized liberal
democracies they profess to hate so heartily.... [Moreover], their tiny
memberships are drawn exclusively from the children of affluent and privileged
homes.... Far from speaking the language of the working classes, they live in a
kind of fantasy world concocted from vulgar neo-Marxist slogans and [other]
half-baked and dangerous ideas....'*'^^
While no sponsoring state is likely to expect such groups will successfully gain
power, supporting these tiny organizations can disrupt the targeted entity, causing it to
divert critical, finite resources and focus its attention within its own borders. This can
be useful from a tactical perspective, but is unlikely to cause a dramatic reduction in
the targeted entity's will to resist. Still, a spectacular terrorist event, even by a
miniscule terrorist organization, could discredit a specific leader of a Western power,
and may even result in a call for new elections and the ouster of a given regime.
Although these Micro-Political terrorists generally operate as Homofighters, they can
operate as Xenofighters when targeting foreign elements within their own nation.
Thus, operations by the German Red Army Faction are likely to be indiscriminant
when employed against US military bases and personnel in Germany.
These, then, are the three basic types of terrorist organizations likely to receive
state sponsorship from some sovereign nation. As was noted earher, the Brodie
Paradox presents definite miHtar>' benefits for using limited warfare having limited aims
and employing limited means. Surrogate warfare, including the use of surrogate
terrorists, clearly capitalizes upon the environmental factors highlighted by the Brodie
Paradox. As will be seen, however, there are other, equally important factors for why
states would want to sponsor terrorism. The most important of which is the utility of
terrorism as a weapon within the current international infrastructure.
3, Fall 1985, p. 510.
Paul Wilkinson, "Terrorist Movements," Terrorism: Theory and Practice, edited




States sponsor terrorism for three basic reasons: 1) it is safe, 2) it is cheap,
and 3) the current interstate infrastructure enhances and supports the employment of
terrorism for political goals. These three elements combine to make it extremely easy
to increase the expenditure of effort on the part of any targeted entity at little cost or
risk to the sponsoring state. The first two points, of course, are germane to any
surrogate warfare and are points which Queen Ehzabeth I would readily recognize and
with which she would undoubtedly concur. Consequently, they need little elaboration
here. It is to the third point that we must now turn our attention.
There are essentially two main factors making terrorism an effective tool in
the international arena. The first is modern technology and the second is the current
structure of the international system and the problem it has in dealing with substate
actors performing actions normally reserved for sovereign nation- states. Modern
technology will be addressed first.
According to Donald H. Bell there are two technological improvements which
have made international terrorism more lucrative than before: 1 ) modern weaponry and
2) modern communications.'*'^^ Clearly, modern explosives and light automatic
weapons have greatly enlianced the lethality of the individual terrorist. As have hand-
held, infrared-guided anti-aircraft missiles (SA-7) and anti-tank rockets (RPG-7).
Indeed, the continuous increase in the complexity of the technical means to employ
terrorism has contributed to what Bell has called the transition from personal to
impersonal terrorism wherein the target has changed from a specific tyrant to a
randomly selected, symbolic individual remotely related to the target of terror.^"*^ To
underscore this shift in the nature of terror he compares the 19th century terrorist
Nechaev's Catechism of a Revolutionist with Marighella's Mlnlmanual of the Urban
Guerrilla. Bell writes.
Unlike Nechaev ... Marighella is absorbed with technical and pragmatic questions
of armaments and their use. Instead of Nechaev's histrionic and even romantic
statement, The revolutionary is a doomed man,' Marighella begins his tract by
stating flatly, The urban guerrilla ... must be a good tactician and a good shot,'
'^'^^Donald H. Bell, "Comment: The Origins of Modern Terrorism," Terrorism: An
International Journal, Volume 9, Number 3, 1987, p. 310.
"^^-Ibid.. pp. 308-310.
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... [which represents] quite a shift from typical nineteenth-centur\' concerns with
the connections of the means with the ends and with the need to justify ones
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action.
As important as modern weaponry is, however, modern communications have
had an even greater impact in the expansion in the use of international terrorism.
Walter Laquer goes so far as to credit television with being, "... one of the main
reasons for the shift from rural guerrilla to urban terror in the late 1960s; for in the
cities the terrorists could always count on the presence of joumahsts and TV cameras
and consequently a large audience. "'^'^'^ Laquer goes on to point out that media
coverage also determined the choice of target, ultimately driving even miniscule
terrorist organizations into the international arena. As he puts it,
Terrorist operations in Paraguay, the Philippines or Bangladesh will hardly ever
be newsworthy, but an attack by Puraguayan or Philippine terrorists directed
against their embassies in Washington, London, or Paris will receive extensive
coverage, and if they ... choose the president of some West European
[government] as their victim they will receive even more publicity. "^"^
Most terrorists, then, seek media coverage,'^'^^ which is best obtained by
operating internationally. Indeed, if an event is particularly spectacular, the media
often seeks the terrorists. For instance, Bell notes that,
One is presented ... with the unseemly competition of the three American
networks during the [1985] hijacking of [TWA] Flight 847. Each network sought
exclusive interviews with the hijackers themselves, and greatest media exposure
was eventually achieved by that network -- ABC - which was most forthcoming
in presenting the views of the terrorists. '^"^
Clearly, then, media exposure is a major factor in why certain terrorist groups
conduct international terrorist operations. But this new technology is not the only




Laquer, Terrorism, op. cit., p. 109.
"^•^^Ibid., p. 110.
A notable exception to this, of course, are the right wing death squads which
have tried to avoid attention.
'^'^^Donald Bell, op. dr., pp. 310-311.
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The most salient factor, and one which drives all of the others, is the ver>'
complexity of the system itself. This provides the terrorists not only with a wide array
of potential targets to attack, these targets can be relatively "soft" since they often lie
in areas of overlapping jurisdiction and responsibility. This, in turn, often results in
cumbersome and inconsistent responses to the terrorist attacks, which affords the
terrorists a greater likelihood of success than had they conducted such an attack in a
purely intranational arena. As Merari has observed,
It should be recognized that the essential ingredient in the terrorist's tendency to
operate outside the borders of their target country is simply weakness. For both
practical and ideological reasons, [terrorists]... would prefer to stage their struggle
'in the heart of the beast'.... Yet, this is often the m^ost difficult place to operate.
Target countries seem rather sensitive about terrorism. Even those countries that
had shown amazing laxity toward captured terrorists whose spears were aimed at
other nations, regained their backbone ... when they became the prime target. "^"^^
Overlapping jurisdiction also can quickly mitigate or even neutralize even the
most successful countermeasures against terrorism. A prime example is the US Na\y
intercept of an Egyptian airliner carr^^ing terrorists who had hijacked the passenger
cruise ship the Achille Laura. Because the airliner was forced down at an American
base located in Sicily, Rome had jurisdiction over the captured terrorists. Although the
Italians kept, and eventually prosecuted the actual perpetrators of the hijacking, Rome
released the man who allegedly planned the operation, Abul Abbas, despite American
requests for extradition. The key stumbling block here, of course, is the concept of
national sovereignty. Political analyst Fehmy Saddy puts it this way,
International means of travel and communications, in particular, have made man
international in a physical sense. Yet, perceptually and legally, he has remained
captive of the geographical determinism of the nation-state.... For all practical
purposes, and thanks to technology, the world has become one society as the
interdependence of nation-states and transnational interactions have transcended
all boundaries and barriers. Still, sovereignty has remained a sacrosanct concept
and cornerstone of the international system."^"^^
In short, technology has provided man with a de facto international system
made up of juridically sovereign states having increasingly porous frontiers and
borders. The result is that subnational actors are able to commit acts of lethal force
'^'^'^ Merari, op. cit., p. 342.
Fehmy Saddv, "International Terrorism, Human Riehts and World Order.'
Terrorism: An International Journal, Volume 5, Number 4, 1982, pp. 326-327.
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against specific national targets which, in turn, unilaterally restrain the use of effective
countermeasures due to the adherence to the very international norms that the
terrorists have violated. So long as such self-imposed weaknesses exist, international
terrorists would be foolish not to capitalize upon them.'^'
In effect, terrorists conduct international operations based upon sound
military' principles. From an offensive perspective, operating internationally gives the
terrorists ample targets which are relatively easy to mass against and overwhelm, if for
only a very short time. Since it would be virtually impossible for every state to
adequately protect every potential target, the terrorists -- providing they employ proper
security and surprise - can usually depend upon their ability to attack and initially
overwhelm any security forces that might be present. International operations also are
sound from a defensive perspective as well. By operating in an international
environment, effective countermeasures by the targeted entity usually requires the
coordination between two or more sovereign states. This often results in slow,
cumbersome, and ultimately ineffective responses on the part of the counterterrorists,
greatly enhancing the terrorists chances of emerging victorious. In short, from a purely
military perspective, international terrorism has greater utility than national terrorism.
But while this explains why terrorists employ this technique, it does not explain why
states sponsor this form of terrorism.
3. Analyzing State Sponsored Terrorism as a Form of War
There can be little doubt that state sponsored terrorism represents the
employment of lethal force for political objectives. Consequently, this type of
terrorism meets the first basic test to determine whether it is a form of war. What is
important to keep in mind, however, is that the political objectives of the sponsoring
state are usually totally independent of those of the actual surrogate terrorists. For
example, Imperial Russia provided clandestine support to Slavic movements in the
Balkans with a view towards pan-Slavism. That is, the creation of a pan-Slavic state
having Constantinople as its capital and led by Russia. "^^^ However, the Serbian,
Montenegrin and Bulgarian patriots receiving Russian support often had their own
agendas. According to one French observer, while these movements were "... very
'^^'^Admittedly the problem is quite complex and one that no individual sovereign
state can unilaterally solve. Some suggested solutions will, however, be addressed in
the next chapter.
*^^L.S. Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453 (New York: Holt, Rinehart and
Winston, 1958) p. 398.
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dissatisfied with the Ottoman [and later Austrian] regimes [they were] determined not
to substitute Russian dominiation for it.""*'^ Still, these movements could, and did,
form a fifth column within the camp of the Ottoman and Austrian empires, diverting
resources to defensive ends that might otherwise have been used offensively against
Russia.
The states sponsoring terrorism are employing lethal force on both a moral as
well as a physical plane. Specifically, they are targeting the cohesion of the targeted
entity, whether it be an alliance system, an empire or a nation-state. The purpose of
such action is to disrupt the psychological ties that bind the constituent members
together by placing assymetrical stress on the targeted political structure. In this way,
one member or element of the targeted entity perceives it is paying an inordinate price
for its continued association with the larger whole, and decides to cut its losses by
withdrawing. Classical examples are: the terrorism employed in colonial wars; during
the Soviet sponsored Wars of National Liberation -- including those in Angola,
Mozambique and Vietnam"*^^ -- the Syrian sponsored truck-bombing of the US Marine
barracks in Lebanon which caused the US to drastically reduce its support to the
Gemayel regime; and the North Vietnamese sponsored Viet Cong attacks upon village-
level authorities of the Saigon regime that undermined their willingness to continue to
support and serve the Diem regime.
It should be pointed out that the sufficient end sought by the sponsoring state
is not necessarily the total destruction of the targeted entity through such means, but
rather simply to destabilize or weaken the target. For example, as Claire Sterling has
observed, the Soviets are not necessarily tr>'ing to cause "real revolutions" by
employing and sponsoring terrorists, but simply using them as a destabilizing factor
within the capitalist camp."^'*^ Still, this clearly represents the use of lethal force on the
^^"A. Leroy-Beaulieu, "Les reformes de la Turquie, la politique russe et le
panslavisme," Revue des Deux Mondes XVIII (December 1, 1876), p. 530. As quoted
in Stavrianos, Ibid.
^^'For brief descriptions of the activities of the Soviet-backed revolutionary'
organizations which operated in these countries prior to their successful takeover of the
reigns of power, see Kenneth W. Grundy, Guerrilla Struggle in Africa: An Analysis and
Preview (New York: Grossman Publishers, 1971). For the Angolan MPLA, see pp.
94, 96-97; for the Mozambiquan FRELIMO, see pp. 78, 103-105, 193. For descriptions
of Viet Minh and Viet Cong terrorism see Asprey, op.cit., Volume 2.
'^^'^U.S., Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, The Origins,
Direction and Support of Terrorism, Hearings before a subcommittee of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, J-97-J7. 97th Cong.; 1st sess.; April 24, 1981; p. 53.
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moral plane to cause the dissolution of the cohesion of a targeted political entity.
Consequently, it is safe to conclude that state sponsored terrorism meets this, the
second major criterion necessary for an activity to be considered a form of war.
The final test, of course, is to determine whether such force employment
constitutes an engagement — i.e., does it represent the employment of force against
force on the physical plane? As was concluded in the last chapter, revolutionary
terrorism qualifies under this requirement due to the necessity for it to comply with the
principles of combat which govern the employment of physical force against physical
force. Regardless of whether the terrorists are national revolutionary, international
revolutionary or micro-political, they must abide by these principles in order to be
successful. Therefore, the immediate inclination is to conclude that state sponsored
terrorism meets this, the third and final test. But again, the question is not whether the
terrorist them.selves are waging warfare, but rather, are the states sponsoring them
doing so?
In traditional warfare a nation is considered to be at war when combatants
under that nation's direct authority and control commit lethal acts against a designated
enemy political entity. Despite large amounts of circumstantial evidence and numerous
claims to the contrary, there is no substantial proof that any nation is actually
directing or controlling a given surrogate terrorist group or operation, much less a
world-wide terrorist network. For example, although Syria is widely believed to
sponsor nearly all of the various terrorist factions currently operating in Beirut,
Lebanon, in February 1987 Damascus had to step in to stop fighting between two
factions it supports."^^^ Moreover, Syrian armed forces actually became involved in fire-
fights with Syrian-backed Druse militia units. "^^^ Clearly, the concept of sponsorship is
not equivalent with control. The question becomes, then, whether sponsoring terrorist
organizations constitute the employment of lethal force by the sponsoring state against
an enemy target?
To begin with, sponsorship entails many types of activities. It may include
financial aid, weapons, training, intelligence, sanctuary and bases for training,
maintaining and staging terrorist forces. While the sponsor may not directly control
and employ these forces against specific targets, the symbiotic relationship between the
i (Statement of Claire Sterling).
'* Mohammed Salam, "Syrian Troops Skirmish With Druse Gunmen," The
//^raW (Monterey), February 24, 1987, p. 2.
^^^Ibid.
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terrorists and their sponsors would clearly influence the terrorist's target selection. For
instance, should the Soviet Union provide a terrorist organization with an SA-7 surface
to air missile. Moscow could rest assured that the missile would not be used against an
Aeroflot airliner, nor against an airliner of any other Warsaw Pact nation. On the
other hand, Moscow may have little control over whether the missile was used against
an Israeli, US or Japanese airliner. The choice of target, timing of the attack, and even
the stated objective for the attack is generally entirely up to the individual actor. In
short, the sponsor acknowledges a certain degree of sovereignty on the part of the
terrorist organization. But when these "sovereign" entities employ lethal force, does
this constitute the use offeree by the sponsoring state?
The answer to this question depends entirely upon the structural perspective
one wishes to take. If you perceive that war may only occur when a nation-state
employs its military instrument for national, political goals, then the answer to the
above question is no. But such a position cannot account for the use of force by
subnational and revolutionarv' movements. Indeed, if war involves only an exchange of
force between sovereign nation-states, then the American Revolutionan.' War is a
misnomer. Moreover, even in traditional forms of vvar, nations have supported the
employment of lethal force by non-national actors, e.g., the partisan movements of
World War II. Thus, there is a precedent for nation-states to ally themselves to
subnational entities, even in a classical war setting. In this manner, a new type of
political structure is created - one that constitutes an entity higher than the traditional
nation-state.
To the degree that this higher entity has common or at least compatible
political goals, it constitutes a political structure. The fact that only one or the other
elements of this common structure employs force therefore becomes a moot point from
the perspective of the current study, since it has defined warfare as the employment of
lethal force between any political entities — not merely states and their military'
instruments. Moreover, when one superimposes the concept of social warfare over this
structure it becomes obvious that the terrorists being sponsored are clearly agents of
the sponsoring entity as well as being the military instrument for a supra-national
political structure within the international community. As with alliances of nations
during World War II, absolute control over the armed forces of an ally was simply not
a factor necessary for victory' - although under the principle of unity of command it
would certainly have helped. All that mattered was that each nation contribute to the
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efTort of defeating a common enemy. For the allies, the enemy during this war was
defined as the ideology of National Socialism, embodied in the nation-state of
Germany and other axis powers. In the post-war period, the enemy has been defmed
as capitalism or communism, and is embodied not only in political entities defmed as
states, but sub-national revolutionary terrorist movements as well. The employment of
lethal force by any element within one camp against any element of the other
represents, then, an act of force between political entities. Given this, states which
sponsor terrorism are performing an act of war.
E. SUMMATION
All three types of state terrorism employ force for a political objective.
Repression terrorism seeks to compel the population to comply with the political will
of the incumbent regime. Military terrorism attempts to compel an enemy state
government to comply with the political will of the terrorizing state by robbing the
targeted regime of the ability to control and use its own population. This is achieved
by either undermining the population's willingness to support, or shattering its cohesion
to make it unable to support its own regime. State sponsored terrorism represents an
attempt to foster and support disaffected elements existing within the camp of the
targeted political entity, whether that entity be a nation-state, empire, or alliance
between ideologically compatible elements.
Despite the fact that all three types of state terrorism employ force for a political
end, repression terrorism is not a form of war for two reasons. First, the state
employing repression terrorism must avoid pressing the issue to its ultimate conclusion
and causing the targeted population's cohesion to shatter. This introduces an element
of moderation that von Clausewitz clearly rejects in any definition of warfare.
Moreover, the force employed can be viewed as an end in itself so long as it keeps the
regime in power. That is to say, unlike in warfare, "victory" does not result in a
cessation of "hostilities," but simply the continuation of them. Secondly, there is no
clash of arms between two contending political parties which violates von Clausewitz's
preeminent principle of war. The population is generally unarmed, supports no
alternate political entity and controls no territory. Consequently, force employed by
the state is unilateral and unidirectional. The targeted population simply cannot reply
in kind.
Military terrorism, on the other hand, very clearly is a form of war. Although it.
too, is an attack on a civil population, that population is clearly a component of an
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enemy state's power structure. Destroying the cohesion of that population, or even
simply undermining its willingness to suDport its own government weakens the enemy
state and m.akes it more susceptible to being compelled. Furthermore, although
individuals within it may be unarmed, the targeted population is far from defenseless,
since they have the regime's armed forces as a means of protection and.'or replying in
kind. Finally, force used in such a manner is a means to an end, and the force-
employment ceases when one of the belligerents realizes its political goals.
State sponsored terrorism is also a form of war. Although the sponsoring state
does not necessarily enjoy absolute control over the sponsored terrorist faction, that
faction represents an active agent allied with the sponsoring entity. This alliance
constitutes a supranational political structure having its own political agenda. The
sponsorship of terrorist elements represents not only a form of social warfare, but
under the restrictions of the Brodie Paradox, represents one of the few practical,
efficient, and safe means of achieving poUtical ends involving conflict between two
nuclear-equipped political entities. The ultimate purpose of the sponsor's use of such
means is to weaken the cohesion of the targeted entity making it more vulnerable to
being compelled. Finally, given that the terrorists constitute one element of the
military' instrument of this supranational political entity, any use of these forces against
any other political entity -- state, empire, or alliance system - represents an exchange
of force between political entities. It is, therefore, a form of war.
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X. COUNTERTERRORISM: CONCLUSIONS AND
COUNTERMEASURES
A. INTRODUCTION
This study has identified war to be an activity which employs lethal force on the
moral and physical planes to achieve a political goal. Given this basic paradigm, seven
types of terrorism were tested to determine whether they qualified as a form of war. Of
these, three qualified. These are: military terrorism, revolutionary terrorism, and state
sponsored terrorism. In order to avoid more cumbersome means to collectively refer to
these types of terrorism qualifying as a form of war, these three will hereafter be
referred to as "war terrorism"
This chapter seeks to identify the general methods necessary to successfully
combat and neutralize war terrorism. It is important to understand from the outset
that what is suggested here is simply a starting point and that while the basic themes
can be identified, each terrorist event is in many ways unique and hence will require, as
in any combat situation, considerable fiexibility to neutralize. Moreover, the
countermeasures presented in this chapter are only applicable to those forms of
terrorism qualifying as a form of war. Mihtary solutions are clearly out of place and
are even counterproductive in attempting to neutralize apolitical or repression
terrorism. Neutralizing criminal, psychotic or mystical terrorism falls mainly within the
realm of law enforcement, jurisprudence, and pubhc health, all of which are beyond the
scope of the present study and the expertise of the author.
Given the myriad of possible scenarios involving a war terrorism event, tactical
methodologies will also be avoided in this chapter. Police special weapon assault team
(SWAT) units and counterterrorist forces are highly proficient at handling hostage
situations, and little would be gained by a long discussion of tactical methods necessary
to assault a building or hijacked aircraft. It is sufilcient to note that when force is
employed by these units, even at the micro-tactical level, they must adhere to the
principles of combat.
Rather than tactical methodologies, then, this chapter will focus upon strategic
methods and policies and the factors that govern them. In short, what will be
presented are those factors a government should consider to: 1) determine whether a
military solution is called for, and if so, 2) what the political objectives should be, 3)
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what the military objectives should be and 4) how the militan- force should be applied
to achieve these objectives.
It should also be pointed out that the priman.' focus of this chapter will be on the
use of counterterrorism by democratic rather than authoritarian regimes. Because
authoritarian regimes have fewer restrictions upon the means of force they may
employ, they most often meet internal terrorist threats with internal repression,
including large doses of repression terrorism, which has already been discussed in
Chapter Nine. Democratic governments, however, face a much more complex dilemma
in that they must not only protect the populace and defeat the terrorist threat, but
must preserve their democratic institutions and way of life as well. Thus, the means of
force employment open to democratic regimes are much more restricted than the forms
of force available to authoritarian regimes. Indeed, because repression terrorism
represents one of the most certain means of neutralizing any internal threat to the
regimes continued control of the state, '^•'' the temptation of democratic governments
to employ increasingly repressive countermeasures is verv' great. It is therefore
imperative that effective countermeasures be identified that will enable democracies to
defeat the terrorist threat without risking the destruction of the fabric of their
democratic societies.
It should also be noted here that very little will be said about military terrorism
in this chapter. This is due to the fact that military terrorism simply constitutes one of
the many methods of force employment used in the context of a larger war. Moreover,
this form of force is at best secondary' to the main, more classical methods of force
employment germane to traditional warfare. Military terrorism, therefore, represents
an adjunct to the main effort. It is but one of many tactical methods a belligerent may
select in employing his military instrument. Consequently, it is impossible to talk of
defeating this form of terrorism except in the context of the war writ large. And, since
the means to defeat an enemy in conventional, classical warfare have already been
addressed in the earlier chapters, little more need be said of military terrorism here.
1
"^^'John W. Sloan, "Political Terrorism in Latin America: A Critical Analysis,"
The Poiiiics of Terrorism, edited by Michael Stohl, op. cit., pp. 307-319. Here Sloan
describes how the reaction to revolutionary terrorism in Argentina, Uruguay and Brazil
resulted m extremely repressive measures which invariably neutralized the revolutionary
terrorist threat, but at the cost of destroying virtually all vestiges of democracy in these
nations, at least for a time.
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B. WHAT IS TO BE DONE?
The most important thing a government must do when confronted with
revolutionary' or state sponsored terrorism is to realize that it is facing a militan^ threat
operating as a form of war. Consequently, while diplomacy, economic sanctions, social
reforms and political pressure may play very important roles in resolving the conflict,
the ultimate arbiter of victory, as in traditional forms of war, remains the use offeree.
In war. it is force or the threat of force that will determine who is compelled and who
achieves their political goals. Once the regime realizes that it is facing a military
threat, the next step is for the regime to ascertain the nature of the threat, or as Sun
Tzu admonished, "to know thy enemy." Here it is critical to gain an understanding of
the terrorist's capabilities, weaknesses, methods and above all, objectives. This
knowledge will enable the regime to determine what its own political and military
objectives should be as well as the best military method to adopt in order to neutralize
the terrorist threat.
Objectives by themselves are useless, however, unless the will to achieve them
exists. This is particularly problematical for a democratic regime, especially when it
faces an internal revolutionary' threat. Because democracies operate on the consent of
the governed, the existence of an internal terrorist threat already connotes a serious
problem within a democratic regime. Indeed, Martha Crenshaw suggests that
revolutionary terrorists receive their claim to legitimacy from shortcomings in the
"social contract" between the government and the governed. She has noted,
For example, what legitimacy the Red Brigade posesses (undoubtedly small, but a
quality which is impossible to measure) is surely attributable to the Italian
government's corruption, general inefficiency, and inability to solve persistent
social and economic problems. "^^^
Consequently, a dem.ocratic regime facing a revolutionary terrorist threat is
already suffering from at least some loss of legitimacy and will most likely experience
considerable difficulty in convincing the population that some (or further) democratic
rights must be given up to effectively fight a counterterrorist war. And, without
mobilizing the population, the regime is unlikely to be able to generate sufficient
popular will necessary to support the required military effort to neutralize the terrorist
threat. This can have grave consequences for weak democracies, ultimately resulting in
either an overreaction by the regime, causing it to adopt a totally authoritarian form of
Martha Crenshaw, Terrorism, Legitimacy and Power, op. cit., pp. 32-33.
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government, as occurred in Uruguay, or if the regime is too weak, the success of the
terrorists, as occurred in the Weimar Republic. In certain cases the inabiUty to
mobilize popular support against a revolutionary/' terrorist threat has even resulted in
virtual anarchy such as that which exists in present day Lebanon.
The mobilization of the population is, then, clearly necessary for defeating the
terrorist threat. It requires the democratic regime to convince the population that: 1)
the threat exists, and 2) the ultimate aim of this threat runs counter to the will of the
majority. The regime will therefore have to expend considerable effort to convince the
populace that a military threat exists and that this threat may require the temporary
loss of certain democratic rights and privileges until the threat is neutralized. By the
same token the people must take great care not to permit the regime to go too far.
Only the absolute minimum force necessar\' to neutralize the threat should be
sanctioned and it must be employed in accordance with the popular will. In short, the
process by which the political decisions to employ lethal force are reached must be a
dynamic one balancing the political requirements of protecting not only the regime, but
the democratic principles upon which it rests. What is abundantly clear, however, is
that an effective counterterrorist strategy cannot ignore the necessity of popular
support. Moreover, such a strategy must be based upon general principles agreed to in
advance by the majority of the participants within the democratic process. Once these
general principles are set, the regime can then chose the political objectives it seeks to
achieve in its war against the terrorists.
Basically, a government can choose one of two political objectives: one seeking a
total end, and one seeking more limited ends. A total objective is one in which the
target is to be completely destroyed as a political entity. A limited objective, however,
is one in which the target is to be compelled to surrender or modify a given political
objective, but continues to exist within the political milieu as a functioning political
entity after the war.
The political objective, of course, drives the military objective. It is here that von
Clausewitz comes into play. As stated in Chapter Five, in order to achieve a total
objective the military must accomplish three things: 1) it must destroy the enemy's
armed forces, 2) it must occupy the enemy's territory so that those forces cannot be
reconstituted, and 3) it must destroy the enemy's will to resist. A limited objective,
however, is achieved by making continuation of the struggle too costly for the enemy,
causing him to give up his political aims for which the war is being fought. This,
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according to von Clausewitz, is achieved through the simple expedient of increasing the
enemy's expenditure of effort beyond which he is willing to bear. As will be seen, the
means necessary to defeat revolutionary terrorism requires a total military objective,
whereas state sponsored terrorism can require either.
Once the regime has selected a political and military objective that is either total
or limited, the final step in developing a counterterrorist strategy is to select the proper
method of force employment in order to effect achieve them. Arriving at the proper
militar>' method in counterterrorist warfare is a dynamic process resting upon
immutable principles of war on the one hand, and on the vagaries of the political,
social and military environment in which the confiict is being waged, on the other.
Because these factors vary so widely between revolutionary and state sponsored
terrorism, each will be discussed separately.
1. Countering Revolutionan' Terrorism
While any nation-state can come under attack from a revolutionary^ terrorist
threat, mature democratic regimes are the least likely to be seriously threatened by this
form of terrorism. Because states having democratic processes afford maximum access
to non-violent means of redressing grievances, the existence of disenfranchised elements
within the populace is minimized and revolutionary terrorism remains an attractive
option only to the most extreme elements of the far right or left. In fledgling
democratic regimes, however, in which there is no tradition of democracy and/ or in
which large segments of the population do not yet have access to these democratic
processes, revolutionar}' terrorism can represent a very serious threat.
Regardless of whether it is a mature or a fiedgling democracy, however, the
regime must meet and destroy the terrorist threat, and it must do so by employing its
armed forces in such a manner that it is able to neutralize this threat without
undermining its democratic institutions. This is not to say that there will not be any
curtailment of individual democratic rights during this conflict. Even in traditional
wars, democratic nations have had to place certain restrictions on both the population
and democratic institutions. Some of these include: setting limits on the freedom of the
press, the initiation of rationing, mandatory conscription, and even restriction of
movement for large portions of the population. Still, these measures were temporary*
expedients implemented and retained only for the duration of the war, and great care
was taken to ensure a return of all democratic rights following the end of hostilities.
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Given the nature of an internal, revolutionary threat, however, the regime will
often have to resort to even more stringent curtailments. For instance, Israel ofcen
resorts to army and police "sweeps" through areas suspected of harboring terrorists.
During these sweeps, all men over a certain age are rounded up, identified and
questioned and homes are searched for weapons and other contraband. While
suspected terrorists are detained, the vast majority of those questioned are quickly
returned to their homes. "^^^ In this way, Jerusalem is able to neutralize potential
revolutionary terrorist threats with minimal disturbance to the daily life of the populace
and without having to resort to the use of lethal force. As in ever\' war, however,
lethal force will ultimately be necessary to achieve political goals, and to ensure victory
this force must be employed in accordance with the principles of war and combat.
A nation-state facing revolutionary terrorism must acknowledge that it is
facing an internal enemy waging total war upon the regime. Consequently, the only
proper political objective the regime can adopt is one which seeks the total destruction
of the revolutionary terrorists and their political infrastructure. In order to achieve this
end. the regime's military instrument seeks to achieve the three elements of the von
Clausewitz trilogy just mentioned above, namely: to destroy the revolutionary'
terrorist's armed forces, to occupy their territory and to destroy their will to resist.
What this section seeks to show is how the military can achieve these objectives.
In traditional, classical warfare, a belligerent enjoying absolute superiority in
combat power may elect to wage an offensive war of annihilation in which the normal
sequence of events is 1) the enemy's armed forces are defeated in battle, 2) the enemy's
territory is occupied and 3) the enemy's will to resist is neutralized. Given the nature
of revolutionary terrorism, however, the regime - which almost always enjoys massive
superiority in combat power — cannot quickly crush the revolutionaries in an offensive
war of annihilation. The reason for this apparent contradiction is two-fold. First, the
regime's superior combat strength is greatly mitigated through its dispersal in garrison,
police and administrative duties. Secondly, and more importantly, the small size and
intense security of revolutionary terrorist organizations make them extremely difficult
to locate and neutralize, further reducing the actual utility of the regime's armed forces.
^ For a description of a typical Israeli sweep see the nev/spaper article entitled,
"More Than 60 Arabs Arrested In Israeli Raid on Refugee Camp," (Associated Press)
The Herald (MonlQTcy) June 1, 1987, p. 2. In this reported sweep between 1.500 and
2,000 men over the age of 16 were rounded up and questioned. Sixty o[ these were
retained on suspicion of anti- Israeli activities, while the remainder were quickly
released.
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Moreover, the utility of the regime's combat power can be further mitigated by
operating within the regime's own cities and towns rather than in the less populated
rural areas. However, as Che Guevara learned in Bolivia, even a highly inefilcient
armiy is militarily superior to a fledgling revolutionary movement and by operating in
sparsely populated rural areas not only are the revolutionaries more easy to locate and
isolate than in urban areas, the regime can employ hea\7 tactical weaponry-, including
artillery', fighter-bombers and tanks, without risking large numbers of collateral
casualties among innocent civilians.'^^^ The utility of such weaponry in densely
populated cities, however, is virtually nil. Thus, as Carlos Marighella noted, not only is
the potential for revolutionary mobilization much higher in the rapidly growing and
volatile atmosphere of the urban environment, the revolutionaries are much safer by
operating there.'^
This urban strategy of the revolutionary terrorists, then, drastically erodes
much of the militarv- superiority the regime would normally enjoy due to technological
and administrative skills. And, while the regime generally retains absolute superiority
at the tactical level, from a strategic perspective, neither the regime nor the terrorists
enjoy sufficient usable combat power to enable them to attack and annihilate their
opponents armed forces in a single, short campaign. As was mentioned in Chapter
Eight, the terrorists meet this situation by waging a war of attrition against the regime
wherein it secures victory by eroding the will of the populace to continue to support
the regime's war effort. The regime, on the other hand, continues to wage a total war
of position and annihilation in which it seeks to destroy the terrorist's armed forces in
combat, occupy their "territory" to prevent these forces from being reconstituted, and
finally neutralizing the will of the population to support the revolutionary's war elTort.
Due to the urban terrorist's tactical ability to elude the regime's armed forces, the
regime is often forced to wage a war lasting many months or even years. And, given
that any modern war of long duration requires the mobilization and support of the
populace, the paramount skill required is not technical or administrative, but social.
The key to victory in a classical social war is to undermine and destroy the
socio-political cohesion between the enemy populace and its government, while at the
same time protecting and sustaining this cohesion within your own political structure.
Revolutionary' wars are unique in that both sides seek to gain and; or maintain control
over the same population. Consequently, it is the side that is able to forge and
460 Sloan, op. cit., p. 305.
^^'Mbid.
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maintain the strongest cohesion with the population that emerges victorious. The role
of force in such a conflict is to create a secure environment wherein it is possible to
establish and sustain an effective infrastructure of administration and control over the
population, while at the same time to destroy that of the enemy. As will be seen, the
regime has two, interdependent means of defeating the revolutionan.' terrorist's
endeavors to gain influence and control over the populace: physical isolation and
moral isolation. Once this is achieved, the regime will be in a much better position to
locate the revolutionary' terrorists, occupy their "territorv'", and destroy their armed
forces.
The first step in isolating the terrorists from the population is what John
McCuen has called counter-organization.'^^^ Counter-organization affords the regime
better command, control and protection on the physical plane, and provides a means
to establish stronger psychological bonds and incieased cooperation between the
regime and populace on the moral plane. According to VIcCuen,
The governing authorities must keep in mind that most countries struck by
revolutionary^ warfare have had adequate military forces based upon conventional
requirements for internal security.... Nevertheless, these forces, however superior,
have never in themselves proved to be an adequate defense against the
revolutionaries.... [Rather] ... massive counter-organization is the most effective
strategy to defeat revolutionary organization.... This strategy [includes] such
techniques as effective administration, civic training, counter-organization of the
population, establishment of popular self-defense, implantation of an intelligence
system, organization of a territorial defense, and improvement of mobile
forces.-^^^
These counter-organizing efforts, of course, do not occur in a vacuum. To be
successful, they require the regime not only know and understand the revolutionarv'
terrorist's goals, but what elTect these are having upon the local populace. Clearly the
regime will have different operational strategies when dealing with a population that is
in general opposed to the terrorist's goals and/or methods, as opposed to dealing with
a populace in which the revolutionaries enjoy wide-spread support. For instance, as
the British learned in Vlalaya, when the populace was neutral or hostile towards the
regime, it was often necessary to concentrate on physically isolating that population
"^ John J. McCuen, The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War: A Psycho- Politico-
Military Strategy of Counter- Insurgency (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: Stackpole Books,




from the terrorists before civic action projects could move in to begin tlie moral
isolation of the insurgents. '^^'^ In areas where regime support remained strong, however,
civic projects could begin imm.ediately and as the legitimacy of the regime v/as thereby
further reinforced, the increasing moral isolation of the revolutionaries was translated
into an increasingly hostile physical environment. The end result is that the
revolutionary terrorists are pushed more and more into a defensive posture where they
become increasingly concerned with problems of survival and are less able to
concentrate on offensive operations of their own.*^^-
The objectives necessary- to effect the moral and physical isolation of the
terrorists are clearly interdependent with each influencing the other. For the sake of
clarity, however, we will examine each separately, beginning with physical isolation.
The elements of the strategy suggested by McCuen germane to physically
isolating the terrorists are: civic training, popular self-defense, territorial defense and
the creation of mobile forces. While McCuen profered these as a means to counter
revolutionary warfare which had already reached the guerrilla phase of the
revolutionary mobilization process, they are equally applicable, and perhaps even more
effective in the earlier, terrorist phase. The basic purpose of each of these four
elements is that they establish a physical presence by the regime among the populace
with which the revolutionaries must contend and neutralize before they can establish
their own means of controlling the populace. For instance, the civic training program
suggested by McCuen is necessary in order to provide "...the large number of local
officials required to [maintain]... the necessary 'human contact' with the population. '"^^
This human contact reinforces in the minds of the populace the fact that the regime is
not some abstract entity existing far away and having no responsibilities to the people,
but an active, positive influence in each person's daily life. Although this may appear
to be appropriate only to rural areas far from the central government, it is also critical
within the large cities. The regime's counter-organization must physically reach down
to each city-block, ensuring to the maximum extent possible that "human contact" is
established and sustained with all those living there. In order to ensure maximum
legitimacy, these block organizations should be made up of people elected from and by





The same can be said for establishing local, popular defense units. Whether
these units are rural militia or auxiliary' police patrolling the streets and alleys of a large
city, their purpose again is to establish a viable presence by the regime "^ith which the
revolutionaries must contend and overcome before they can successfully mobilize the
revolution."^ McCuen goes so far as to suggest that local defense is perhaps the most
important element (at least on the physical plane) in the government's counter-
organization strategy. He writes that,
Unless the people themselves have the means and commitment to resist, their
desire for personal security is likely to overpower their loyalty to the goverimient
or neutrality. Even in this early phase of the [revolutionary mobilization
process]... organization of the local auxiliar}' police and militia units should be a
first priority task of the governing authorities. '^^^
The purpose of these local security forces is to create a physical environment
in which any offensive operation by the revolutionary terrorists will cause them heavy
casualties, particularly should they attempt any shock operations such as
assassinations, bank robberies or political kidnapping. Moreover, by increasing the
security of the most critical nodes of command, control, service and other high risk
facilities through the installation of concrete barriers, fences, alarms and other passive
measures, these facilities can be made virtually impervious to any but the most
determined terrorist attacks. Such measures have been undertaken at most airports,
nuclear energy facilities, and military installations even in the most democratic states.
In such a physical environment the terrorists are exposed to potentially prohibitive
losses unless: 1) they attack less well protected targets -- i.e., the general populace -- 2)
they eschew shock actions altogether and employ only less discriminant fire attacks
using bombs and other fire weapons, or 3) they employ only shock actions in which
they prevent themselves from being overwhelmed by the regime's massive tactical
superiority by seizing hostages. Should the terrorist's employ options 1 or 2 they
clearly risk their claim to having any moral superiority over the regime, which
Marighella, Mao and others have insisted is critical to mobilizing the revolution.
^ There is, of course, the danger that the presence of armed militia and/or
auxiliary policemen could cause widespread resentment among a populace used to
living in an open democratic society. And, since the support of the populace is critical
to winning any social war, any loss of regime legitimacy in the eyes of the populace can
clearly spell disaster for the government. This will be addressed in greater detail when
moral isolation of the terrorists is discussed.
"^^^Ibid., p. 107.
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Consequently, operations involving the seizure of hostages obviously remains one of
the few options open to revolutionary terrorists when operating in a high threat
environment.
Hostage-taking is attractive to the terrorists because not only does it
neutralize the superior physical combat power of the regime at the tactical level, it also
places the regime in the moral predicament of having to chose between giving in to the
terrorist's demands and risking the lives of the hostages in an assault. If improperly
executed, an assault on a hijacked aircraft, building or other structure can result in
scores of casualties among the hostages who would have lived had the government
given in to the terrorist's demands. Such heavy casualties, particularly if they are
children, can seriously erode the population's moral support for the regime. It is here
that the highly mobile, specially trained and equipped units of the Special Weapons
Assault Team (SWAT) variety employed by many metropolitan police forces comes
into play. If properly trained and equipped, these forces have a truly impressive
advantage over ad hoc assault forces facing a terrorist-hostage situation. Regular
police or poorly trained SWAT units can spell disaster, however. For instance, in
comparing and contrasting the Philadelphia police assault on the revolutionary group
Move in May 1985 with the SAS assault on the Iranian embassy in London, Gayle
Rivers notes that after firing 10,000 rounds of ammunition, killing six adults and five
children and burning down 61 houses, the Philadelphia police finally terminated all
resistance. A SWAT unit trained to the degree of the SAS or the American Delta
force, notes Rivers,
[...] could have covered the Philadelphia house in forty-five seconds to one
minute. The armed people would have been shot or disabled. The women, if not
armed, and the children would have been moved out. The assault team would
withdraw, leaving the law enforcement people to move people back into the
neighborhood. ...No deaths of innocents. No burning down of sixty-one houses,
leaving 250 people homeless. No city-wide shame. No fiare-up of racial
antagonisms. Just an efiicient - and by SAS or Delta standards - relatively easy
operation.
It is obvious that forces capable of this degree of discriminant force, applied
rapidly and efiiciently, can clearly neutralize almost any terrorist-hostage situation. In
creating such forces, the regime removes the final shock option available to terrorists
operating in a high-threat physical environment. And, as mentioned above, if the
Gayle Rivers, The War Against the Terrorists: How to Win it (New York: Stein
and Day Publishers, 1986) pp. 46-47.
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terrorists are forced to employ the much less discriminant fire attacks, they lose much
of their moral superiority over the regime and severely jeopardize any hopes they have
of mobilizing the revolution.
The regime should, of course, endeavor to foster this lowering of the
revolutionarv''s moral superiority and, in particular, do everything possible to avert
atrocities committed by its own security forces — especially where it concerns the
employment of wanton and indiscriminant force. The regime has two means to achieve
this, both of which should be employed simultaneously. The first is to recruit and
employ security forces from and within the local populace. When a militiaman or
auxiliary policeman is operating in his own neighborhood, he is much less likely to
employ indiscriminant force than when he is patrolling in a strange environment
among people he does not know. Secondly, the regime should insist on maximum
discipline and proper training for its regular armed forces when they are em^ioyed to
counter internal threats. Even then, these regular armed forces should be used only
sparingly and as a last resort. During the terrorist phase of the revolutionary'
mobilization process this militar\- presence is probably best provided by what Grant
Wardlaw has called the Third Force,'^'^ -- which is essentially the SWAT-type of
special ground combat units described above-- since they are most likely to employ
lethal force in a disciplined and highly discriminant manner. Without such precautions,
not only are the democratic institutions of the regime placed in jeopardy, but the
government runs the risk of poorly trained and undisciplined troops committing
atrocity after atrocity; ultimately resulting in the moral bankruptcy of the incumbent
leadership. Indeed, as Wardlaw has observed,
The containment of terrorism should as far as possible be a police matter dealt
with by existing police forces. Each police force should have a unit which is able
to deal with public order situations involving firearms, explosives, and/or
hostage-taking. ..Tn extreme situations with which the police are unable to cope
it should be acceptable to call upon the armed forces. If large numbers of armed
personnel are called out they should have received adequate training in both
civilian security operations and their powers and duties."^
We see, then, that by properly employing the regime's police and armed forces
it is possible to go a long way towards physically isolating both the regime's
mechanisms of command and control as well as the general populace from terrorist
"^^Wardlaw, op. cU., pp. 97-100.
"^^Mbid., p. 100.
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attack. This is not to suggest tiiat every, or even most, terrorist attacks can be
prevented, but rather that the physical environment can be made so costly for the
terrorists that such attacks are few in number and of limited effectiveness. Moreover.
if the terrorists can be compelled to use only indiscriminant forms of force, their claim
to moral superiority over the regime is drastically eroded, particularly if the latter
avoids employing equally indiscriminant methods. Up to this point, however, we have
only addressed counter-organization from a physical perspective. This is clearly not
enough. The population must also be counter-organized on the moral plane as well.
It is to this that we now turn our attention.
From a moral perspective, counter-organizing the rural and urban populations
reinforces their psychological and emotional identification with the regime in areas
where the revolutionaries are not yet operating, and provides an alternative in those
areas already subjected to revolutionary terrorism. The key to this counter-
organization on the moral plane is to estabhsh small, local groups wherein strong
bonds of friendship and loyalty to one another can be translated into loyalty to the
incumbent regime and its ideology, traditions and institutions. Additionally, these
counter-organizations can be instrumental in alleviating much of the discontent
experienced by the population by providing education, health-care, construction
projects, child-care, organized sports, etc. These organizations can also provide a
means by which grievances can be aired and action initiated to correct them."^^^ Indeed,
one of the most effective means to morally isolate the revolutionary terrorists,
according to Conor Cruise O'Brien, is to remove the necessity of violence in order to
achieve political change. It is here that democracies have a decided advantage over
totalitarian regimes. Writing of the American Civil Rights movement of the 1960s
O'Brien notes that.
Southern blacks were the most politically - and otheruise — disadvantaged and
deprived minority that has existed in any democracy in modern times. If their
political disadvantages could be largely removed by democratic process, it is hard
to see any good case for political violence on behalf of minorities less
disadvantaged.'''^^
^^'iVIcCuen, op. cit., p. 98.
•Conor Cruise O'Brien, "Terrorism Under Democratic Conditions," Terrorism,
Legitimacy and Power, Martha Crenshaw, ed., op. cit., p. 95.
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Although systemic and social inequities undoubtedly served as the primary'
causal factors for the formation of the Black Panthers and other black groups seeking
to use lethal force to cause social and political change, the existence of non-violent,
democratic means provided an alternative means which obviously received the support
of the majority of disinfranchised American blacks of the early 1960s. Clearly, by
providing more effective administration coupled with functioning democratic processes
available to all citizens, a regime can undermine the legitimacy of the terrorist's use of
lethal force and morally isolate the revolutionaries from the mass of the populace.
Moral isolation also serves to increase the expenditure of effort on the part of
the revolutionary terrorists, particularly as many people -- even many belonging to the
terrorist's reference group — become willing to provide intelligence information to the
regime and its armed forces. For instance, when the Catholic clergy interceded to stop
the 1981 hunger strikes by Irish Republican Army (IRA) inmates of a British prison (in
which ten IRA members, including Bobby Sands, had starved themselves to death) the
clergy found itself under attack by the IRA leadership which wanted more deaths to
show the barbarity of the British system.'^'''* What actually occurred was to cause a
backlash among Irish Catholics against the \KA. As O'Brien notes.
This... seems to have caused widespread reaction against the IRA among those
who had rallied to its 'humanitarian' cause in the early days of the hunger strikes.
Certainly the Catholic clergy now became more explicit and businesshke in its
opposition to the IR.A.. The Bishop of Derry... told his congregation, after an
IR.A. murder outside his cathedral, that it was their duty to cooperate with the
police in the apprehension of murderers. He thus broke the old taboo against
'informing', an important step.'^'^
This increasing moral isolation of the IRA has recently had dire consequences
for that revolutionary- terrorist organization. According to certain accounts it was
through an informer that Belfast police were alerted to an IRA attack on a police
station an the night of May 8, 1987. The attack was repulsed by the alerted police in
what was described as, "... the bloodiest single blow against the... (IR-A.) in 18




^"Senior IRA Men Lost In Ambush." (Associated Press) The Sunday Herald
(Monterey), May 10, 1987, p. 6A.
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support of the populace can clearly cause the terrorists to operate at a much higher
expenditure ofefTort level.
Such counter-organization can also positively afiect offensive operations
conducted by the regime against the revolutionary terrorists, particularly in situations
in which the terrorists have lost much of their claim to moral superiority over the
regime. Here, the population can be quite helpful in providing information concerning
the location of the terrorist's "territory" -- such as safehouses, training and storage
facilities, and staging areas -- as well as the location of the actual terrorists themselves.
Just as with classical guerrilla operations, once the terrorists lose their ability to move
among a friendly or at least indifferent populace, their security is jeopardized. Once
identified, they are easily overwhelmed by the security forces, and escape and evasion
becomes increasingly difficult as safehouses are occupied by the regime, and arms
caches, printing presses, and other revolutionary paraphernalia are discovered and
destroyed. Finally, most damaging of all, is the arrest or killing of senior cadre
members. These represent the center of gravity for fledgling revolutionary' movements
still operating in the terrorist phase of the revolutionary mobilization process. Two
excellent examples of this occurred in the United States with the ambush of the Black
Panther leaders in Chicago in December 1969 and the attack on the Symbionese
Liberation Army headquarters in Los Angeles in May 1974.'^'^''' In both cases the
"revolution" was terminated by a single lethal act.
Clearly, then, counter-mobilizing the population is the key to defeating
revolutionary terrorism. This is done through positive action which endeavors to
establish and maintain human contact between the regime and the populace, by taking
the necessary steps to protect both the regime command and control infrastructure as
well as the population from terrorist attacks, and by creating a physical environment
which compels the terrorists to use less discriminant forms of lethal force. So long as
the regime uses only the most discriminant force, the moral superiority of the terrorists
begins to wane, and the socio-political cohesion the revolutionaries seek to create
between themselves and the populace becomes impossible. In the end, the isolated and
weak revolutionary terrorist forces are located and easily dispatched by the
ovenvhelming superiority enjoyed by the regime's armed forces.
*'P.N. Grabosky, "The Urban Context of Political Terrorism," The Politics of
Terrorism, edited by Michael Stohl, (New York: Marcel Dekker, Inc., 1979) p. 71.
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2. Countering State Sponsored Terrorism
Unlike revolutionary terrorism which always seeks a total end and is therefore
a form of total war, state sponsored terrorism can be employed for either a total or a
limited end. For instance, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) is sponsored by
many Arab states, and employs force for both limited and total ends. Clearly, the PLO
seeks a total end against Israel, but by the same token seeks only a limited end against
Israel's allies, most notably the United States. Thus, how a state responds to state
sponsored terrorism will depend upon whether or not that state perceives its very
existence to be at stake or whether only a given foreign policy objective is at risk. This
section seeks to identify the range of military options a state may employ in order to
neutralize this form of war called state sponsored terrorism.
In the last section, solutions for dealing with an internal terrorist threat were
presented. These rem.ain applicable here in so far as defeating sponsored terrorists
operating within the state's own territory is concerned. Therefore, the means by which
states defeat sponsored terrorists operating internally will not be addressed in this
section. Rather, the current subject will center on how to defeat state sponsored
terrorism at its roots. That is where it fmds support, training and sanctuarv' by
operating out of another sovereign nation.
To begin with, the nation defending itself against state sponsored terrorism
has in reality two enemies: the actual terrorists and the state which sponsores them.
Yet there is still only one center of gravity; the will of the sponsoring state to continue
to support the terrorists. If the targeted regime can successfully destroy the will of the
sponsoring state to continue to support the terrorists, then the cohesion between the
two is shattered, and the terrorists must find a new sponsor and sanctuary. In this
way, the terrorists are denied territory essential for training, staging and supporting
operations. Ther are, of course, many examples of this technique, but probably best
known is the break between Jordan and the PLO in September 1970. Following two
years of increasingly heav7 Israeli attacks on Jordanian bases and towns suspected of
providing support to the PLO, Jordan had the organization expelled. According to
William V. O'Brien, the rift occurred after "... King Hussein apparently considered
excessive the price his country and regime were paying for giving sanctuary and
support to the PLO's war against Israel.'"*'^
I
^^HviUiam V. O'Brien, op. cii., p. 38.
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What is being proposed, then, is that a nation that is the target of state
sponsored terrorism initiate and conduct a liirdted war against the sponsoring state.
The purpose of the war is to increase the sponsor's expenditure of effort until he is no
longer willing to sponsor the terrorists, and withdraws his support. The force
employed against the sponsoring state should, of course, be commensurate with the
threat. In this regard, Israel - surrounded as it is by states seeking its total destruction
and under attack by terrorist organizations waging total war on the Israeli regime -
will have to use greater force than say, the United States or France, who are secondary
targets against whom the Middle Eastern terrorists are waging a limited war. Even so,
this force must also be employed within the context of social warfare, where
technological and administrative skills remain critical yet secondary to those involving
social skills. Here the emphasis should rest upon taking advantage of any social or
political cleavages which might exist within the sponsoring state so as to employ force
in a manner which exacerbates and widens any existing polarizing factors. In this
manner, the regime of the sponsoring state becomes embroiled in efTorts to put its own
house back in order and may become less sanguine about continuing its support of
terrorist offenses launched by forces trained in its own territor\^
A case in point is the April 14, 1986 attack on terrorist bases in Libya by the
United States. While certainly a step in the right direction, the United States, by
relying exclusively upon technical means, lost an excellent opportunity to rock the
foundations of and possibly even topple the Kaddafi regime. For example, in addition
to the actual bombing attacks, the American aircraft could have dropped thousands of
leaflets over Tripoli and Benghazi explaining to the Libyan people exactly why the
attacks had occurred. The leaflets could have shown a picture of the body of 1 1 year
old Natasha Simpson, (or better, non-American and non-Jewish victims) killed in
Rome by the Abu Nidal terrorist group operating out of Libya. Accompanying this
photo should have been the statement that the United States is not seeking to kill
Libyan civilians or soldiers, but the merely the terrorists the Libyan government is
supporting, and that to prevent any future attacks the Libyan people should appeal to
their government to expel the terrorists immediately. As it was, the attack proved very
successful from a technical perspective. The camps were hit and apparently suffered
heavy damage for the loss of only one of the attacking F-111 fighter-bombers.
Additionally, the psychological effect on Kaddafi of directly attacking his living
quarters was, from the American perspective, quite positive. In the year following the
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attack no known Libyan sponsored terrorist groups have made an attack against L'S
citizen, or property. Consequently, it appears the the US raid on Libya may have
caused the terrorist sword to drop from Kaddafi's "paralyzed hand." But damage to the
socio-political cohesion of the Libyan regime was not as heavy as it could have been
due to the fact that Kaddafi was allowed to interpret the attack for his own people,
and could therefore, more easily convince them that Libya was a victim of American
barbarity rather than the other way around.
Other countries such as Syria, with its Sunni-Shiite religious cleavage or Iran,
with its Arab-Persian ethnic cleavage, have even greater vulnerabilities to their social
cohesion. Moreover, the Soviet Union, which some consider to be the ultimate
sponsor of international terrorism,"^^^ has 22 major national ethnic groups with a
population of over one million, many of whom have openly protested or rioted against
the Soviet government within the last two decades. '^^^ By targeting, or even threatening
to target these cleavages, it may be possible to reduce Soviet support for international
terrorism. This is not to suggest that it is nccessar\' to attack the Soviet Union with
armed forces in the hopes of causing it to lose its socio-political cohesion. Indeed,
such an attack could possibly have the exact opposite effect. Instead, there are other,
more subtle and hence (given the Brodie Paradox) much less dangerous weapons
available in the arrenal of social warfare. One of the most effective is suggested by
Gayle Rivers:
When the Western democracies feel really threatened they are quite capable of
setting up terrific covert intelligence operations.... [Such operations] should now
be applied [in a manner]... that is not passively collecting information but actively
supplying disinformation to Libya, Syria, Iran, and the Soviet Union, specifically
designed to make them distrustful of their internal security and of each other.
...Any network composed of such disparate ethnic groupings can become a
playing field for mischievous 'black' intelligence. ...Nothing is more disorienting
as distrust within one's own ranks. "^^^
What is abundantly clear, however, is that the state sponsoring the terrorism
will continue to do so until forced to make an expenditure of effort which it is
unwilling to sustain. But the force employed against the states sponsoring terrorism
See Claire Sterling, The Terror Network: The Secret War of International
Terrorism (New York: Berkeley Books, 1984) particularly Chapter 16.
'^^^Carol J. Williams, "Separate Cultures, Societies Pose Problems for Kremlin,"
(Associated Press) The Sunday Herald (Monicvcy) May 10, 1987, p. SB.
^^^ Gayle Rivers, op. cit., pp. 243-244.
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must be highly discriminate, ideally hitting only the terrorists and their supporting
infrastructure. Little is gained from directly attacking the civilian population of the
sponsoring state, especially within the context of social warfare. Consequently,
conventional armed forces, particularly long range naval or land artillery', have ver\'
limited utility against terrorists located within a city of a sponsoring state. Airpower
enjoys a somewhat higher utility in that it has the range and accuracy -- under current
conditions -- to hit and destroy specific targets. But even airpower will undoubtedly
cause large numbers of casualties among the local population when attacking terrorists
who have deliberately collocated with "refugee camps. '"^^^ At present the Israeli's, who
are fighting a total war for survival, are willing to accept the necessity of having to
cause collateral damage and casualties among those living near the targets they strike,
considering this not only to be an unavoidable by-product of a counterterrorist
campaign but also a means by which to inflict an unacceptable expenditure of effort on
the sponsoring state."*^^ Still, despite its inaccuracies, airpower provides one of the few
means of hitting point targets in a high threat environment with any measure of
success. There are, however, even better and even more promising means.
The most discriminant use of^ force possible is the use of specialized ground
forces capable of hitting not just general target areas, but of killing or capturing the
terrorists themselves. These forces, such as the Israeli Mossad, German GSG-9, British
SAS and American Delta Force, are generally thought of as quick-reaction teams
capable of neutralizing an on-going terrorist attack. Examples include the Entebbe
raid, or the October 1977 GSG-9 assault on a hijacked airliner in Mogadishu, Somalia.
But these are essentially defensive operations, employing lethal force against the
terrorists only after they have perpetrated an attack. In this way the terrorists are
permitted the luxury of having the initiative, engaging in combat only when and where
they choose. As has been mentioned before in this study, by fighting purely on the
defensive an entity loses any chance it may have for victory, and at best can only
manage to preserve itself Consequently, elite, specialized forces such as SAS and
Delta should also be employed offensively to neutralize not only given terrorist bases
located within a sponsoring state, but specific terrorists as well. There are already
precedents of this type of action having quite promising results. Gayle Rivers alludes
to many of these in his book The War Against The Terrorists, '^^^ and Albert Parn'
'^^^William V. O'Brien, op. cit., p. 36.
4S3ibid.
^^'^Rivers, op. cit., pp. 210-217.
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describes several others. One such ofTensive operation by these specialized ground
troops he describes :n this manner.
On April 10. 1973, in a predawn raid upon Beirut and Saida on the Lebanese
coast, well-armed Israeli commandos, landing from boats, their intelligence scouts
preceding them, penetrated the main guerrilla offices not only in the refugee
camps but in a Beirut residential sector as well. They hit and wrecked the
headquarters of Fatah and of Hawatmah's Popular Democratic Front. In the
heart of Beirut, smashing apartment doors, they shot dead three prominent Fatah
leaders.... As the Israelis reboarded their boats, they carried not only their
wounded with them, but also bags of captured documents. With the help of
these. ..[Israeli] intelligence men made many arrests of secret guerrilla agents
throughout the country. ^^^
Not all of the offensive operations need be this large and risky. Rivers notes
the success of the German GSG-9 in tracking down and capturing individual terrorists
who move throughout Europe. In one case, the GSG-9 tracked three known terrorists
to Bulgaria and in June 1978 sent a small team into that Warsaw Pact nation, captured
the terrorists and successfully returned them to West Germany where they are now in
prison.^^^
The benefits of such small teams conducting offensive operations is clear.
They cause maxmium damage to the terrorists and their infrastructure with minimum
force that functions under extremely tight command and control. This maximizes, to
the greatest possible degree, the probability that lethal force will be applied only
against the designated enemy, and that collateral damage to innocent civilians is
minimized. Additionally, these forces are not only more effective, they are, on the
whole, cheaper than conventional forces. As Rivers has observed,
A raid on terrorist camps in Libya or Lebanon by professionals would be less
destructive of civilian life than retaliatory' bombing raids and less expensive than
using the [US] Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean. The preoccupation of the Sixth
Fleet with terrorism must be viewed by the Soviets with some amusement.'^^
To be totally effective these forces must be self-contained combat units having
command and control over all of the assets necessar>' to successfully execute a specific
mission. According to Charlie Beckwith, the commander of the Iranian hostage rescue
mission, one of the most serious limitations, and the one that ultimately resulted in the
'^^^Albert Parry, op. cii., p. 466.
'^^^Rivers, op. cit., pp. 213-214.
•^^^Ibid., p. 217.
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failure of the mission, was that Delta Force was dependent upon ad hoc airlift assets
composed of aircraft and airciew designed and trained for conventional combat
missions. As Beckwith notes, "The normal Naw crews who trained on the [RHo3
Sikorsky helicopters] had no experience in the type of mission we envisioned [sic]. In
fact, there v/ere no pilots in any of the services who had been trained to fly in the
conditions this mission required. '"^^^ In response to a question from the Senate Armed
Services Committee as to why the Iranian hostage rescue mission was a failure.
Colonel Beckwith's answer summed up the situation perfectly. He stated that,
In Iran we had an ad hoc affair. We went out, found bits and pieces, people and
equipment, brought them together occasionally and then asked them to perform
a highly complex mission. The parts all performed, but they didn't necessarily
perform as a team.... My recommendation is to put together an organization
which contains everv'thing it will ever need, an organization which would include
Delta, the Rangers, Nav>- SEALS, Air Force pilots, its own staff, its own support
people, its own aircraft and helicopters. Make this organization a permanent
military unit.... Allocate sufficient funds to run it. And give it sufficient time to
recruit, assess, and train its people. Otherwise, we are not serious about
combating terrorism.'^^^
The answer to the need for effective counterterrorist combat units is thus one
with which Napoleon would be familiar. That is, to create a self-contained, mission
oriented strategic unit, with its own commander, staff, and made up of all the necessary
combat and combat support personnel and equipment it requires to operate
independently. '^^'^ There is, however, one additional factor to consider, and that is that
state sponsored terrorism is a multi-national problem and therefore requires a multi-
national response to be truly effective.
At present each state is on its own to build, train, equip and employ
counterterrorist forces. Indeed, as William V. O'Brien has observed,
The overriding to be learned from Israel is that a society victimized by terrorism
must recognize that it is in a war, must empower its armed and security forces to
carry out wartime measures - not only against the terrorists where they are to be
found, but against the states and populations that collaborate with them."^^^
^^^Charlie A. Beckwith and Donald Knox, Delta Force (New York: Flarcourt,
Brace, Jovanovich, 1983; Dell Publishing Co., Inc.. 1985) p. 203.
'^^^Ibid., p. 268.
Creveld, Command In War, op. cit., p. 97.
"^^HviUiam V. O'Brien, op. dr., p. 41.
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Such a situation represents only a partial answer to the problem of
counterterrorism, however. Sovereignty is becoming an increasingly troublesome
barrier to the effective response to international terrorism. As Rivers emphasizes, state
sovereignty presents one of the major hinderances to the creation of a centralized chain
of command and control necessary to create a truly effective counterterrorist force
capable of operating internationally.'*'^^ As was noted in Chapter Nine, international
terrorism owes much, if not most, of its success to being able to take advantage of a
cumbersome international milieu made up of pohtical entities which have their own
means and methods of meeting the problem. Simply by crossing an artificial line
known as an international border, terrorists who have committed lethal acts in one
area of jurisdiction, can avoid prosecution or extradition from another. Indeed, during
the 1970s, many countries sought to solve their terrorist problems by deporting
terrorists rather than putting them in prison. Clearly, what is needed is a common
policy consistently executed by all those currently subjected to international, state
sponsored terrorism. In short, it is necessary to create a supranational political entity
having sovereign control over its own counterterrorist forces, yet remaining responsible
to its constituent members.
It is ironic, therefore, that perhaps the ultimate legacy of international, state
sponsored terrorism will be to have served as the catalyst for the first truly
international government project enjoying both the responsibihty and the power to
protect its collective citizenr}'. There is already considerable evidence that human-kind
is moving towards this form of global superstate. Men are already operating as
international citizens in manv wavs, and national allegiances are increasindv being
usurped by psychological bonds to other structures, including international entities.
For instance, many European peoples are. after centuries of waring against each other,
now beginning to realize they have common goals, needs, and relatively similar
cultures. This represents a major step towards the creation of a United European
political entity. Indeed, according to Barry Bu'^an's argument presented in Chapter
Five, at the most basic level of analysis a state is in reality "... more a metaphysical
entity, an idea held in common by a group of people, than it is a physical
organism. '"^'^^ Moreover, this metaphysical entity has, over the past several millennium,
consistently grown until it in some cases, encompasses entire continents. As Gwnne
"^^^ Rivers, op. cit., p. 230.
"^^^Barry Buzan, op. cit., p. 38.
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Dyer has observed,
There is a slow but quite perceptible revolution in human consciousness taking
place: the last of the great redefinitions of humanity. At all times in our history
we have run our affairs on the assumption that there is a special category of
people... whom we regard as full human beings, having rights and duties
approximately equal to our own, and whom we ought not to kill even when we
quarrel. Over the past fifteen or twenty thousand years we have successfully
widened this category' from the original hunting-and-gathering band of a couple
of hundred people to encompass larger and larger groups. First it was the tribe
of some thousands of people bound together by kinship and ritual ties; then the
state, where we recognized our shared interests with millions of people whom we
don't know and will never meet; and now, finally, the entire human race.
These redefinitions, as Dyer notes, occur not out of sentiment, but out of a
necessity of collective security and because it proved to be a useful means of advancing
human-kind's material well-being. '^^^ Clearly, the greatest threat facing mankind is
nuclear holocaust. But, so far, this has remained potential force rather than kinetic. It
is state sponsored terrorism that currently kills and maims people for a political
objective, and it is this form of war which must be met and neutralized. The common
theme running throughout this study, and indeed, the foundation upon which it has
been built, is that the only certain means to neutralize the threat of lethal force is to
meet it with lethal force on both the physical and moral planes in accordance with the
principles of war and combat. Unity of Command demands that a military unit have
but one commander responsible for employing his force to achieve a specific military
objective. Economy of Force demands that ther be no duplication of effort, and that
only the amount of force absolutely necessary to neutralize the threat or achieve the
assigned objective be employed. Mass and Manuever demand that the force be placed
in sufficient quantity and in the right place to overcome all resistance and cause
maximum damage to the enemy's war making capabilities. Security and Surprise
demand that the enemy be robbed of the initiative and forced to react to your attacks
and operations which are carried out in a means and at times he does not expect.
Finally, Simplicity demands that all elements understand their mission and are able to
work in concert with other elements to accomplish their overall plan of operations, free
of bureaucratic encumberances promulgated by political entities having different
political objectives.
'^'^^Guynne Dyer, op. cit., p. 263.
^^^ibid.
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This, of course, represents an ideal; a goal towards which the democratic
nations of the West should work. Although ihe present situation is one in which each
state jealously guards its sovereignty, there are already promising signs that a multi-
national entity having certain powers approaching those of a traditional nation-state is
coming into being. The first step is to establish a collective extradition treaty wherein
all member states agree to extradite captured terrorists to any other member state for
the purposes of trial and punishment. The next step should be a common agreement
between all members of this "superstate" of proper punitive sanctions to be taken
against a state known to be sponsoring terrorism. The last step, of course, is the
creation of a jointly trained and controlled special counterterrorist force that can be
employed offensively against the international terrorist bases located within the
sponsoring states. Th's force can be made up of units from each of the signatory
members of the superstate. The employment of this force on a given mission would
require the consent of all members, with perhaps a means to override a veto by one of
the signatory powers with a two-thirds majority vote. Additionally, this joint
counterterrorist force (JCF) would be on call to assist in neutralizing a terrorist
incident within each member nation. It should be understood, however, that this force
cannot substitute for local defense forces, or other counter-organizing measures. Their
sole purpose in internal actions would be to lend their expertise in dealing with a
specific hijacking or other hostage situation, or perhaps to assault a position held by a
terrorist combat unit - particularly where absolute discriminant force is called for. The
ultimate purpose of the JCF would be offensive; to subject the international terrorists
to total war in which their forces are destroyed, their will to resist is attacked and
undermined, and their territory' denied them. This latter is provided by conducting
limited war upon the sponsoring states with an aim towards increasing their
expenditure of effort beyond which they are willing to sustain.
By creating such a superstate having both the means and will to protect their
collective interests it becomes possible to estabhsh a consistent, coherent
counterterrorist strategy. It denies the terrorists and thier sponsors the strategic
advantage they currently enjoy due to self imposed restrictions by the targeted states
and the overly cumbersome, ad hoc agreements that are quickly made during a specific
terrorist attack or event. Faihng to achieve this "superstate" throws each nation back
upon its own resources, which are greatly mitigated by the existence of man-made
boundaries delineating sovereign states. In such a situation, tactical victories against
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terrorism may be possible, but each state remains essemially on the strategic defensive
in which -- at best -- all that can be hoped for is to preserve the current, unsatisfactory-
and dangerous situation.
C. SUMMATION
This chapter has offered some general prescriptive methods for dealing with and
neutralizing the threat from those types of terrorism which are a form of war. Military
terrorism is essentially a tactic of employment used by forces engaged in a
conventional, classical war. Consequently, no specific means of defeating this form of
terrorism can be addressed except within the context of the larger war itself. Since the
means to defeat an enemy in conventional or classical warfare formed the basis for the
first four chapters of this study, it was deemed not necessary to reiterate these in this
chapter.
Revolutionary' terrorism represents a form of total war in that the revolutionaries
are seeking the total destruction of the targeted regime. Given this, coupled with the
fact that this threat is operating internally, the only proper response by the regime is to
wage total war on the terrorists; destroying their armed forces, occupying their territory
and undermining their will to resist. Because this war is being fought among the
populace and infrastructure of the regime, the regime must employ limited means
involving highly discretionary force. Above all, the populace must be counter-
organized to avoid the physical and moral efforts of the revolutionaries to gain the
allegiance of the population. By counter-organizing the populace the regime creates a
physical environment that is extremely dangerous to terrorist operations. This, in turn,
forces the terrorists to use increasingly indiscriminant forms of force in order to avoid
the heavier casualties germane to the more discriminant shock, operations. This
indescriminant force can result in the moral isolation of the revolutionaries from the
populace, particularly if the regime's armed forces avoid committing atrocities or other
excesses. Once morally and physically isolated from the population, the regime will
have much less difficulty locating the terrorists, destroying their armed forces and
occupying their "territory-".
State sponsored terrorism offers a much more complex problem, however. Here
there are two enemies with which the targeted regime must contend. Despite this,
there is but one center of gravity, and this is the cohesion between the terrorists and
their sponsor. By destroying this cohesion the terrorists are denied territory' essential
for creating, training and employing their combat forces. Interdicting this cohesion is
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accomplished by increasing the sponsoring state's expenditure of effort until it is
beyond that which it will continue to bear. At the same time, the regime must also
take the war to the terrorists themselves by launching direct attacks upon the terrorist's
bases and infrastructure - even if it is located in a sponsoring state. Because the
regime conducting such operations does not want to alienate the population of the
sponsoring state, the force employed in such counterterrorist operations should be
highly discriminant - ideally eliminating (physically, or in terms of their will to fight)
only the terrorists and their immediate supporters. Indeed, within the context of social
warfare, everv' effort should be made to cause the population of the sponsoring state to
rebel against its government and demand the removal of the terrorists. Given the
lethality of modem conventional weapons and their relative inaccuracy, the ideal
counterterrorist weapon to employ in a sponsoring state is not conventional armed
forces, but light, highly speciauz.ed forces capable of closing with a specific target,
employing lethal force only against the terrorists and their immediate supporters, and
returning, when possible with prisoners and intelligence material. Ideally, this would
be a multi-national force having the authority to operate within any of the nations
belonging to some form of supernational government. In lieu of this, states suffering
international terrorist attacks should cooperate as much as possible, sharing
intelligence and permitting extradition of those terrorists who are captured.
Failure to have a common approach against international, state sponsored
terrorism means having weaknesses which the terrorists can capitalize upon. Only by
treating state sponsored terrorism as a form of war can consistently correct responses
be achieved. Certainly a strong alliance of democratic nations, having the necessary'
resources and resolve to neutralize the threat from these minute proxy forces, can do
so without endangering the democratic institutions these nations cherish. The necessity
for collective security is there. The question is, will the Western democratic nations be
able to set aside petty differences long enough to meet this threat? This is the ultimate
challenge of the modern democracies. Failure to meet this challenge means victory for
terrorism and those who employ it.
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XI. CONCLUSION
This study has sought to establish that certain forms of terrorism are a form of
warfare. In order to determine this, it was necessary to establish a clear understanding
of precisely what constituted the phenomenon called war, and from this understanding
examine the phenomenon called terrorism. In order to avoid a shallow tautology,
hov/ever, more than just a simple definition of war was necessary. "War" had to be
isolated in not only its purpose but also how \i functioned. Once these special activities
were isolated and clearly understood, it was then possible to construct a paradigm
sufficient to test the various froms of terrorism. Consequently, this study is divided
into two basic parts, the first dealing with war and the second aimed at defining and
testing terrorism in its various manifestations in order to determine if it or any of its
sub-types qualify as a form of war.
Coming to grips with the phenomenon called war was, in many respects, the
most dilTicult aspect of this study. As was seen in Chapter Two, there are four major
approaches to the study of war, each of which provide insight into how man views the
phenomenon, but each having weaknesses in terms of providing a total understanding
of all aspects of war. The primar}^ approach chosen in the current study was the
technological approach. This approach was chosen over the others because it is the
least subjective and provides insight not only into why warfare exists, but how it
functions.
According to the technological approach, the purpose of warfare is to compel
other actors to do one's will through the application of physical force. Physical force is
chosen and used because it has utility in compelling others and because there is no
higher (earthly) authority than a decision made by force. Consequently, the first test
this study uses to determine whether a type of terrorism qualifies as a form of war is
that it involve lethal force employed by one organized political entity against another
political entity for the purpose of compelling it to meet certain political ends.
In the third chapter we were introduced to a much closer examination of the
phenomenon of force. In this chapter we saw that force and power were not
equivalent concepts but that power was in reality a product of force which functioned
on both the physical as well as the psychological or moral plane. Of these two
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manifestations of force, we saw that it is clearly the operation of force on the moral
plane which results in the greatest realization of power. Indeed, nearly every classical
military' thinker analyzed in this study contended that moral force is by far the most
important determinant of victory, both on the battlefield and in the war in general. As
a consequence, military organizations the world over have spent considerable time and
energy in efforts designed to maximize the ability of their own forces to withstand the
threat of force on the psychological or moral plane. This is measured in terms of unit
cohesion, the loss of which invariably means certain defeat for that unit. Due to the
decisive nature of force operating on this plane, military organizations have also sought
means to maximize the moral influence of their own forces, seeking not to physically
compel ever>^ enemy combatant, but rather to do so psychologically. Thus, the second
test of this study's paradigm is to determine whether the entities employing lethal force
have taken special steps to maintain their own cohesion and at the same time have
made a special effort to specifically target the cohesion of the enemy's forces.
In Chapter Four we saw how force functioned on the physical plane. It is here
that the immutable principles of war come into play. Clearly, the most critical element
involves the employment of force against force in physical combat. This von
Clausewitz referred to as the Principle of Engagement, which essentially expresses the
idea that warfare entails the reciprocal use of force by both political entities involved.
Thus, if a form of terrorism involves the employment of force only by the terrorists,
then it is nor a form of war. This is not to suggest that the reciprocal use of force must
be simultaneous, only that both political entities involved are employing lethal force
against each other in order to compel one another for political ends. Moreover, when
this force is employed, it must meet the principles of combat. These define how
physical force can overcome physical force in an engagement. Again, if it can be
shown that a form of terrorism need not comply A^ith these principles and can still
consistently emerge victorious, then this form of terrorism does not involve the
Principle of Engagement and is not a form of war.
Chapters Two, Three, and Four thus provide the basic paradigm by which
dilTerent types of terrorism are tested to ascertain whether or not they qualify as a form
of war. This paradigm consists of three basic questions: 1) does this activity involve
lethal force by a political entity for a political end, 2) does this activity involve the
employment of lethal force against the cohesion ol^ the targeted political entity, and 3)
does this activity involve the reciprocal use of lethal force by both sides employed in
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accordance with the principles of combat? These three questions provide answers not
only to the question why is this force being employed, but how is it used, and thereby
affords a method of testing that is sufficiently complex that it validates the presence of
the phenomenon of war on more than one simple, and possibly arbitrary measurement.
Clearly, however, even if it is based upon the same immutable principles and
laws, warfare has many differences as well. In Chapter Five it was determined that
there are many types of war which devolve from differences in: 1) the objectives sought
in the war and 2) the methods used to attain these objectives. Here we saw that
warfare could be waged for two basic political objectives: total and limited. Moreover,
war could be waged in accordance with two general military objectives: annihilation or
attrition, and in accordance with two general military methods: positional or evasive.
Using these three general groupings it is possible to come up with eight combinations
of types of war ranging from a total, positional war of annihilation to a limited, evasive
war o[ attrition. Moreover, the type of war that a belligerent employs rests upon not
only what he wishes to accomplish, but the size and capability of his forces in relation
to those of his enemy. Understanding the dynamic interaction of these six elements
makes it possible to understand how different types of terrorism can employ force
based upon the same immutable principles as classical forms of warfare in a totally
unique manner. In this way, it becomes possible to analyze critical differences between
repression terrorism, revolutionary terrorism and state sponsored terrorism.
In addition to these different types of war. Chapter Five also introduces the idea
that the way warfare functions cannot be separated from its environment. Over time,
new technologies and organizational structures have changed the factors influencing
the shape and nature of warfare, and it is here that the analysis of the evolution of
warfare comes into play.
According to Chapter Five, warfare evolves as part of a dialectical process
wherein what exists at any given moment in time represents a synthesis of a previous
thesis and a later antithesis. In analyzing this evolution we saw that the Modern
Epoch contained five major evolutionary' phases, each of which was governed by a
specific paramount warskill. The importance of this paramount skill is that the side
capable of fielding the largest force capable of fighting at a given era's paramount skill
level would invariably emerge victorious -- providing they were able to sustain that
advantage. What is critical to the present study is that the current, or nuclear era, is
governed by social warfare, wherein the decisive factor is the ability to employ social
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skills. That is, the ability to employ force in a manner so as to destroy the socio-
political cohesion between the enemy's population and its government, while at the
same time protecting your own. Given the dangers of direct confrontation between the
armed forces of nuclear equipped powers -- the so-called Brodie Paradox — the most
stable and efficient means of waging warfare in the nuclear era is by sponsoring social
forces within the enemy's camp to undermine and weaken the enemy's government and
power base. Perhaps the most efficient and effective means to bring this about is to
sponsor the employment of terroristic methods to mobilize a revolution against the
enemy's regime.
In Chapter Six we were introduced to terrorism per se. Here, terrorism was
defined as a deliberate attempt to create terror through a symbolic act involving the
use or threat of abnormal lethal force for the purpose of influencing a target group or
individual. Armed with this definition we then examined huw terrorism functioned. As
was quickly seen, terrorism is not linked to any specific ideology or method of
government, but simply represents a specific method of force employment. This can
occur in two ways: triadic or quadratic. In triadic terrorism abnormal lethal force is
employed against a symbolic victim in order to terrorize and influence the behavior of
all who identify with the victim. In quadratic terrorism, the influenced group is
separate from the terrorized group. Either way, however, terrorism represents an
extremely efficient use of force. This is what makes it the favorite method of force
employment of the very weak. Given the definition and understanding of the role of
force in the terrorist process, it becomes possible to identify the types of terrorism
which might qualify as a form of war. Here, three major groupings were found:
apolitical terrorism, revolutionary' terrorism and state terrorism. Within two of these
groups, several sub-types of terrorism were found to exist, and each of these were
tested based upon the paradigm constructed in the first part of this study.
The three sub-types of terrorism found in apolitical terrorism are: psychotic,
criminal and mystical terrorism. As was noted in Chapter Six, the lack of a political
purpose alone would seem suflicient to disqualify these forms of terrorism as a form of
war, but there are many who suggest that psychotic or criminal terrorists are in fact
unwitting political terrorists who are subconsciously reacting to their socio-political
environment, and that mystical terrorists seek to maintain a political environment in
which they can continue to practice their deadly rites. Thus, they can be construed to
have a political purpose.
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Upon examining each of these forms of terrorism, however, it was found that
none qualified as a form of war. Psychotic terrorism failed to qualify due to the fact
that the terrorists employ this form of lethal force primarily to satiate their own
psychological needs and that those who identify with the symbolic victim were unable
to determine how they should modify their behavior in order to avoid future violence.
In a similar vein, criminal terrorism failed to qualify as a form of war because the
terrorists again employ force simply to satiate personal needs and any impact upon the
political milieu was essentially incidental and unintended. Although mystical terrorism
seeks to maintain a given political environment wherein the terrorists may continue to
perform their lethal religious activities, this form of terrorism, too, fails to qualify as a
form of war. It fails for two reasons. First, the lethal force being employed is clearly
an end in itself There is absolutely no way in which the target of terror can modify
their behavior to avoid future terrorism. Secondly, this form of terrorism clearly
violates the Principle of Engagement in that the employment of force is unilateral.
Thus, there is no clash of arms and therefore no need for the principles of combat.
Consequently, mystical terrorism, like criminal and psychotic terrorism, is not a form
of war.
Revolutionary terrorism is the one major form of terrorism having no sub-types.
Moreover, it very clearly is a form of warfare. It involves lethal force for a political
process: to topple the incumbent regime. It also represents the employment of lethal
force on both the physical and moral planes. Its utilization of force on the moral
plane can be easily seen in the role of revolutionary terrorism within the revolutionary
mobilization process. Here we see that the force employed has utility in both
mobilizing the populace and undermining the ability and the will of the regime to
resist. On the physical plane, revolutionary terrorism employs force in accordance with
both the Principle of Engagement and the seven principles of combat. For instance, by
adhering to these principles, the Lebanese terrorists were able to launch the
spectacularly efTective attack on the Marine barracks in Beirut in 1983. By the same
token, as the Tupamaro and Argentinian ERP examples described in Chapter Eight
above clearly underscore, failure to adhere to these principles has proven time and
again to be disastrous for revolutionary terrorist organizations. Clearly, then,
revolutionary terrorism qualifies as a form of war.
State terrorism consists of three sub-types: repression terrorism, military
terrorism and state sponsored terrorism. Of these only repression terrorism fails to
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qualify as a form of war. While repression terrorism clearly represents the use of lethal
force by a political entity for a political purpose, it fails to meet the Principle of
Engagement. The populace being subjected to the lethal force perpetrated by the
regime has no means to resist, has no political structure and has no territor>'.
Moreover, they cannot truly be considered the "enemy" by the regime since the
population actually function as an element of the regime's own power structure.
Therefore, to take the "war" to its ultimate conclusion and destroy the populace
represents a logical absurdity and cannot be done. Repression terrorism therefore does
not qualify as a form of war.
Military terrorism, on the other hand, very clearly qualifies as a form of war. It
represents the employment of terroristic force against the population of an enemy
regime for the purpose of shattering their will to support their government and its war
effort. Thus, it clearly represents the employment offeree on the moral plane. It also
quite clearly involves the use of force on the physical plane in accordance with the
principles of war and combat, since military terrorism is employed by a nation's
military instrument against a political entity that can both defend itself and can reply
in kind. Finally, of course, it represents the use offeree for a political objective. What
should go without saying, however, is that military terrorism, particularly when applied
through air bombardment, has never yet proven effective. Even the Japanese, who
suffered tremendous civilian casualties from air bombardment, never lost their will to
continue the war, and it was only the unprecedented intercession of the Emperor that
terminated the war.
State sponsored terrorism also qualifies as a form of war. In this form of
terrorism, the government of a sovereign nation-state provides overt or covert support
to terrorist organizations which operate within the enemy's camp for the purpose of
undermining a specific targeted entity, usually the regime of another nation-state. This
form of terrorism is actually no more than a sub-type of social warfare, wherein one
state targets the socio-political cohesion of a second state for the purpose of weakening
It so that it will divert its resources into defensive measures and/or to make it more
vulnerable to an offensive attack. This clearly represents the use of force for a political
objective. Moreover, given that they are attacking the socio-political cohesion of the
targeted entity, this means of force employment also represents the use of force on the
moral plane. It is in the concept of the Principle of Engagement that state sponsored
terrorism may not appear to qualify as a form of war. This question arises due to the
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fact that the terrorists a given state sponsors are not subject to the sponsoring state's
absolute authority. Consequently, we have to ask. if sponsoring a terrorist organization
" which has the authority to choose its own targets and means of attack — represents
the employment of lethal force by the sponsoring entity against the target? Here again,
if viewed from the perspective of social warfare, the answer has to be that, indeed, a
clash of arms between two political entities does occur. Thus, state sponsored
terrorism is a form of war.
Of the seven forms of terrorism tested, three qualified as a form of war. These
are revolutionary terrorism, military terrorism and state sponsored terrorism. The
significance of these findings is obvious. In order to neutralize these forms of terrorism
they must be treated as a form of war, and only by waging warfare upon them in
accordance with the principles of war and combat is it possible to defeat this threat.
Of course, given that military terrorism represents a military tactic within the context
of a larger war, it is not possible to talk about waging war against this form of
terrorism per se. Rather, it is defeated in conjunction with defeating the enemy's
conventional armed forces. Revolutionary and state sponsored terrorism, however,
represent individual categories of warfare types, and can exist independently from
other, larger forms of war. Consequently, engaging and defeating these can be
achieved and require a specific mode offeree employment to do so.
Defeating revolutionary terrorism poses particularly difiicult problems in that the
regime is waging warfare against an enemy which is operating in and among its own
population. Consequently, the chances of causing casualties among innocent civilians
is very high unless only the absolute minimum of force is employed in a highly
discriminant fashion. Defeating the revolutionary' terrorists involves employing force in
essentially the same basic manner as in conventional, classical warfare. Since the
revolutionary terrorists are waging a total war against the regime and are an internal
threat, the regime must wage total war against the revolutionaries. This means it is
essential that the revolutionary terrorist's armed forces are destroyed, their "territory" is
occupied, and their will to resist is neutralized. As was shown in Chapter Ten this is
achieved by creating a physical and moral environment which forces the terrorists to
operate at an expenditure of effort level well above that which they can sustain. By
creating a physical environment wherein the most critical nodes of the regime's
command and control infrastructure are "fortified" along with the establishment of
local means of resistance capable of being rapidly reinforced by highly mobile,
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extremely disciplined and well-trained special forces, the terrorists will be forced to risk
large numbers of casualties in shock operations, or else employ less discriminant fire
attacks, wherein the revolutionaries are placed in the position of causing casualties
among the innocent. This, in turn, can lead to the revolutionaries losing any moral
support they may have had among the populace. This loss of moral support can be
reinforced by counter- organizing the population to ensure that psychological bonds
form between the people and the regime. This can pay dividends in the form of
intelligence information concerning where the terrorist's "territory" is located or even
who the terrorists are. In that way the regime is able to identify and neutralize the
enemy by direct action.
In combating state sponsored terrorism, the targeted regime has two enemies: the
terrorists and their sponsors. While the targeted regime will usually have to wage total
war against the terrorists, it will normally wage only limited war against the sponsor.
The purpose of the targeted regime's attacks on the sponsoring state are to increase its
expenditure of efTort beyond which it is unwilling to bear, thereby having it withdraw
its support for the terrorists. Indeed, it is this cohesion between the sponsoring state
and the terrorists which represents the center of gravity. One this cohesion fails, the
targeted regime can dispatch the internal terrorist threat in a manner suggested in the
previous paragraph. What is abundantly clear is that any attack by the targeted
regime upon the terrorist sponsor should be in the context of social war seeking to
capitalize upon the internal cleavages existing within the sponsoring state. This is
particularly necessary in instances in which the sponsor has nuclear-equipped armed
forces. In this way, the targeted entity can cause the maximum expenditure of effort
for the sponsoring state with the minimum possible force. Moreover, just as with an
internal threat, every effort should be made not to kill innocent civilians, but to the
greatest degree possible, kill or capture only terrorists.
This requires highly specialized forces capable of long-ranged ingress and egress
with sufficient force to be able to neutralize any threat encountered. Airpower
represents one such weapon, although its inherent inaccuracies make it less appropriate
to this form of warfare. Ideally, such a force would be a highly reliable ground force
equipped, trained and having the authority to perform hit and run attacks directly
upon terrorist bases located in the sponsoring nation. Examples of these operations
were described in Chapter Ten. Only by employing force in such a manner is it
possible to neutralize the state sponsored terrorist threat.
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In conclusion, then, certain types of terrorism are a form of war, meeting the
same criteria and functioning in the same manner as traditional or classical forms of
war. These forms of warfare exist as the latest evolutionary- step in the evolution of
warfare, one in which social skills are paramount. Technical, administrative,
organizational and pliysical skills all remain extremely important to securing victory,
but without the social skills to back them up, at best all the targeted entity can do is
delay the inevitable. Given that these terrorist threats qualifying as a form of war must
function and operate in accordance with immutable laws and principles, however, the
formulas for defeating these threats are neither remarkable nor complex. Military men
throughout the world should be able to accept the validity of both the principles and
the formulas which have been offered in this study to defeat those forms of terrorism
qualifying as a form of war. What remains to be seen is whether the democratic
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